MARRIAGE, TOTEMISM AND RELIGION

AN ANSWER TO CRITICS

BY

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MARRIAGE, TOTEMISM, AND RELIGION

AN ANSWER TO CRITICS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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PREFACE

RATHER more than fifty years ago I had the advantage of examining the river gravels of the Somme with Sir John Evans, Sir Joseph Prestwich, and Mr. Busk, and we convinced ourselves that the flint implements discovered and described by M. Boucher de Perthes were really of human workmanship.

Shortly afterwards I visited the Danish Shell Mounds, the Swiss Lake Dwellings, and the caves of the Dordogne, and described them in a series of articles in the *Natural History Review*, subsequently collecting and expanding them in my work on *Prehistoric Times* (1865) and comparing the modes of life they indicated with those of existing savages.

A few years later—in 1868—I delivered a course of lectures at the Royal Institution on "The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man," which were published by Messrs. Longmans.

I endeavoured to show that the institutions of man develop with considerable uniformity all over the globe, although as races advance they naturally diverge more or less under the influence of different climate, food, and other conditions — that, to use Tylor's words,[1] "They succeed each other in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seems the comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar human nature acting through successively changed conditions in savage, barbaric, and civilised life." Of course, however, this must not be pushed too far; the resemblances relate to general principles and fundamental customs, but not to matters of detail.

During the last fifty years our sources of information have greatly increased. The habits of lower races, the customs and superstitions of those somewhat more advanced, have been studied and recorded with more care and under trained appreciation, as, for instance, by Messrs. Howitt and Fison, Spencer and Gillen; and have been discussed and

[1] E. Tylor, *Journ. Anthropol. Institute*, xviii., 1889, p. 269.

studied with great ability by Tylor, Lang, Robertson Smith, and others—to name a few among our own countrymen—by Fustel de Coulanges, Durckheim, Girard Teulon, Reinack, Westermarck, Wilken, and other foreign ethnologists.

In the main it seems to me that the conclusions which I ventured to put forward have received additional support from the evidence which has since accumulated.

They have not, however, escaped criticism, though they have incurred few of which I can, or desire to, make any complaint. The time, however, has perhaps come when I may attempt a general reply, and defend, or at any rate attempt to defend, my position.

I do not propose to repeat the facts on which I based my conclusions, but merely to reply to the arguments brought forward against them, and in some cases to bring forward fresh evidence.

If any excuse is required, I will shelter myself under the broad ægis of Mr. Lang, who was kind enough to say of my book that—

"First published in 1870, this was a pioneer

work of great value and importance. Perhaps the vast amount of new information and of new speculation which has accrued since 1870 might almost make us wish that Lord Avebury had found time to re-write his early book."[1]

[1] Andrew Lang, *Social Origins and Primal Law*, p. 122.

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MARRIAGE, TOTEMISM AND RELIGION

CHAPTER I

ON THE ABSENCE OF MARRIAGE AMONGST THE LOWEST RACES OF MAN

In spite of the profound study which has been devoted by many learned and able philosophers to the Origin and Evolution of Civilisation, there are still great differences of opinion on the subject. Some indeed of them, though by no means all, are due to the same terms—as, for instance, "marriage," "religion," &c.—being used in different senses.

The word "religion" is, for instance, often used to include magic and witchcraft.

Dr. Westermarck, again, in his important work, *The History of Human Marriage*, considers that marriage is, and always has been, common to the whole human race. But

then he defines it as "nothing else than a more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring."[1] The first traces of marriage, he tells us, "are found among the chelonia (reptiles)." He might have gone further and included insects (white ants, &c.).

Long ago Kant[2] also defined marriage as "Die Verbinding zweyer Personen veschiedenen Geschlechts zum lebens-wierigen wechselseitigen Besitz ihrer Geschlechts eigenschaften." Here the introduction of the word "lifelong" carries the matter considerably beyond Westermarck's definition, but does not introduce the recognition of a right, or of a duty on the part of the community.

On the other hand, the sense in which other writers, and I myself, have used the term, is that of an exclusive relation of one or more men to one or more women, based on custom, recognised and supported by public opinion, and, where law exists, by law.

[1] *The History of Human Marriage*, p. 19.
[2] *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, vol. i. p. 107.

My position was that no such institution existed amongst our primitive ancestors, and that they lived in a state of what, for want of a better term, I proposed to call "communal marriage." This has been admitted by some high authorities, but questioned by others, who do not seem, however, to be always consistent, and while denying it in some passages, appear to admit it in others.

Take, for instance, even M'Lennan. He devotes a chapter in his *Studies in Ancient History* to the discussion of Communal Marriage, and after examining the evidence brought forward in my first edition, he dismisses it somewhat contemptuously, saying :[1] "I have now examined, in both of its branches, the evidence of ancient communism ('communal rights') over women, on which Sir John Lubbock founds his speculation, and I submit that it has been proved to be of no value." Yet in the very same volume he commits himself to the opinion that there was a time when there was nothing that could be called marriage in his or our

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 443.

sense. We can trace, he says, "the line of human progress far back towards brutishness, finding, as we go back, the noble faculties peculiar to man weaker and weaker in their manifestations, producing less and less effect—at last scarcely any effect at all—upon his position and habits. As we go back, we find more and more in men the traits of gregarious animals, slighter and slighter indications of operative intellect. . . . As among other gregarious animals, the unions of the sexes were probably in the earliest times loose, transitory, and in some degree promiscuous."[1] And a few pages further on he says: "We may, however, recall the fact that tradition is found everywhere pointing to a time when marriage was unknown, and to some legislator to whom it owed its institution: among the Egyptians to Menes; the Chinese to Fohi; the Greeks to Cecrops; the Hindus to Svetaketu. And we shall proceed to show how much evidence remains to give verisimilitude to these traditions."[2]

[1] *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 130. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 140.

His final view may be considered to be that contained in his posthumous papers, published by Mrs. M'Lennan and Mr. Arthur Platt. In them he says:[1] "In the very earliest state of things it may be presumed that simple promiscuity prevailed between the sexes. Marriage was at first unknown." And again:[2] "My hypothesis, so far as concerns the present purpose, is in outline as follows: The primitive groups were, or were by their members, when consanguinity was first thought of, assumed to be all of one stock. *Marriage was at first unknown.*"

Thus, then, while in his earlier work M'Lennan felt justified in entirely denying my suggestion as to communal marriage, and even pouring scorn upon it, further consideration forced him to the conclusion that I was right after all. If he had lived, I feel sure that he would have withdrawn his criticism, and I can fairly claim his support—doubly valuable, firstly, from his high authority; and secondly, because he was a convert.

[1] *Studies in Ancient History*, second series, p. 49.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 1.

Professor Westermarck of course maintains that marriage existed amongst the earliest of mankind—marriage, that is, in his sense of the word. But I gather that he would say the same even using the term in its more usual and, as I cannot but think, more correct sense. Yet he quotes many cases which seem to me fatal to his view. "There can be no doubt," he says, "that our primeval human ancestors had to combat for their brides." Yes; but that is not the point. They had also to combat for the possession of the wife at any time. I may give one or two cases in illustration from others quoted by him. Speaking of the Northern American Indians, Hearne states that "it has ever been the custom among those people for the men to wrestle for any woman to whom they are attached, and, of course, the strongest party always carries off the prize. A weak man, unless he be a good hunter and well beloved, is seldom permitted to keep a wife that a stronger man thinks worth his notice. . . . This custom prevails throughout all their tribes, and causes a great spirit of emulation

among their youth, who are upon all occasions, from their childhood, trying their strength and skill in wrestling."[1] Richardson[2] also saw more than once a stronger man assert his right to take the wife of a weaker countryman. "Any one," he says, "may challenge another to wrestle, and, if he overcomes, may carry off his wife as the prize. . . . The bereaved husband meets his loss with the resignation which custom prescribes in such a case, and seeks his revenge by taking the wife of another man weaker than himself." With reference to the slave Indians, Mr. Hooper says: "If a man desire to despoil his neighbour of his wife, a trial of strength of a curious nature ensues: they seize each other by the hair, which is worn long and flowing, and thus strive for the mastery until one or another cries *peccavi*."

Letourneau[3] also denies the existence of communal marriage. He again does not, however, appear to me to be consistent. He calls his book *The Evolution of Marriage*.

[1] Hearne, *loc. cit.*, p. 104. [2] *Boat Journey*, ii. p. 43.
[3] *The Evolution of Marriage*.

Surely this implies a time when marriage had not been evolved? Moreover, after quoting many cases of marriage by capture, he says[1] that "to be able to see in these customs anything resembling marriage, one must be a prey to a fixed idea—a positive matrimonial monomania. There is here no marriage by capture, but rather slavery by capture." In early times again, he says, "men were almost devoid of moral training, and the care for decency and modesty was of the slightest." In another passage he adopts the view that "it is doubtless thus, after the manner of the great monkeys, that primitive human societies have been formed," and thus, he says, "marriage, or rather sexual union," originated.

Stärcke[2] also questions the existence of communal marriage. His opinion is no doubt entitled to weight, but cannot be put against the evidence. Moreover, he himself says[3] of primitive savages that "there is no individual fatherhood, all have only one father—the tyrant

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 91.
[2] *The Primitive Family*, pp. 242, 255–56.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 245.

whose sons and daughters they all are, and to whom all the property belongs. From this condition, in which the man rules by means of his rude sexual power, we rise to that of gynocracy, in which there is the dawn of marriage, of which the strict law is at first observed by the woman, not by the man." Here he seems practically to admit what he had previously denied.

In this connection I think I have some reason to complain. I had quoted the great authority of Latham, who, speaking of the Nairs, says:[1] "No Nair son knows his own father; and, *vice versa*, no Nair father knows his own son. What becomes of the property of the husband? 'It descends to the children of his sister.' Among the Limboos (India), a tribe near Darjeeling, the boys become the property of the father on his paying the mother a small sum of money, when the child is named, and enters his father's tribe; girls remain with the mother, and belong to her tribe."

Referring to this passage, Professor Stärcke,

[1] *Descriptive Ethnology*, vol. ii. p. 463.

in his *Primitive Family*, says (page 85): "Lubbock's[1] account of the Limboos will serve as an example of the inaccurate way in which these kinds of customs have sometimes been described. Limboo sons belong to their fathers if a small sum of money has been paid to the mother; the child then receives a name, and is admitted into his father's tribe, while the daughters abide with their mother. In this custom Lubbock traces a survival of an extinct female line of descent. It is hardly necessary to say that we should rather trace in such a custom the dawning of a female line; but the custom itself has no existence. Campbell, to whom Lubbock refers, only states that the Limboo bride is purchased, and, if such a stipulation has been previously made, is taken to her husband's home. Labour is often substituted for the purchase money."

Professor Stärcke, in a note to this passage, admits that he has not taken the trouble to look up the passage which I quote. He says: "Lubbock quotes Campbell, *Trans. Ethno. Soc.*, new series, vol. vii., which I have had

[1] *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 161.

no opportunity of consulting; but I think the same reference may be found in *Journ. Asiat. Soc. of Bengal.*" It is indeed singular that Professor Stärcke should hold me up as a melancholy example of inaccuracy in quotation, without having taken the trouble to look up my reference, and that he should then accuse *me* of carelessness! However, this is an exceptional case. He is generally courteous, and I will therefore only assure him that his guess is quite wrong. If he had taken the trouble to look to the reference I gave, he would have found my quotation to be correct, and his attack on me quite uncalled for.

Mr. Lang also doubts the existence of communal, or, as he prefers to call it, "group-marriage." He says:[1] "Lord Avebury assumes, as a working hypothesis, that 'the communal marriage system . . . represents the primitive and earliest social conditions of man . . .' The objections to this hypothesis we have stated, though, of course, historic certainty cannot be attained."

In the same work he tells us, as an

[1] *Social Origins*, p. 124.

argument against my suggestion, "that if we have complete and conclusive evidence that in large portions of Australia every man had the privilege of a husband over every woman not belonging to his own gens . . . I fail to see that a man gained anything by enduring the trouble and risk of capturing a bride all to himself." This objection surprises me; I should have thought a man gained a great deal. At any rate the Australians certainly thought, and think, so.

In the next page, moreover, I am glad to see that Mr. Lang appears to go a good way with me. "It is easy to see," he says,[1] "how small groups of the same hearth become exogamous, namely, through sexual jealousy, which would oblige the young males to wander away, or to get wives by capture, practices resulting under the tabu, in the sacred rule of exogamy." The Urabunna of Central Australia on the other hand, he continues, "have no such individual wives, if we accept the statement of Messrs. Spencer and Gillen (who are, he will admit, two of our very safest authori-

[1] *Social Origins*, p. 126.

ties). But the Arunta have such individual wives. Hence it seems necessary for Lord Avebury to prove that the Arunta do demonstrably acquire their individual wives by capture."

That this is true of many Australian tribes is certainly the case. Describing the habits of the Kurnai, Messrs. Fison and Howitt say:[1] "How does he acquire his wife? The young Kurnai could, as a rule, acquire a wife in one way only. He must run away with her. . . . It is no use his asking for a wife excepting under the most exceptional circumstances, for he could only acquire one in the usual manner, and that was by running off with her."

As regards the Geawe-gal tribe, they say: "In the case of female captives, they belonged to their captors, if of a class from which wives might be legally taken by them. If of a forbidden class, then I think that the captor might make an exchange with some one of the proper class who had a woman at his disposal. In the Wonghi tribe, whose territory was situated on the north side of the Lachlan

[1] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 200.

River, for about eighty miles above Whealbah, a woman was the property of her captor when she was not of a tribe forbidden to him," *i.e.* if she did not belong to a gens with which it was unlawful for him to intermarry.

Speaking of the Turras, another Australian tribe, Messrs. Fison and Howitt say: "There is individual marriage. Consent of the woman's parents is necessary before marriage; if this is refused, the pair occasionally elope. Wives are also obtained by gift, exchange, or capture. A female captive belonged to the captor."[1]

Again, the Kamilaroi have "the right to the female captive," controlled by the "exogamous rule of marriage." Speaking generally, they observe, "that marriage is brought about throughout Australia by capture is quite certain."[2] The evidence, indeed, seems conclusive that marriage by capture is a recognised custom throughout Australia; and having the effect of giving the captor special rights over the captive—rights, moreover, re-

[1] In his last work, on *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, Mr. Howitt tells us, on the authority of Mr. Gillen, that the true name of the Turras was the Narrangao.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 343.

cognised by the tribe—would, I submit, give rise to a second, higher, and more special relationship between certain men and women to individual by the side of communal marriage.

Mr. Atkinson's view is that man was originally a "non-social animal," living as the anthropoid apes now do; and that he lived in small communities, each composed of a single male with one or more wives, whom he jealously guarded against all other men, and various children. He quotes Mr. Darwin's well-known passage:—

"Man, as I have attempted to show, is certainly descended from some ape-like creature. We may, indeed, conclude, from what we know of the jealousy of all male quadrupeds, armed as many of them are with special weapons for battling with their rivals, that promiscuous intercourse in a state of Nature is extremely improbable. Therefore, looking far enough back in the stream of time, and judging from the social habits of man as he now exists, the most probable view is that he aboriginally lived in small communities, each with a single wife, or, if powerful, with

several, whom he jealously guarded against all other men. Or he may not have been a social animal, and yet have lived with several wives, like the gorilla—for all the natives agree that but one adult male is seen in a band; when the young male grows up, a contest takes place for the mastery, and the strongest, by killing or driving out the others, establishes himself as head of the community."[1]

No one, however, can read the account which Mr. Atkinson gives, and the suggestions he makes, without feeling how difficult it would be for a species which had once adopted such solitary and unsocial habits to make any real progress. He admits that to break down such customs would "demand imperatively very exceptional qualities, both physiological and psychological."[2] But progress general to mankind, and yet based on such exceptional qualities, seems an improbable hypothesis, and I would rather look to the social quadrumana as affording the basis

[1] *Descent of Man*, vol. ii. p. 361 (1871).
[2] *Primal Law*, p. 232.

of human development. Moreover, groups comprising several males would, *ceteris paribus*, have a great advantage over others where there was only one.

Mr. Darwin himself appears to have felt the difficulty, for it will be observed that he offers an alternative: "Or he may have been a social animal and yet have lived with several wives, like the gorilla." As a matter of fact, however, I believe that among social monkeys no permanent unions really exist. Some species live in large bands containing several old males.

But however this may be, Mr. Atkinson eventually arrives at social communities with communal marriage. Mr. Lang expresses his surprise at this. He says:[1] "How can marriage be communal, granting Mr. Atkinson's views about sexual jealousy?" And he points out that Mr. Atkinson never saw his work except in MS., and had no opportunity of correcting the proofs.

The sentence, however, is not isolated or exceptional. Atkinson speaks of communal

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 288.

marriage in several passages. For instance, "class or communal marriage was the common trait of the polyandrous and the Cyclopean family,"[1] "group-marriage, which we are now dealing with,"[2] &c. Indeed the phase is an essential part of his system as of mine, the only difference between us being that he regards it as preceded by an isolated and unsocial condition, the existence of which as a general stage of human development I cannot but doubt.

Though he does not in terms give me the benefit of his support, Mr. Atkinson goes far in the direction of adopting my theory of the origin of marriage. Unions, by which he means marriage, within the group being excluded, "marriage could only take place with an outside mate. The presence of a captured female within the camp would thus, as we see, actually constitute in itself a proof, and the only one possible at the epoch, of the legal consummation of marriage."[3]

Mr. Hartland also speaks of it[4] as an

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 284. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 246. [3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 267.
[4] *Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, vol. ix. p. 322 (1898).

established fact "that in earlier times the domestic condition was that of marriage, if marriage it could be called, of both man and woman to a group."

Lastly I must refer to Mr. Crawley, who in *The Mystic Rose* admits[1] that I am supported "by Messrs. Fison and Howitt, who first adduced the phenomena of 'group-marriage.' Dr. Westermarck has so ably shown the unscientific character of the promiscuity theory that it would be unnecessary to add to what he has said, were it not for the fact that Messrs. Spencer and Gillen in their important work have, I think, too easily given their assent to Fison and Howitt's interpretation of 'group-marriage' as proving early promiscuity. Indeed they assert that there is no such thing as individual marriage in the Urabunna tribe. It will be clear, after we have examined these facts, that Messrs. Spencer and Gillen have misunderstood their origin and meaning, and that their criticism of Dr. Westermarck's condemnation of the promiscuity theory is therefore mistaken. In

[1] *The Mystic Rose*, p. 475.

one detail, that of the so-called *jus primæ noctis*, Dr. Westermarck is wrong, but so are Messrs. Spencer and Gillen."

I have already replied to Dr. Westermarck, and as regards the facts of Australian life am satisfied to follow Messrs. Fison and Howitt, supported especially as they are by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen.

Mr. Crawley denies[1] that the facts "necessarily point to a previous promiscuity or even to a present group-marriage. This 'marriageableness' is found also in Fiji, but we do not either there or in Australia find any 'right' exercised upon it."

I am astonished at this statement, which is quite inconsistent with the evidence collected by Messrs. Fison and Howitt and Messrs. Spencer and Gillen.

For instance, Mr. Howitt says:[2] "A female captive belonged to her captor if of a class from which he might take a wife;" and he quotes another observer, Mr. Gibson, who, speaking of a different part, says:[3] "If a girl

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 476.

[2] *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 195. See also pp. 208–35.

[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 280.

was captured in a raid on one of the clans, or from one of the neighbouring tribes, she was the property of her captor."

Messrs. Spencer and Gillen tell us that actual marriage by capture has now become comparatively rare. This is natural as the natives become more numerous, the tribes larger and somewhat more advanced. They describe, however, a typical wife-hunting expedition.[1] It was arranged in advance to which of the party the woman to be captured should belong, and "when captured, as she was shortly afterwards, she became the property of that man, no one of the others disputing his right." I may also refer to the classical case of Theseus, who, as Plutarch tells us, made a contract with his companion Tyndarus, that when they had carried off Helen they should decide by lot which of them should have her to wife—the loser being bound to help his more fortunate friend in a similar expedition. According to the best recent observers, who confirm previous statements, Mr. Crawley is mistaken in questioning the right of the conqueror to his captive.

[1] *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 555.

If, however, my view has been questioned by some high authorities, on the other hand I can quote, I will not say higher, but at any rate as high, and more numerous, authorities in support of my belief that our ancestors lived in a state of communal marriage.

Professor Hartland, in his interesting work on *The Rise of Fatherhood*, limits his inquiry "to those more or less permanent relations recognised by law or custom and entailing rights and duties, however feeble and limited, upon the parties entering into them."[1] I gather, however, that there was in his opinion an earlier period when the relations between the sexes were ruder and freer.

He gives abundant evidence of extreme laxity among the lowest races, and even among some more advanced; he refers, for instance, to the early Arabs, among whom a so-called "husband was little if anything more than a temporary lover who could be dismissed or could depart at pleasure." Again, among the Cherokee Indians, "divorce is easy. The husband, no longer satisfied with his wife,

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 3.

leaves her; she returns to her family and the matter is ended."

Mr. Fison felt towards me, and wrote of me, with intense bitterness on account of the following passage in *The Origin of Civilisation.* Speaking of the Polynesian wizards, I had said: "Some even of our recent missionaries, according to Williams, believed that the Polynesian wizards really possessed supernatural powers, and were 'agents of the infernal powers.' Nay, Williams himself thought it 'not impossible.' We may well be surprised that Europeans should believe in such things, and missionaries so credulous and ignorant ought, one might suppose, rather to learn than to teach."

Mr. Fison himself, I gather, was a believer in the supernatural powers so claimed, and observes that however absurd such credulity "may be in Sir John Lubbock's opinion, his opinion is not quite a final settlement of the questions involved."

This is of course true; and though I am still surprised that Mr. Williams, and apparently Mr. Fison, should really believe in the super-

natural powers of savage wizards, I felt long ago that I had expressed myself with the impetuosity of youth, and have modified the passage in recent editions.

Notwithstanding Mr. Fison's strong bias, however, I can on this part of the question quote him as a supporter. Speaking of the Australians generally, he says:[1] "Marriage is theoretically communal." He goes on[2] to give a striking illustration: "Mr. G. F. Bridgeman's native servant, before mentioned, who had travelled far and wide throughout Australia, told him that he was furnished with temporary wives by the various tribes with whom he sojourned in his travels; that his right to those women was recognised as a matter of course; and that he could always ascertain whether they belonged to the division into which he could legally marry, 'though the places were 1000 miles apart and the languages quite different.' Many pages might be filled with similar testimony. This seems to be the most extensive system of communal marriage the

[1] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 161. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 50.

world has ever known."[1] He gives also an amusing account of an incident which happened to himself:—

"I remember, when I first went among the Murray blacks, one of the young men attached himself to me. He said we must be brothers, and as he was a Kilparra man, I was, of course, the same. I one day said to his wife: 'I am John's brother; you are my sister.' The idea was, to her, most ridiculous. With a laugh, she said: 'No; you are my husband.'"[2]

Mr. Howitt, Mr. Fison's colleague and coadjutor, is also a believer in communal marriage. His latest view is given in his separate volume on *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, where he says:[3]—

"The late Mr. M'Lennan considered that the Levirate was derived from the practice of polyandry. It seems to me that we may with more reason seek it in the practice of group-marriage, which I venture to forecast will be ultimately accepted as one of the primitive conditions of mankind."

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 53. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 289. [3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 281.

Messrs. Spencer and Gillen are also clear on the point. They say:[1] "The less complex the organisation of the tribe, the more clearly do we see evidence of what Messrs. Howitt and Fison have called, in regard to Australian tribes, 'group-marriage.'" Again, "Individual marriage does not exist either in name or in practice in the Urabunna tribe."[2]

Messrs. Howitt and Fison say:[3] "In his argument against Sir John Lubbock's theory, Mr. M'Lennan remarks: 'If we were to find a large number of well-vouched cases in which, on a marriage, extraordinary freedoms with the bride were permitted to men of the bridegroom's kindred, it might be plausibly maintained, in the absence of any more satisfactory explanation, that . . . there was an assertion on the one side, and a recognition on the other, of an ancient right. But the cases ought to point clearly to this. The privileged persons should be men of the bridegroom's group only, and the cases should be capable of no simpler explanation

[1] *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 56.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 63.
[3] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 152.

than that which refers them to an ancient communal right.'[1] Such cases are to be found in abundance—cases, at least, in which 'men of the bridegroom's group' assert a common right to the bride, and of which, as far as I am aware, there 'is no simpler explanation than that which refers them to an ancient communal right.'"

Mr. Howitt also observes that "indeed such customs may explain the *jus primæ noctis*, which Lord Avebury truly explains as expiation for individual marriage."[2]

Mr. Robertson Smith does not in so many words tell us that communal marriage prevailed in ancient Arabia, but the social arrangements which he describes[3] almost, if not entirely, amount to it:—

"The eldest brother or head of the polyandrous group will begin to desire to have his wife to himself; to insure this he must find another wife for his younger brothers, and so gradually the principle of individual

[1] *Studies*, &c., p. 435.

[2] *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 219.

[3] *Kinship and Marriage in Arabia*, p. 123. See also pp. 127, 143, &c.

marriage and fatherhood must be established. Here, then, we have a condition of things not imaginary, and not even uncommon in primitive societies, which supplies exactly what we want for the explanation of the origin of Arabian tribes of male descent. And I think it is safe to say that no other known form of marriage-custom will account for the circumstance that we find in Arabia a recognition of blood-kinship in the male line among the groups which had no notion that a man should keep his wife strictly to himself."

On this point I may also claim the support of Dr. Frazer, who says [1] that "it is probable that the present marital customs of the Australian tribes have been everywhere preceded by group-marriage"; and again, speaking of New Ireland,[2] "this custom appears to be a relic of sexual communism or of group-marriage." He adds other cases; for instance, among the Chukchees of Siberia,[3] "marriage does not

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. i. p. 249.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 129.

[3] Waldemar Bogaras, *The Chukchee* (Leyden and New York, 1904–1909), pp. 602–605 (forming vol. vii. of the Jesup South Pacific Expedition), recorded in Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. ii. pp. 348, 350.

deal with one couple only, but extends over an entire group. The Chukchee group-marriage includes sometimes up to ten married couples. From this account we gather that practically the whole of the Chukchee tribe or nation lives in a state of group-marriage, which is regulated by custom and does not approach to sexual promiscuity."

"On these grounds, therefore," he says,[1] "it appears to be a reasonable hypothesis that at least a large part of mankind has passed through the stage of group-marriage in its progress upward from a still lower stage of sexual promiscuity to a higher stage of monogamy."

As part of the evidence of this view he refers to the customs which I have called "expiation for marriage,"[2] an argument which, however, he ascribes to, and for which he quotes the high authority of, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen.[3]

It will be remembered that a part of my case consisted in the evidence of tribal rights,

[1] Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. p. 151.
[2] *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 138. [3] *Loc. cit.*, vol. i. p. 313.

and what I called "expiation for marriage." This part of the case has hardly been touched by my critics. I cannot here repeat the evidence, but may bring forward some additional support. Thus Messrs. Fison and Howitt say: "A woman taken in a hostile attack belonged to the man who captured her, if she were of the proper class. Nearly all their fights were the result of capture of women, either after the ceremonial combats, or in raids made for that special object."[1] If, however, the man was assisted by friends, the right they also thus acquired was recognised, or was repaid by similar co-operation in another raid.

In the tribes which stretch northwards from the Arunta to the Gulf of Carpentaria there are, according to Messrs. Spencer and Gillen,[2] "three distinct grades of marital relationships." In one "we have the very wide relations in connection with ceremonies in which there is the very greatest license." These seem to

[1] See also Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 235.

[2] *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 141.

me, however, from what they say, to relate to special occasions rather than to special women.

In the second class the relations are more strict, and in the third the woman may be said to be "the property of one man." Before this property is recognised, and "when the woman is being handed over to one man, there takes place very clearly the recognition of the group right, and probably the recognition of a wider right still."

Messrs. Spencer and Gillen[1] describe the ceremonies which take place when "a woman is being, so to speak, handed over to one particular man," and say "the ceremonies in question are of the nature of those which Sir John Lubbock has described as indicative of 'expiation for marriage.'" And a little further on they say of the same ceremonies:[2] "These customs are, it appears to us, only capable of any satisfactory explanation on the hypothesis that they indicate the temporary recognition of certain general rights which existed

[1] *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 96.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 111.

in the time prior to that of the form of group-marriage of which we have such clear traces yet lingering among the tribes. . . . On no other hypothesis yet advanced do the customs connected with marriage, which are so consistent in their general nature and leading features from tribe to tribe, appear to us to be capable of satisfactory explanation."

Mr. Fison also mentions[1] that "the formal presentation of female captives to the head man and a council of elders in the Gournditch-mara tribe before being given to their future husbands, points strongly to adoption."

Mr. Crawley, indeed, disputes[2] my suggestion as to expiation for marriage, which was accepted by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen. "The group marriage of the Arunta," he says, "simply amounts to a religious duty, whereby the bride is physically prepared for her husband." Surely a very singular suggestion. Here he continues: "Their criticism of Dr. Westermarck is sound, but their own inference that it is[3] a rudimentary right of marriage surviving from primitive pro-

[1] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 112.

[2] *The Mystic Rose*, p. 479. [3] As I suggested.

miscuity is more beside the mark still. . . . It is quite opposed in theory to the so-called *jus primæ noctis*, which, if it ever obtained in Europe (it probably never obtained elsewhere), was simply a barbarous application of feudal rights, and also to religious prostitution. Finally, it is not an 'expiation for marriage,' as Lubbock thought."

I regret that Mr. Crawley does not agree with me, and admit that his opinion is entitled to respectful consideration. At the same time the expression of an opinion is not in itself an argument.

Mr. Morgan, in his important work on *Relationships*, has collected together a great store of valuable information, which, as I have pointed out in *The Origin of Civilisation*, strongly supports the view here advocated. He calls attention to the remarkable points of agreement, and says:[1] "The several hypotheses of accidental concurrent invention, of borrowing from each other, and of spontaneous growth, are entirely inadequate."

"If two families," he adds,[2] *i.e.* "the Red-

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 495. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 505.

skins and the Tamil, commenced on separate continents in a state of promiscuous intercourse, having such a system of consanguinity as this state would beget, of the character of which no conception can be formed, it would be little less than a miracle if both should develop the same system of relationship."

He concludes, then, that it must be due to[1] "transmission with the blood from a common original source. If the four hypotheses named cover and exhaust the subject, and the first three are incapable of explaining the present existence of the system in the two families, then the fourth and last, if capable of accounting for its transmission, becomes transformed into an established conclusion."

In *The Origin of Civilisation* I have given a table showing, as I believe, the gradual evolution towards clearer and truer ideas of relationships. Mr. Frazer is of a different, and indeed the very opposite, opinion. "In recent years," he says,[2] "Dr. W. H. R. Rivers,

[1] *Ibid.* See also p. 497.

[2] W. H. R. Rivers, *On the Origin of the Classificatory System of Relationships*, anthropological essays presented to Edward Burnett Tylor, pp. 310–315 (Oxford, 1907).

arguing from similar confusions in other forms of the classificatory system, particularly the forms which prevail among the Torres Straits Islanders, the Kurnai of South-East Australia, and the Two Mountain Iroquois of North America, has made it highly probable that the confusion of these relationships in the Polynesian form of the classificatory system is not early but late, and that it marks the decadence rather than the primitiveness of the system. If he is right, as I believe him to be, Morgan's principal, almost his only, argument in favour of the former wide prevalence of a form of group-marriage in which the husbands were own brothers and their wives were their own sisters, falls to the ground."

He has, however, apparently overlooked, or at any rate he does not refer to, my chapter on Relationships. It is founded on the evidence collected by Morgan. I am, indeed, unable to agree with the great American ethnologist, but it is only fair to recognise the great value and interest of the vast volume of evidence which he has collected. Stärcke indeed seems to me unjust to Morgan when he says :—

"Lubbock, in his remarks on Morgan's book, states that while he does not accept his most important conclusions, yet he cannot avoid declaring that Morgan's work is one of the most important contributions to ethnological science which has appeared for many years.[1] With all respect for Morgan's diligence as a collector of facts, I am disposed to agree with M'Lennan that his work is altogether unscientific, and that his hypotheses are a wild dream, if not the delirium of fever.[2] His statements throughout are based on such vague analyses and such irrational psychology, that they can only confuse the question, unless they are altogether ignored."[3]

Morgan seems to me, on the contrary, to have made a most valuable contribution to science. The evidence he has collected clearly points to the existence of communal marriage.

I cannot, of course, go all over the evidence again, but may observe that I gave two tables of Relationships[4] as they would be (1) upon

[1] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 157.
[2] M'Lennan, *Studies*, p. 360.
[3] Stärcke, *The Primitive Family*, p. 207. [4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 204.

the theory of progress, and (2) on the theory of degradation; and while the first is the general rule, the second does not, so far as I know, anywhere exist. I cannot therefore subscribe to the view which Mr. Frazer adopts from Dr. Rivers.

Under communal or under group-marriage a father's sister is regarded as a mother; a father's sister's son is therefore a brother; and a father's sister's grandson is a grandson. Under our system, on the contrary, a father's sister is an aunt, and her son is a cousin. The table, therefore, would stand as follows:—

		Under our system.	Under the lowest system.
A father's sister	called	Aunt.	Mother.
,, sister's son	called	Cousin.	Brother.
,, ,, grandson	called	Aunt's grandson.	Son.
,, ,, great-grandson	called	,, great-grandson.	Grandson.

Now among the Two Mountain Iroquois a father's sister is called an aunt. If their system had been a retrogression the sequence would have been—

Aunt,
Cousin,
Aunt's grandson,
,, great-grandson.

If the case was one of progress the sequence would be—

Aunt,
Brother,
Son,
Grandson;

and this is what we find it, showing that Mr. Frazer's view is not borne out, and that it is a case of progression and not of retrogression.

I do not repeat here the great body of evidence which I collected in my *Origin of Civilisation*, but have contented myself with quoting against my critics the admissions which they felt compelled in fairness to make, and referring to some eminent authorities who have expressed the same opinion since my book was published. I cannot but think that I have conclusively proved the first proposition of my thesis—namely, that there was a time when the status of marriage did not exist among our ancestors.

CHAPTER II

ON THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

If, then, there was a time when the institution of marriage did not exist, the question arises, How did it originate?

It has been shown, I think, in the last chapter, that any attempted appropriation of a woman by one man was resented as an infringement of tribal rights, and would be generally resisted; but even if, as time went on, the arrogation of such an exclusive possession by any exceptionally masterful man was acquiesced in, he was always liable to be ousted by a stronger, and that he could not look to the tribe for any moral or material support.

The institution of marriage would be a step forward of the utmost importance. What, then, led to this great and beneficent reform? The explanation which I suggested was, that "If a

man captured a woman belonging to another tribe he thereby acquired an individual and peculiar right to her, and she became exclusively his property, no one else having any claim on or right over her. After a marauding expedition the chiefs would naturally claim the fairest captives; as, for instance, Agamemnon and Achilles in the *Iliad*, and as in the Song of Deborah—

> 'Have they not sped? have they not divided the prey;
> To every man a damsel or two?'

Thus, then, the women in such a community would fall into two classes: the one, subject no doubt to the disadvantage of being aliens, and so to say slaves, but yet enjoying the protection, and in many cases having secured the affection, of one man; the other, nominally no doubt free, but in the first place subject to the attentions of all their tribesmen—attentions no doubt often very unwelcome, but yet which could not be rejected without giving bitter offence—and in the second without any claim on any one specially for food, shelter, and protection.[1]

[1] *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 110.

"It seems to me that under such circumstances many women belonging to the latter class would long to exchange their nominal freedom and hazardous privileges for the comparative peace and security of the former. On the other hand, many men would desire to appropriate exclusively to themselves some woman of their own tribe by whom they were specially attracted. Hence would naturally arise a desire on the part of many to extend the right of capture, which originally had reference only to women of a different tribe, and to apply it even to those belonging to their own."

If I were rewriting this passage I should insert in the sixth line, after "captured," the words "the person or heart of." In those rude and violent times the capture would probably as a rule be forcible, but there would even then no doubt be cases of love at first sight; and my point was, that if a man introduced a woman into his tribe from outside, his tribesmen would have no rights in her—she would be his own, whether she was brought in by force or came in of her own accord, whether

her presence was due to force of arms or of love, to Mars or to Cupid.

On the other hand, the women of the tribe would gradually come to feel that they were really in a less dignified and satisfactory position, and, as civilisation advanced, the symbol of capture, with its attendant results and advantages, would be extended to them also.

This suggestion not only seems to throw light on the origin of marriage, but explains, or goes far to explain, marriage by capture and exogamy.

Under this system each tribe is divided into two or more classes or phratries, and no man can marry a woman belonging to his own phratry.

Exogamy seems to have been first mentioned by Gallatin in the *Archæologia Americana*,[1] as occurring in North America among the Choctaws, Cherokees, Creeks, Natches, and probably other tribes.

"Every nation," he says, "was divided into a number of clans, varying in the several nations from three to eight or ten, the mem-

[1] Vol. ii. p. 227.

bers of which respectively were dispersed indiscriminately throughout the whole nation. It has been fully ascertained that the inviolable regulations by which those clans were perpetuated amongst the southern nations were, first, that no man could marry in his own clan; secondly, that every child belongs to his or her mother's clan."

Sir G. Grey[1] subsequently described a similar custom as occurring in parts of Australia, where "(1) children of either sex always take the family name of their mother;[2] (2) a man cannot marry a woman of his own family name."

Dr. Latham also,[3] speaking of the Magars of Nepaul, says: "There are twelve thums. All individuals belonging to the same thum are supposed to be descended from the same male ancestor; descent from the same great mother being by no means necessary. So husband and wife must belong to different thums.

[1] *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and Western Australia*, vol. ii. p. 226 (1841).

[2] It is now known that in some tribes descent is reckoned through the father.

[3] *Descriptive Ethnology*, vol. i. p. 80 (1859).

Within one and the same there is no marriage. Do you wish for a wife? If so, look to the thum of your neighbour; at any rate, look beyond your own."

These were at first regarded as curious and isolated peculiarities. The wide existence of the custom was first brought prominently to light by Mr. M'Lennan in his remarkable work on *Primitive Marriage*. The prevalence of marriage by capture has indeed been denied by Mr. Crawley. "It was," he asserts,[1] "never more than a rare sporadic result. 'Capture' proper,[2] that is, hostile capture from another tribe, has never been, and never could be, a mode of marriage; it is only a method of obtaining a wife. These two have often been confused." And he complains[3] that the students have neglected "to use primitive data of custom and thought for the explanation of rules invented by primitive man . . . and have thus been led to attribute to early man such monstrosities of improbability as the general practice of infanticide and of marriage

[1] Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, p. 405.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 368. [3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 442.

by capture." This is a strong expression of opinion, no doubt, but so far at least as marriage by capture is concerned it seems to me to be without foundation, and I can only express the surprise with which I read it, considering the overwhelming evidence brought forward by M'Lennan and supplemented in my book. Indeed Mr. Crawley himself gives many instances.[1]

Exogamy and marriage by capture are so closely connected that they may well be considered together. The suggestion of Festus, who explained the existence of the custom in Rome as a relic of the Rape of the Sabines, need not be considered, as it could only apply to that particular case.

The principal theories which have been suggested have been :—

1. That of Plutarch, adopted by Tylor, that it was a political expedient to strengthen the tribe by foreign alliances, and union between different tribes.

2. That suggested by M'Lennan and adopted by Morgan and others, that it was due to the

[1] See p. 325 *et seq.*

prevalence of female infanticide and the consequent scarcity of women.

3. That of C. O. Müller, that it was due to coyness.

4. That it was a social reform due to the moral sense of women.

5. That it was due to a recoil from marriage with an early housemate.

6. That it was arranged by chiefs to prevent the marriage of near relations.

7. That of M. Girard Teulon, that communities which from any special circumstances took to marrying out, would gain so much in physical vigour that they would secure predominance, and exogamy would eventually become a custom enjoined by law.

8. That of M. Fustel de Coulanges, that the use of force, or pretended force, arose from the supposed necessity of resisting transference from the Gods of one family to those of another.

9. That it arose from totemism: that just as a man felt himself precluded from eating an animal belonging to his totem, so it would be wrong, or dangerous, to marry a woman of his own totem.

10. That suggested in my Royal Institution lectures, and quoted on page 40.

These suggestions, it may be observed, are not all exclusive; it is quite possible that two or more may have co-operated. The question is, What is the main cause?

I.

Plutarch[1] long ago in the *Roman Questions* asks, "Why do they not marry women near of kin?" "Was it," he says, "from their wishing to amplify and increase friendships by marriages, and to acquire many kinsfolk, by giving their daughters to wife to others and receiving wives from them?"[2] He was, however, evidently not himself satisfied with this explanation, as he goes on to make two other suggestions.

According to M. Reinach, "Aristote et St. Augustin avait allégué que l'inceste concentrerait les affections de famille dans un cercle trop étroit."[3]

Mr. Tylor, who also adopts this view, quotes

[1] Plutarch, *Quæst. Rom.*, cviii.
[2] *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, xviii., 1889, p. 267.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 165.

the saying of Mahomed that "Matrimonial alliances increase friendship more than aught else. Then will we give our daughters unto you, and we will take your daughters to us, and we will dwell with you, and we will become one people."[1]

In fact, in his view it was a case of marrying out, or being killed out!

In archaic times, however, and before marriage by capture had softened into a symbol, it was no doubt a grim reality, and the forcible capture of women was clearly more likely to lead to war than to peace. In its origin, then, the custom would strengthen animosities rather than alliances.

Surely M'Lennan was right when he said:[2] "But it is not in a primitive age, not until after a very considerable advance has been made in civilisation, that tribes are ever found joined in a political union."

2.

M'Lennan himself considered that savages were driven into exogamy by the prevalence

[1] *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, xviii., 1889, p. 267.
[2] M'Lennan's *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 40.

of infanticide and the consequent scarcity of women. On the whole, he says,[1] "the account which we have given of the origin of exogamy appears the only one which will bear examination. The scarcity of women within the group led to a practice of stealing the women of other groups, and in time it came to be considered improper, because it was unusual, for a man to marry a woman of his own group."

This led to polyandry, which he regarded as a general and even necessary stage in social development, and subsequently to the Levirate. This view he retained till the end of his life.[2]

I gave in 1870 my reasons for being unable to accept the explanation. Mr. Lang[3] is surely right that "this theory of Mr. M'Lennan's is quite untenable. The prevalence of female infanticide at the supposed very early stage of society is not demonstrated, and did not seem probable to Mr. Darwin. Even if it existed, it could not create a prejudice against marrying the few women within the group."

It does not seem necessary to enlarge on

[1] *Studies in Ancient History*, vol. i. p. 160 (1886).
[2] *Loc. cit.*, second series, p. 61. [3] *Social Origins*, p. 21.

Mr. M'Lennan's suggestion, which, so far as I am aware, has been adopted by no subsequent authority, and which, in the light of facts subsequently recorded, my distinguished friend would, I believe, himself have abandoned.

3.

C. O. Müller accounts for the custom by the suggestion that the bride could not honourably surrender her freedom unless compelled by violence. "Two things," he says,[1] "were requisite as an introduction and preparation to marriage at Sparta—first, betrothing on the part of the father; secondly, the seizure of the bride. The latter was clearly an ancient national custom, founded on the idea that the young woman would not surrender her freedom and virgin purity unless compelled by the violence of the stronger sex."

The reasons given by M'Lennan against this suggestion seem to me, as indeed to almost all subsequent writers, to be conclusive, and I will not therefore occupy time by discussing them again. Herbert Spencer indeed has

[1] *The Dorians*, book ii. chap. iv. p. 292.

suggested that though not an adequate explanation it may have been a factor—he even suggests an "important factor"—which is going further than I can follow him.

Even if we could thus explain away—which does not seem to me possible—all the cases in which the woman alone resists, there remain the very numerous and widely spread examples where the resistance, or mock resistance, is offered by the male relatives. This certainly cannot have been due to female coyness.

4.

Bachofen considered that the women, shocked and scandalised by the then state of things, revolted against it, and established a system of marriage with female supremacy. I believe, however, that communities in which women have exercised supreme power are quite exceptional.

5.

Dr. Westermarck endeavours to explain exogamy[1] by the existence of "an instinct" against marriage of near kin :—

[1] Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, p. 389.

"It seems to me extremely probable that the practice of capturing women for wives is due chiefly to the aversion to close intermarriage—existing, as we have seen, among endogamous tribes also—together with the difficulty a savage man has in procuring a wife in a friendly manner, without giving compensation for the loss he inflicts on her father. . . . From the universality of the horror of incest, and from the fact that primitive hordes were in a chronic state of warfare with one another, the general prevalence of this custom may be easily explained."

But if there be, as he says,[1] an innate aversion to marriage between persons who have lived very closely together from early youth, surely that would render the institution of any such rule quite unnecessary. The existence of the rule seems, if anything, to show that there was no such instinct. If there be such a feeling—which I do not deny—where, then, is the necessity for the rule? He thinks that the separation of brother and sister, which is a custom of many savage races, is to prevent

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 320.

intermarriage; but if close living together inspires aversion, the custom would be likely to produce the very opposite effect from that which he thinks it was instituted to effect.

But as a preventive of incest any such rule is really unnecessary. Separation does but increase the ardour of lovers. Those who have been brought up together from childhood have, on the contrary, been trained to the calm level of affection. They are, as it were, old people in relation to one another, and are less, not more, likely to fall in love.

6.

I now come to the theory which endeavours to explain the origin of exogamy as having been arranged by chiefs in order to prevent the marriage of near relations.

This has been the opinion of some high authorities, as, for instance, of Morgan and Herbert Spencer.

Dr. Frazer says:[1] "The effect of these successive bisections of the community into exogamous classes, with their characteristic

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. p. 106.

rules of descent, was to bar the marriage of persons whom the natives regard as too near of kin, each new bisection striking out a fresh list of kinsfolk from the number of those with whom marriage might be lawfully contracted; and as the effect produced by these means is in accordance with the deeply rooted opinions and feelings of the natives on the subject of marriage, we appear to be justified in inferring that each successive bisection of the community was deliberately instituted for the purpose of preventing the marriage of near kin."

Surely, however, the rule as it stands is extraordinarily ill and clumsily adapted to such a purpose. Take the common case of a tribe divided into two exogamous clans. Is it reasonable to suppose that in order to prevent a man marrying a very few women to whom he was closely related, he would be forbidden half the women in the tribe—to the great majority of whom he was not related at all!

The rule is extraordinarily sweeping, and yet only effects half its object, for it permitted marriage between the nearest rela-

tions either on the father's or the mother's side. When an objection to the intermarriage of near relations existed, exogamy was unnecessary; when it did not exist, exogamy, if this view were correct, could not arise.

M'Lennan had carefully considered and discussed this suggestion.

"A survey," he says,[1] "of the facts of primitive life and the breakdown of exogamy in advancing communities exclude the notion that the law originated in any innate or primary feeling against marriage with kinsfolk."

Messrs. Spencer and Gillen say[2] that "it is at least extremely doubtful if the origin of the restriction has anything whatever to do with the deliberate intention of preventing the intermarriage of individuals whom we call cousins."

Mr. Ling Roth tells us[3] that "over and over again have I both seen and heard the propositions laid down almost as a *sine qua*

[1] *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 112.
[2] *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 98.
[3] *Ethnological Studies*, p. 69.

non that the various groups, classes, &c., have been devised in order to prevent consanguinity and incest; the more intimate, however, that I have become with the language and traditions of the aboriginals in Boulia District and elsewhere, the more convinced am I that in these localities at all events this is not the case."

Finally, Mr. Mathew[1] expresses his opinion that the suggestion "is very fanciful and far-fetched."

7.

I now come to the theory of M. Girard Teulon that communities which from any special circumstances took to exogamy would gain so much in physical vigour that they would secure predominance, and exogamy would eventually become a custom enjoined by law. He says:—

"Si maintenant l'on admet, que par le fait des nombreux accidents ou hasards de la vie sauvage, la nécessité ait poussé certaines fractions à exercer leur droit communiste plus fréquemment en dehors de leur

[1] *Two Representative Tribes of Queensland*, p. 158.

groupe immédiat, qu'à l'intérieur, il a pu de bonne heure en résulter pour elles et leurs descendants une supériorité physique et mentale sur leurs voisins ; par le fait de la séparation des fractions de la tribu et de l'augmentation de la population, les unions en pareil cas se pratiquaient entre moins proches consanguins ; les produits de ces croisements ont dû être plus vigoureux que ceux engendrés dans le cercle étroit de la même section de parents.

" Il se sera établi, dans la suite des temps, un préjugé en faveur de ce mariage hors de la communauté ; peu à peu on aura abandonné, puis condamné, le mariage à l'intérieur du groupe entre frères et sœurs, et l'exogamie se généralisant, on l'aura élevée au rang de loi morale ou organique." [1]

Professor Stärcke seems to favour this suggestion :—

" The moral aversion," he observes,[2] " which we entertain in the case of marriage between near kinsfolk may, I think, be indirectly ex-

[1] *Les Origines du Mariage et de la Famille*, par A. Girard Teulon, p. 123.

[2] Stärcke, *The Primitive Family*, p. 211.

plained, for there cannot be a more valid objection to such marriages than the fact that the offspring of such marriages are so often idiotic, or at any rate in some respect deficient."

This is no doubt a valid objection, but is surely not likely to have been taken by savages. Professor Stärcke himself points out on the next page that we ourselves have taken no steps to prevent marriage "between consumptive and syphilitic persons and those affected with hereditary disease," unjustifiable as such marriages are, and we can hardly give savages credit for being more wise and prudent than the most advanced nations now are.

Moreover, it is no real explanation of exogamy; the ultimate and unforeseen advantage could not account for the origin of the custom.

Mathew also unhesitatingly rejects[1] this suggestion, "which requires savage man to discover hypothetical evil results from incest (supposed evils which have no real

[1] *Two Representative Tribes of Queensland*, p. 159.

existence), and to enact a statute as a remedy which he had neither the capacity to invent nor the power to carry into effect if invented."

From certain passages in Dr. Frazer's book it might be inferred that he favours this view. Thus in his final volume[1] he tells us that: "Considering everything as carefully as I can, I incline, though with great hesitancy and reserve, to think that exogamy may have sprung from a belief in the injurious and especially the sterilising effects of incest, not upon the persons who engage in it, at least not upon the man, nor upon the offspring, but upon women generally and particularly upon edible animals and plants; and I venture to conjecture that a careful search among the most primitive exogamous peoples now surviving, especially among the Australian aborigines, might still reveal the existence of such a belief among them. At least if that is not the origin of exogamy, I must confess to be completely baffled, for I have no other conjecture to offer on the subject."

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. p. 16.

Yet only a few pages before he had said:[1] "All that we know of the ignorance and improvidence of savages confirms the observation of Darwin that they 'are not likely to reflect on distant evils to their progeny.' Indeed, the improbability that primitive man should have regulated the relations of the sexes by elaborate rules intended to avert the evil effects of in-breeding on the offspring has been greatly increased since Darwin wrote, by the remarkable discovery that some of the most primitive of existing races who observe the strictest of all systems of exogamy are entirely ignorant of the causal relation which exists between the intercourse of the sexes and the birth of offspring. The ignorance which thus characterises these backward tribes was no doubt at one time universal amongst mankind, and must have been shared by the savage founders of exogamy. But if they did not know that children are the fruit of marriage, it is difficult to see how they could have instituted an elaborate system of marriage for the express purpose of benefiting the children. In short,

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 155.

the idea that the abhorrence of incest originally sprang from an observation of its injurious effects on offspring may safely be dismissed as baseless."

With this I quite concur, and it surely conclusively disposes of his argument. There is nothing to prevent the Australians and other low races directly forbidding the marriage of near relations. In fact Dr. Frazer admits[1] that some Australian tribes have actually done so. Moreover, he justly observes[2] that "in small communities—and in savage society the community is generally small—such a rule must often make it very difficult for a man to obtain a wife at all."

A few pages further on the opposite opinion is expressed. "That the exogamous system of these primitive people," he says, "was artificial, and that it was deliberately devised by them for the purpose which it actually serves, namely, the prevention of the marriage of near kin, seems quite certain; on no other reasonable hypothesis can we explain its complex arrange-

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 108. See, for instance, Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 254.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 134.

ments, so perfectly adapted to the wants and ideas of the natives."

But then immediately afterwards he seems to contradict himself, for he continues: "Yet it is impossible to suppose that in planning it these ignorant and improvident savages could have been animated by exact knowledge of its consequences or by a far-seeing care for the future welfare of their remote descendants. When we reflect how little to this day marriage is regulated by any such considerations even among the most enlightened classes in the most civilised communities, we shall not be likely to attribute a far higher degree of knowledge, foresight, and self-command to the rude founders of exogamy." [1]

I confess I do not feel sure but this seems to be his final conclusion, and I quite concur.

8.

Fustel de Coulanges suggests [2] that force is required—not to overcome the modesty of the bride, but to compel her to transfer her allegiance from the gods of her father to those of her husband. "La jeune fille," he says,

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 168. [2] *La Cité Antique*, p. 45.

"n'entre pas d'elle-même dans sa nouvelle demeure. Il faut que son mari l'enlève, qu'il simule un rapt, qu'elle jette quelques cris et que les femmes qui l'accompagnent feignent de la défendre. Pourquoi ce rite? Est-ce un symbole de la pudeur de la jeune fille? Cela est peu probable; le moment de la pudeur n'est pas encore venu; car ce qui va s'accomplir dans cette maison, c'est une cérémonie religieuse. Ne veut-on pas plutôt marquer fortement que la femme qui va sacrifier à ce foyer, n'y a pas elle-même aucundroit, qu'elle n'en approche pas par l'effet de sa volonté, et qu'il faut que le mâitre du lieu et du dieu l'y introduise par un acte de sa puissance? Quoiqu'il en soit, après une lutte simulée, l'époux la soulève dans ses bras et lui fait franchir la porte, mais en ayant bien soin que ses pieds ne touchent pas le seuil."

Clearly, however, this theory is quite inapplicable to the lower races.

9.

Mr. Lang[1] derives exogamy from totemism. "Totem names," he says, "once accepted and

[1] *Social Origins*, p. 161.

stereotyped, implied a connection between each kindred and the animal, plant, or other thing in nature whose name the kindred bore. Round the mystery of this connection the savage mind would play freely, and would invent the explanatory myths of descent from, and kinship with, or other friendly relations with, the name-giving objects. A measure of respect for the objects would be established; they might not be killed or eaten, except under necessity; magic might be worked by human emus, kangaroos, plum-trees, and grubs for their propagation, as among the Arunta and other tribes; or against them, to bar their ravaging of the crops, as among the Sioux. As a man should not spear a real emu if the emu was his totem, so he does not, for reasons to be adduced, marry or have an amour with a woman who is also of the emu blood. That is part of the tabu, resulting from the circumstances presently to be explained."

M. Reinach says:[1] "Mais pourquoi l'exogamie? C'est que le totem n'est sacré que pour ses fidèles; un totem étranger n'a rien de

[1] *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, p. 164.

divin. Une femme étrangère, introduite dans un clan par le mariage, perdra du sang sans qu'il en résulte d'inconvénients pour le clan."

If this were the explanation, exogamy and marriage by capture must always be preceded by totemism. This does not, however, appear to be the case; totemism is especially characteristic of the black, brown, and red races, but exogamy and marriage by capture are by no means confined to them.

I have found, like Mr. Lang, that "to disengage from his learned book, *The Mystic Rose* (1902), Mr. Crawley's theory of the origin of exogamy is no easy task."[1]

According to Mr. Crawley's view, if I understand him correctly, "all men are regarded with superstitious dread by all women, and *vice versa;* above all, as a daily danger, the men or women living in close contiguity must avoid each other. To keep them apart all sorts of tabus and avoidances are invented, including the tabu on their marriage."

Mr. Crawley suggests that contact with women is likely to produce weakness and

[1] *Social Origins*, p. 23.

timidity. But of those living in close community, why should some have this injurious influence and not others?

M. S. Reinach[1] entirely disputes Mr. Crawley's view: "S'il y avait un atome de vérité dans la théorie de M. Crawley les femmes devraient partout rechercher avec avidité le contact des hommes, afin d'acquérir les qualités viriles qui leur manquent et dont l'absence constitue leur infériorité. Or, loin de là, les femmes craignent le contact des hommes plus que les hommes ne craignent le contact des femmes et leur pudeur est autrement exigeante que celle du sexe fort. Que reste-t-il donc de toute l'argumentation du savant anglais?

"Théoriquement, le commerce sexuel est prohibé par des tabous très stricts et les cérémonies du mariage ont pour but de lever ces tabous, c'est-à-dire d'écarter le danger imaginaire ou réel."

Mr. Robertson Smith does not propose any explanation of the origin of exogamy. He simply says:[2] "The origin of exogamy is not

[1] *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, vol. i., p. 116.
[2] *Courtship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, p. 225.

yet explained, though there is reason to hope for important contributions towards its explanation from the posthumous papers of J. F. M'Lennan; but there can be little question that it is due to general causes which come into play at a certain stage in all early societies."

Having thus, as I venture to think, disposed of other theories, I now come to defend my own, which I may restate for convenience—namely, that "originally no man could appropriate any woman of his own tribe exclusively to himself, nor could any woman dedicate herself to one man, without infringing tribal rights; but that, on the other hand, if a man captured a woman belonging to another tribe he thereby acquired an individual and peculiar right to her, and she became his exclusively, no one else having any claim or property in her."[1]

I will take in the first place the objection raised by my old friend Mr. M'Lennan. He argued[2] that "when savages had women of their own whom they might marry, captive women would naturally become slaves or con-

[1] *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 110.
[2] M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 35.

cubines rather than wives; the men would find their wives, or their chief wives, within the tribe; and the capture of women could never become so important in connection with marriage as to furnish a symbolism for all marriages to a later time."

But M'Lennan believed in the existence of a primitive period of communal marriage when there was no question of individual marriage. Men would not, and could not, therefore find their chief or any individual wife within the tribe.

He says truly enough that women carried off by force would "naturally become slaves or concubines." But wives at that time were slaves, so that his objection really has no force.

Mr. M'Lennan, as we have seen, at first ridiculed, but finally accepted my suggestion of communal marriage. He ignored in his earlier writings my view as to the origin of marriage, but this also, to my great satisfaction, he finally adopted. In his posthumous work[1] he says: "On a practice of capture arising all this would be changed. The captives would

[1] *Studies in Ancient History*, second series, pp. 64, 65.

be the slaves of their captors—would be owned by them, and under their protection and guardianship. The new mode of marriage would give a sudden extension to the form of the family resting on monandry or Thibetan polyandry. There would be the cohabitation of husbands and wives, and for the first time the idea of a wife as a subject of her husband or husbands would become general. Now the new idea of marriage which would thus be introduced is the idea that was destined everywhere to triumph—that has in fact triumphed among all exogamous races, so far as I know. And it was natural and inevitable that it should triumph. It is easily conceivable how, once men had experience of this new marriage system, unions of kindred on the old model should not only go into desuetude, but not be accounted marriages after all. If, then, we conceive that some time after the rise of a practice of capture the name of 'wife' came to be synonymous with a subject and enslaved woman in the power of her captor or captors, and the name of marriage to be applied to a man's relation to such a woman as possessor of

her, the origin of exogamy becomes apparent. Since a subject and enslaved wife would, in the circumstances of the time, be attainable only by capture, marriage would be possible only through capture, and the prohibition which, as we have seen, would apply to capture, would apply to marriage. Marriage with a woman of the same stock would be a crime and a sin."

This must be taken as his final opinion, and it was a great satisfaction to me to find he adopted my view.

I now turn to Mr. Tylor, and frankly admit the great weight naturally attaching to his opinion. Mr. Tylor found "that there are in different parts of the world twelve or thirteen well-marked exogamous peoples whose habit of residence is for the husband to join the wife's family. This state of things seems to me to prevent our regarding exogamy as a result of capture, it being plain that the warrior who has carried a wife captive from a hostile tribe does not take up his abode in her family. If capture leads to any form of exogamy, this must, I think, be a paternal form; and if it be admitted that the maternal form is earlier,

then it follows that capture is inadmissible as the primary cause of exogamy."[1]

Mr. Tylor here assumes that the custom of the husband joining the wife was aboriginal in these twelve or thirteen exogamous peoples. This, however, seems very improbable. The wife was originally a property. In my view marriage by capture preceded the custom of the husband's moving to the wife's house.

On the other hand, when marriage had become firmly established, when marriage by violent capture had been reduced in many cases to a mere form, terminating in a friendly arrangement, then there was no reason why the husband should not, if the arrangement were otherwise convenient, join the wife's family.

Mr. Tylor also assumes that the custom of descent through the mother was the aboriginal custom. There is no reasonable doubt, I think, and it is indeed generally agreed, that it preceded descent through the father. I am not, however, prepared to admit that it was primeval,

[1] *Journ. Anthropol. Institute*, vol. xviii. p. 266 (1889): E. Tylor on "A Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions: applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent."

but believe there was a time when, as in some of the higher quadrumana now, the young after being weaned are regarded as belonging to the troop, but not specially so to any particular male or female. For this I may quote the authority of M'Lennan, who said: "The earliest human groups can have had no idea of kinship."

Dr. Stärcke also says:[1] "Lubbock's explanation of exogamy is so closely interwoven with his communistic hypothesis that it must stand or fall with it. As we have already declared, and shall more clearly show in the sequel, we regard the communistic hypothesis as wholly false, so that there is no reason for closely examining his explanation of exogamy; we may content ourselves with quoting M'Lennan's incisive criticism.

"The man's kinsfolk stand on one side, the woman's kinsfolk on the other. If, however, women were usually taken captive by a group of men acting in common and enjoying their sexual pleasures in common, I do not see how it would be more easy for a man to take

[1] Stärcke, *The Primitive Family*, p. 221.

for himself a captive woman instead of one belonging to his tribe.[1] This criticism is destructive of Lubbock's hypothesis, and only leaves the modest remnant of truth, that whoever in a primitive community wishes to obtain a wife for himself, must generally contend with a rival."

Having, however, successfully established in the last chapter the existence of communal marriage, Dr. Stärcke's objection falls to the ground.

I now turn to the criticism of Mr. Fison. He expresses himself with great decision, and I admit his high authority, though, as I have already pointed out, it is somewhat weakened by his strong personal bias.

Mr. Fison says that "granting the old undivided commune, his whole theory rests upon the assumption that a warrior has a sole right, as against his tribe, to a captive taken by him in war. In support of this right Sir John advances nothing whatever beyond the assertion that it would be likely to accrue. On the contrary, it appears to me in the highest

[1] M'Lennan, *Studies*, pp. 444, 446.

degree unlikely, because among savages the individual has no rights as distinct from the group to which he belongs; and, moreover, it is directly contradicted by evidence which can be tested at the present day."[1]

Mr. Fison can surely not have considered the matter carefully when he committed himself to the assertion that "among savages the individual has no rights as distinct from the group to which he belongs." Certainly an Australian has not much that can be called property, but his weapons, his opossum skin, &c., &c., are his own; and what is more to the purpose, he has certain rights as to the bestowal of his marriageable girls.

So far as material property is concerned, Roth states that when a man dies his brothers inherit his weapons, implements, &c., as well as his wives. Both Eyre and Grey consider that individuals owned property, and there are even cases of property in land.

Mr. Wheeler, Martin White scholar in sociology, in *The Tribe and Intertribal*

[1] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 151.

Relations in Australia, 1910, says, page 36, that "there is a clear recognition of individual or family ownership in personal property." It is probable, however, that the tribes may differ somewhat in this respect.

So far as the right to a captured woman is concerned, M. Salomon Reinach[1] objects that: "On a proposé deux théories principales pour rendre compte de l'exogamie; M. Lubbock admettet que les hommes des différentes tribus auraient d'abord (comme dans l'histoire des Romains et des Sabines) pris de force leurs femmes dans d'autres tribus; peu à peu, cette habitude se serait consolidée en règle et la razzia serait devenue une sorte de contrat. Une considération suffit à montrer l'inanité de cette thèse; c'est que l'exogamie n'est pas l'interdiction du mariage entre membres d'une même tribu, mais entre membres d'un même clan."

I cannot attempt to answer this argument, because, though it may perhaps be my stupidity, I fail to understand it.

[1] Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, p. 161. He also mentions M'Lennan and H. Spencer, but I think he has not correctly understood their views.

Lastly, Professor Westermarck says :[1] "Why should women taken in war have been the men's personal property, if the women of the tribe were not so? As Mr. M'Lennan justly remarks, war captives are usually obtained by group acts or quasi group acts; hence capture would be recognised as a regular mode of adding women to the group, subject to the customary rights of its male members; and every man in the group would claim the communal right to women taken by others."

In *The Origin of Civilisation* I have given abundant evidence that the victor did retain his captive, after compensating and rewarding no doubt those who had helped him. Here, also, as regards the fact, I may refer to Mr. Howitt[2] and others against Mr. Fison and Professor Westermarck. I will only here add the classical case of Theseus, who, as Plutarch tells us, made a contract with his companion Tyndarus that when they had carried off Helen they should settle by lot which should have her

[1] *The History of Human Marriage*, p. 316.

[2] *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, pp. 195, 203, 235, 280.

to wife—the loser being bound to help his more fortunate friend in a similar expedition.

Mr. Fison goes on to allege[1] that my suggestion "is directly contradicted by evidence which can be tested at the present day." The only basis for this sweeping assertion, and an answer which Mr. Fison regards as conclusive, is that a man cannot marry a woman whom he has captured unless he can do so legally, that is, unless she belongs to a family within which union is permissible. Here, then, he says,[2] "we have exogamy, certainly not produced by marriage by capture, according to Sir John Lubbock's theory (*The Origin of Civilisation*, page 83), but actually compelling marriage by capture to conform to long-established exogamous rules."

But though this argument seems conclusive to Mr. Fison, it did not convince his colleague, Mr. Howitt. Mr. Howitt indeed could so little assent, that he tells us it is the one point on which he could not agree with Mr. Fison. We may be sure, therefore, that he would have done so if he could. On

[1] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 151. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 67.

such a matter the opinion of Mr. Howitt might well be considered as counterbalancing that of Mr. Fison.

Though Mr. Howitt does not give me the advantage of his support in so many words, he does so practically. Mr. Fison makes the singular error of supposing that what is true now must have held good in all previous times.

Mr. Howitt considers,[1] as I do, that the sequence of events was, firstly, a period of communal marriage, during which, by capture or elopement, some men secured women specially for themselves; and subsequently what he calls a segmented commune, *i.e.* a community divided into two or more "exogamous intermarrying communes. This would arise by the segmentation of an original commune." I confess I do not quite understand what is Mr. Howitt's idea as to how this segmentation would originate. I doubt if there was ever anything which could be called a "segmentation." Let me then give my suggestion.

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 264.

In endeavouring to reconstruct the past history of Australia, we must evidently carry ourselves back to a time when the Australians, coming no doubt from the north, and few in numbers, occupied but a small area of the country.

At present we know that certain family names are spread over enormous districts. They must, however, have originated in some comparativaly small area and tribe, thence spreading over the country.

Let us take the first tribe mentioned by Mr. Fison, the Mount Gambier tribe of South Australia. It is, he says,[1] divided "into two classes called respectively Krumite and Kroki. The females are called Krumitegor and Krokigor."

The existence of Krumites and Krokis in a single tribe did not, as I think, originate from a "segmentation" of the tribe into two phratries, but rather from the infusion of women belonging to the Kroki tribe among the Krumites, and of others belonging to the Krumites among the Krokis, so that

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 33.

eventually the tribe came to consist of the two phratries.

Let us suppose two small tribes—Krumites and Krokis—living near one another, and with communal marriage only. Occasionally a Krumite would carry off a Kroki woman, or a Kroki man would carry off a Krumite woman, either with or without her consent. Both Mr. Fison and Mr. Howitt admit that under these circumstances the right of the captor would be respected by the tribe.

By degrees there would be more and more Krumite men with Krokigor wives, and Kroki men with Krumitegor wives. But no Krumite could marry a Krumitegor, nor could any Kroki man marry a Krokigor woman.

As mother-kin prevailed, the children of the Krumitegor wives would be Krumites in the midst of the Kroki clan, and those of the Krokigor wives would be Krokis in the midst of the Krumite clan.

The idea, however, that a Kroki could only marry a Krumitegor, and a Krumite could only marry a Krokigor, would gradually gain strength as time ran on. Finally the rule

might become so strong that even if a Krumite carried off a Krumitegor girl, or a Kroki a Krokigor girl, he would not be permitted to marry her.

If instead of two such neighbouring tribes there were four or eight, the result would be similar, though more complex.

Mr. Fison seems, as Mr. Howitt points out, to have fallen into the mistaken idea that the present rule must have been in force in all previous ages.

At any rate his objection does not seem to me, any more than it did to Mr. Howitt, to be conclusive, or indeed to have much force.

Mr. Hartland, though he does not refer to my suggestion in so many words, seems, if I understand him correctly, to adopt it.[1] He says: "The evolution of human society more commonly takes a different direction. It is dependent not on weakness but on strength and prowess. The impulse to domineer by virtue of physical superiority has asserted itself in all ages. The capture of women has doubtless been always going on. Thus side by side

[1] *Primitive Paternity*, vol. i. p. 95.

with marriages in which the husband resided with or visited the wife, arose the practice of keeping one or more captive women at a man's own home for his use and benefit. The power in the household given to him by such an arrangement would be desired by others who had not the opportunity of making hostile raids for the purpose of capture. It was obtained by elopement, by simulated capture, by exchange, by the payment of what we call a bride-price. In any one of these ways, or by a combination of two of them, marriage is entered into in various parts of the world."

Lastly, I may say a word as to the curious custom known as avoidance or "hlonipa," by which sundry near relatives, and especially sons and mothers-in-law, are forbidden to have any relations with, or even to speak to, one another.

Mr. Tylor, who has some very interesting remarks on these customs in his *Early History of Man*, observes that "it is hard even to guess what state of things could have brought them into existence,"[1] nor, so far as I am

[1] *Loc. cit.*, chap. xiv. p. 134.

aware, has any one else attempted to explain them. In the chapter on marriage I endeavoured, however, to point out the manner in which I conceive that they may have arisen.

My suggestion was that the custom "seems to be a natural consequence of marriage by capture. When the capture was a reality, the indignation of the parents would also be real; when it became a mere symbol, the parental anger would be symbolised also, and would be continued even after its origin was forgotten."

Mr. Crawley, speaking of this suggestion,[1] observes that it "has been assisted by one or two mistaken accounts of explorers; but, in the first place, 'marriage by capture' was never more than a rare sporadic result; in the second place, the preponderance of sex is overlooked. Why should the 'indignation' be so generally expressed by the mother only? Thirdly, no fact ever remained as a symbol or ceremony without some real psychological impulse to inspire it."

Mr. Mathew, however, who has observed

[1] *The Mystic Rose*, p. 405.

the custom at first hand, supports my conclusion :[1] "It seems to me that the cause of estrangement is that the son-in-law has been in times long past guilty of an offence which his wife's relatives, and especially her mother, grievously reprehend, and which custom forbids the latter to condone ; and the offence, it is most natural to conclude, has been the forcible abduction of his wife."

And again :[2] "Elsewhere I have suggested that probably in cases of marriage by capture it might have fallen to the girl's mother, as her natural guardian, to inflict some condign penalty upon the abductor, if he should happen to be overtaken, and that in the course of time the exaction of penalty was dispensed with and the fiction of mutual invisibility was introduced instead."

Messrs. Fison and Howitt also observe[3] that "it seems not unlikely that the hostile feelings aroused against him in the mind of her mother in consequence of his elopement

[1] John Mathew, *Eaglehawk and Crow*, p. 115.

[2] John Mathew, *Two Representative Tribes of Queensland*, p. 164.

[3] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 16.

with her daughter, which must be supposed real, received a continued expression from the mother through this refusal of all intercourse with her son-in-law. An occasional occurrence at first, ripened in time into a settled custom."

M. Reinach also considers my suggestion, "le moins invraisemblable," though he is not prepared to accept it.[1]

I submit, then, that the other theories which have been suggested in order to account for exogamy and marriage by capture will not hold water, and that the objections to my suggestion have broken down.

[1] *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, vol. i. p. 119.

CHAPTER III

TOTEMISM

Totems are a class of objects which a savage regards as standing to him and his in some peculiar and intimate relation, from which in some mysterious manner he derives his origin, and which he regards with superstitious respect, in some cases amounting to awe. A fetich is an object the possession of which is supposed to give the owner power over some spirit or demon. A fetich, then, is a single object; a totem is a class of objects.

Another name which has sometimes been confused with one or the other of these is the "manitou," a name, like totem, of North American origin. A "manitou" may perhaps be described as the totem of an individual, while the true totem has relation to the class.

Totemism is no doubt founded on somewhat loose and vague ideas, but the fundamental characteristics may be said to be—

1. The descent from some object, generally an animal or plant;

2. The natural reluctance to do it any injury; and

3. Finally, the worship of the totem.

How, then, did totemism originate?

I suggested that it arose "from the practice of naming, first individuals, and then their families, after particular animals. A family, for instance, which was called after the bear would come to look on that animal first with interest, then with respect, and at length with a sort of awe."

Mr. Herbert Spencer almost simultaneously, and independently, arrived at a similar explanation.

The principal difference between us was that his suggestion had special reference to nicknames, which was not the case with mine.

My, or our, view has naturally been subjected to criticism.

The first point with which I will deal is the relation of totemism to religion.

Speaking in 1868, I referred to "nature-worship or totemism, in which natural objects,

trees, lakes, stones, animals, &c., are worshipped."

To this Mr. Lang objects[1] that "nature-worship may exist where there is no totemism, and totemism where there is no nature-worship; indeed where, as among the Arunta, there is, strictly speaking, no worship, as far as we are informed."

Dr. Frazer, author of the article "Totemism" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and who has recently given us an exhaustive work in four volumes on *Totemism and Exogamy*, in which, with great industry, he has brought together the customs of savages in all parts of the world, also criticises my statement.

"Lord Avebury," he says,[2] "regards totemism as a worship of natural objects, and thinks it may have arisen through the practice of naming, first individuals, and then their families, after particular animals, plants, or other natural objects; for from naming themselves thus people might gradually come to look upon their namesakes, whether animals, plants, or what

[1] *Social Origins*, p. 122.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 44.

not, with interest, respect, and awe. Totemism, however," he asserts, "cannot properly be called a religion at all."

In his third volume he again says—speaking of the Hereros and other pastoral tribes of Africa, where a large proportion of the totemic taboos have reference to cattle—"this observation should warn us against falling into the common error of treating totemism as a religion or worship of animals and plants."[1]

In his fourth and final volume also he says: "If religion implies, as it seems to do, an acknowledgment on the part of the worshipper that the object of his worship is superior to himself, then pure totemism cannot properly be called a religion at all, since a man looks upon his totem as his equal and friend, not at all as his superior, still less as his god."[2]

Yet on the same page, a little further on, he admits that "the attention of American observers, even of an observer so sagacious as L. H. Morgan, seems to have been turned

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iii. p. 83.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 5.

almost exclusively to the social side of totemism, while the religious or superstitious side of the system, in other words, the relation to which human beings are supposed to stand to their totemic objects, has been almost wholly overlooked."[1]

Again, in his article in the *Encyclopædia*, he says that totemism is "both a religious and a social system. In its religious aspect it consists of the relations of mutual respect and protection between a man and his totem; in its social aspect it consists of the relation of the clansmen to each other and to men of other clans."[2]

For instance, in the island of Yam, north of Australia,[3] "the hammer-headed shark and the crocodile seem to have been on the point of sloughing off their animal skins and developing into purely anthropomorphic heroes or gods, while in the food offered, the prayers prayed, the songs sung, and the dances danced in their honour we see the rudiments of religious worship. The sacred enclosure, also, with its

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 18. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 467.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 21.

shrines and images of the animal-shaped heroes, is not far removed from a temple."

Again, he says:[1] "Dr. Rivers appears to be unquestionably right in holding that the sacred animals associated with tribes or subdivisions of tribes in Fiji are totems in the process of evolving into gods."

In Samoa[2] "the sacred animals and plants seem certainly to have advanced beyond the stage of totems pure and simple and to have attained to the dignity of gods. Thus it would appear that in this part of Polynesia totemism has developed into a religion."

In Tonga[3] "Dr. Rivers was informed that the natives believed themselves to be descended from their sacred animals"; and he adds: "This scanty Tongan evidence distinctly strengthens the belief that we have to do with true totemism, for while there is a close resemblance with the beliefs and practice of Samoa there is in addition the belief in descent from the totem-animal."[4]

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 140.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 151.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 178.
[4] W. H. R. Rivers, "Totemism in Polynesia and Melanesia," *Journ. of the Royal Anthropol. Institute*, xxxix., p. 160 (1909).

In his fourth volume also he says:[1] "No doubt it may, under favourable circumstances, develop into a worship of animals or plants, of the sun or the moon, of the sea or the rivers, or whatever the particular totem may have been; but such worship is never found amongst the lowest savages, who have totemism in its purest form; it occurs only among peoples who have made a considerable advance in culture, and accordingly we are justified in considering it as a later phase of religious evolution, as a product of the disruption and decay of totemism proper."

And finally he says[2] that "at its lowest level in Australia totemic society is democratical and magical. At higher levels—in Melanesia, Polynesia, America, and Africa—it becomes more and more monarchical and religious, till it culminates in the absolute monarchies and bloody religious ritual of Ashantee, Dahomey, and Uganda. In India its natural development has been in large measure checked and obscured by races which are not totemic; hence

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 5.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 30. See also p. 230.

it is hardly safe to take Dravidian totemism into account in an attempt to arrange the totemic societies of the world in a series corresponding to their natural order of evolution. If now we look about for a stage of religion which may reasonably be regarded as evolved from totemism, we shall perhaps find it most clearly marked in Melanesia and Polynesia, where, answering to the religious evolution of gods, there has been a political evolution of chiefs. The family and village gods of Samoa, embodied in the shape of animals, plants, and other species of natural objects, are most probably nothing but somewhat developed totems which are on the point of sloughing off their old shapes and developing into anthropomorphic deities."

But that is just what I suggested, viz. that the respect for the totem culminates "at length in awe" and leads up to religion.

This I understand to be his final conclusion. He does not withdraw, indeed, his previous expression of dissent, or refer to my book; still the above passage clearly embodies the opinion which I expressed, and I may therefore

fairly claim Dr. Frazer as an actual, though not an avowed supporter.

Whatever may be the case as regards Dr. Frazer, I can certainly quote other high authorities as supporters.

Mr. J. F. M'Lennan did not, so far as I know, express his view as to the origin of totemism, but he said:[1] "We have found that there are tribes now existing on the earth in the totem stage, each named after some animal or plant, which is its symbol or ensign, and which by the tribesmen is religiously regarded. . . . In several cases we have seen the tribesmen believe themselves to be descended from the totem, and in every case to be, nominally at least, of its breed or species. We have seen a relation existing between the tribesmen and their totem, as in the case of the bear, that might well grow into that of worshipper and god, leading to the establishment of religious ceremonials to allay the totem's just anger or secure his continued protection."

If he does not in so many words adopt our

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, Oct. 1869.

suggestion, he certainly seems to lead up to it.

Mr. J. F. M'Lennan's brother, Mr. D. M'Lennan, also a learned ethnologist, though he does not refer to Herbert Spencer or to me, clearly adopts our view. He says:[1] "Animal and plant worship . . . exhibited the leading notes of totemism; that animals, for example, were worshipped by tribes of men who were named after them and believed to be of their breed, and never eaten unless eucharistically."

This is also the opinion of Mr. Tylor. He says that totemism "comes within the province of religion so far as the clan animals, &c., are the subjects of religious observances, or are actually treated as patron-deities. To some extent this seems to happen among the Algonquins themselves, some accounts describing the totem-animal as being actually regarded as the sacred object or 'medicine' or protector of the family bearing its name and symbol."[2]

Robertson Smith[3] speaks of "the ascription

[1] *The Patriarchal Theory*, p. 229 (1885).
[2] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 213.
[3] *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, p. 188.

to the totem of a sacred character, which may result in its being regarded as the god of the stock, but at any rate makes it be regarded with veneration, so that, for example, a totem animal is not used as ordinary food."

I may also quote M. E. Durckheim, editor of *L'Année Sociologique*, who says:[1] "Dans le principe, en vertu de sa nature même, le totémisme est une religion etroitement, limité au clan," and again, "Un totem, en effet, n'est pas seulement un nom; c'est, d'abord et avant tout, un principe religieux."[2]

I still think that totemism would have been a convenient designation for religion in this stage. The writings of Mr. Lang himself, however, and other anthropologists, have so far popularised the term "totemism" as a social rather than a religious phrase, that it is perhaps convenient to limit it in this sense. In any case this is a question of terminology.

I now come to the second point. If totemism led up, though it may not have been the only consideration which did so, to the worship

[1] "Sur le Totémisme," *L'Année Sociologique*, p. 119 (1902).
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 110. See also pp. 82–87.

of animals and plants, was this due to the name having been adopted by the family? My words were: "In endeavouring to account for the worship of animals, we must remember that names are very frequently taken from them. The children and followers of a man called the Bear or the Lion would make that a tribal name. Hence the animal itself would be first respected, at last worshipped."[1]

Mr. Fison has objected to my suggestion. He says:[2] "Sir John Lubbock considers that the worship of plants and animals is susceptible of a very simple explanation, and has really originated from the practice of naming, first individuals and then their families after particular animals. This is surely a reversal of the true order. The Australian divisions show that the totem is in the first place the badge of a group, not of an individual. The individual takes it, in common with his fellows, only because he is a member of the group. And, even if it were first given to an individual, his family,

[1] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 624.
[2] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 168.

i.e. his children, could not inherit it from him when descent is reckoned on the female side."

Mr. Fison first objects that the "Australian divisions show that the totem is in the first place the badge of a group, not of an individual." This, however, is not the case. No doubt the Australian divisions show that the totem is now the badge of a group. They do not, and cannot, show that this was so "in the first place."

Mr. Fison truly says that "the individual takes it in common with his fellows only because he is a member of the group." No doubt that is the case now, but why did the group take the name originally?

My suggestion was that if a group was led by a man who had been named after an animal, the members of the group took the same name; if the leader was a Lion or a Kangaroo, the group came to call themselves Lions or Kangaroos, and to assume some mysterious relation with the animal whose name they bore.

Australian totems cannot have originated under existing conditions. At present the

same totems extend over great areas; they must have originated in comparatively small areas.

Mr. Fison's second objection is "that even if it were first given to an individual, his family, *i.e.* his children, could not inherit it from him when descent is reckoned on the female side."

This may be true, but Mr. Fison here again falls into the mistake of supposing mother-kin to have been aboriginal. It preceded father-kin, no doubt, but there must, I submit, have been a still earlier stage when children were not regarded as specially related either to the father or the mother, but only as part of the horde. Mr. Fison's second objection therefore falls to the ground.

Mr. Lang[1] also evidently regards it as a fatal objection that totem names are group names; and as they "occur where group names are derived from the mother, they cannot have originated in the animal nicknames of individual dead grandfathers. The names of the dead are usually tabooed and forgotten; but that

[1] *Social Origins*, p. 142.

is of no great moment. The point is that such group names are derived through mothers in the first instance, not through male founders of families. No theory which starts from an individual male ancestor, and his name bequeathed to his descendants, can be correct."

This is the same objection as that of Mr. Fison, which I have already answered.

Mr. Lang's own theory is that totemism originated in nicknames invented by outsiders. He assumes that mother-kin preceded both totemism and endogamy. This would surely be fatal to his theory. If totemism originated at a time when the child was regarded as that of the family group rather than of either father or mother exclusively, then his objection to my suggestion necessarily falls to the ground.

Mr. Lang suggests that these nicknames were imposed from without. But in the group as he considers it constituted, the woman belongs to a different phratry from the man, and in such a group his objection seems fatal to his own suggestion. But though the objection applies to his theory it is no answer to mine.

It is based on the assumption that it originated at a time when a child was regarded as related to the mother and not to the father. This Mr. Lang considers to be original, and if so the objection might be fatal. But I may perhaps be allowed to quote from *The Origin of Civilisation:* "We shall find, I think, reason for concluding that a man was first regarded as merely related to his family; then to his mother but not to his father; then to his father and not to his mother; and only at last to both father and mother."[1]

Mr. Lang admits that his "theory, of course, is not in accordance with any savage explanations of the origin of their totem. It could not be! Their explanations are such fables as only men in their intellectual condition could invent; they are myths, they involve impossibilities."[2]

Mr. Howitt discusses Mr. Lang's suggestion, and says: "To me, judging of the possible feelings of the pristine ancestors of the Australians by their descendants of the present time, it seems most improbable that any such

[1] Page 52. [2] *Social Origins*, p. 188.

nicknames would have been adopted and have given rise to totemism, nor do I know of a single instance in which such nicknames have been adopted."[1]

Indeed in discussing exogamy Mr. Lang seems to me to abandon this view, and almost entirely, if not entirely, to adopt that which I suggested. "Totem names," he says, "once accepted and stereotyped, implied a connection between each kindred and the animal, plant, or other thing in nature whose name the kindred bore. Round the mystery of this connection the savage mind would play freely, and would invent the explanatory myths of descent from, and kinship with, or other friendly relations with, the name-giving objects. A measure of respect for the objects would be established: they might not be killed or eaten, except under necessity."

I now pass to M. S. Reinach, who says:[2] "Lubbock et Spencer ont admis que l'habitude, fréquente chez les primitifs, de prendre le nom d'un animal, a donné naissance au totémisme:

[1] A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 154.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. i. p. 22.

les petits-fils du guerrier Serpent se seraient persuades qu'ils descendaient vraiment d'un animal ainsi désigné. Cette explication présuppose à tort que l'idée de la descendance est le facteur essential du totémisme, alors qu'elle n'est qu'une hypothèse de sauvage, destinée a rendre compte de l'ancienne alliance qui existe entre son clan et un clan d'animaux. La facilité avec laquelle les hommes prennent et reçoivent des noms d'animaux est un effet, non une cause du totémisme."

For this categorical statement he gives no evidence. Moreover, he admits[1] that "Les clans et les individus prennent des noms d'animaux ; là où le totémisme existe, ces animaux sont des totems" ; and a little further on :[2] "Les membres d'un clan totémique se croient très souvent apparentés à l'animal totem par le lien d'une descendance commune."

And again :[3] "Les chasseurs sont divisés en clans ou petites tribus dont chacune croit avoir pour ancêtre un animal différent. Le clan du loup croit descendre du loup, avoir

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 21. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 25.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 93. See also p. 295.

fait un traité d'alliance avec les loups et, sauf dans le cas de légitime défense, ne pas pouvoir tuer de loups. Le clan du cheval croit descendre du cheval et ne pas pouvoir, sans commettre un crime horrible, tuer un cheval et ainsi de suite. Chacun de ces clans s'abstiendra de chasser et de tuer telle ou telle espèce d'animaux."

As to the facts, therefore, I am glad to have the support of his high authority, and he admits that our suggestion expresses the view of totemistic savages themselves. Far, however, from regarding this as any confirmation, he goes so far as to allege that the views of those concerned must necessarily be wrong:[1] "L'explanation d'une coutume, recueillie de la bouche des primitifs, ne doit jamais être tenue pour exacte."

He subsequently, however, admits:[2] "Mais il suffit que quelques sauvages fassent des réponses plus précises pour que nous donnions à ces dernières la préférence, à la condition qu'elles s'accordent avec certaines idées d'ordre

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 39.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 128.

général qui sont communes à tout l'ensemble de l'humanité."

Dr. Frazer seems to have suggested, and Messrs. Spencer and Gillen adopted, the view that totemism arose in magical processes intended to secure and increase the supplies of food. But, as Mr. Howitt says,[1] "this hypothesis takes us back far into the time when the function of each totem group was to secure the multiplication of the particular object the name of which it bore. But the totem group is seen there to be fully formed, and the question still remains, How was it that men assumed the names of objects, which in fact must have been the commencement of totemism?"

Dr. Frazer again rejects the explanation suggested independently by Spencer and myself, without giving, as it seems to me, any sufficient reason for doing so. He says[2] indeed: "But this view attributes to verbal misunderstandings far more influence than, in spite of the so-called comparative mythology, they ever seem to have exercised."

[1] *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 153.
[2] *Ency. Brit.*, article "Totemism," p. 476.

Yet he found himself in reality compelled by the force of facts practically to admit it.

I do not, indeed, find it easy to arrive at Dr. Frazer's real view as to the origin of totemism. He says:[1] "The general explanation of totemism to which the Intichiuma ceremonies seem to point is that it is primarily an organised and co-operative system of magic designed to secure for the members of the community, on the one hand, a plentiful supply of all the commodities of which they stand in need, and, on the other hand, immunity from all the perils and dangers to which man is exposed in his struggle with nature."

This could not, however, explain the origin of totemism. Totemism must have existed before it could have been utilised to secure a supply of food. This must obviously have been an afterthought. Indeed, he seems to realise this, for he tells us[2] that "further reflection has led me to the conclusion that magical ceremonies for the increase or diminution of the totems are likely to be a

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. i. p. 116.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 160.

later, though still very early, outgrowth of totemism rather than its original root." This, however, does not appear to be his present view. After long reflection, he says:[1] "It occurred to me that the simple idea, the primitive superstition at the root of totemism, may perhaps be found in the mode by which the Central Australian aborigines still determine the totems of every man, woman, and child of the tribe."

Some Australian tribes believe that the spirits of the dead haunt particular places, those of different totems congregating in particular localities. Here they enter the mother and are born in due course, the totem of the child depending on the place. The child, as I understand, is given the name of the spirit who is supposed to be reincarnated, but this does not carry us further. Dr. Frazer admits[2] that "a link in the chain of evidence was wanting; for, as I have pointed out, the Australian beliefs cannot be regarded as absolutely primitive. Three years after I pro-

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. i. p. 57.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 59.

pounded my theory the missing link was found, the broken chain was completed, by the researches of Dr. W. H. R. Rivers; for in the Banks Islands he discovered a series of beliefs and customs which fulfil exactly my theoretical definition of absolutely primitive totemism."

Dr. Rivers's observation, however, even if correctly interpreted, is a very narrow basis for so far-reaching a conclusion. It is not very clear. To my mind it seems fanciful and inconclusive. On the other hand, the explanation suggested by Herbert Spencer and myself is simple—I might almost say obvious—and to it I still adhere. It is indeed little more than a statement of fact.

Since *The Origin of Civilisation* was published additional evidence has accumulated, none of which tends to weaken my argument, and much of which strongly supports it. I referred in the work cited to natives of Australia, India, Madagascar, South Africa, North America, Samoa, Siberia, and elsewhere. Here I will only add some few additional cases. The Peruvians, according to Garcillasso de la Vega, considered the

fish of a certain river as "their brothers." According to the Rev. John Batchelor, some of the Ainos believe themselves to be descended from a bear and call themselves after it. Some of the New Guinea tribes regard the totem animal as their ancestor.

Among the Halepaiks of the Canara district in the Bombay Presidency[1] "each exogamous section, known as a bali (literally a creeper), is named after some animal or tree which is held sacred by the members of the same. This animal, tree, or flower, &c., seems to have been once considered the common ancestor of the members of the bali, and to the present day it is both worshipped by them and held sacred in the sense that they will not injure it."

In the Madras Presidency[2] "the Komatis are a highly organised caste, being divided and subdivided into many clans or septs which are strictly exogamous and totemic; in other words, no man may marry a woman of the same clan as himself, and all the

[1] E. Thurston, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 321, quoting *Monograph Ethnological Survey of Bombay*, xii. (1904).

[2] *Loc. cit.* p. 241.

members of a clan revere their totems in the usual way, making no secret of their reverence."

According to Dr. Theal,[1] the historian of South Africa, "the reverence of the Bantus for their totemic animals rests on a belief that the souls of their dead are lodged in the creatures; in other words, totemism with them is only one form of the worship of ancestors."

I need not, however, multiply quotations, for speaking generally Dr. Frazer says:[2] "Thus through the identification of dead men with their totems a reverence for the totems tends readily to be combined with or to pass into a reverence and worship of ancestors."

The late Dr. Wilken has suggested[3] "that totemism among the North American Indians, or wherever it may be found, may have sprung from the transmigration of souls in the same way in which we have indicated among the peoples of the Indian Archipelago; the animal

[1] G. M'Call Theal, *Records of South-Eastern Africa*, vol. ii. p. 404, *et seq.*

[2] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. ii. p. 107.

[3] *Het animisme bij de Volken van den Indischen Archipel. De Indische Gids.*, 1884.

in which the souls of the dead are thought by preference to be incarnate becomes a kinsman, an ancestor, and as such is revered. Thus it is not, as Spencer supposes, a 'misinterpretation of nicknames,' but the transmigration of souls, which forms the connecting link between totemism on the one side and the worship of the dead on the other, which link, while it has dropped out among many peoples, is still for the most part clearly observable in the Archipelago."

But the question is, why does a savage suppose that his soul is connected with some particular species of animal? and what support is there for this particular view?

Dr. Wilken's explanation seems to me far-fetched and not such as would have occurred to an archaic people.

Moreover, it could only have originated in a people among whom descent is reckoned in the male line. It is found, however, in many races which are still in the mother-kin stage. Mr. Lang has already pointed out that this objection is fatal.

W. Robertson Smith has attempted to

explain the origin of totemism by what has been called "a totem sacrament." This was an original and ingenious suggestion, but unsupported by evidence. It has been supposed by some that the "Intichiuma" ceremonies by which some of the Australians think they can increase their food-supplies furnish the evidence required. This, however, is not so. The ceremony is not one of religion, but of the very opposite—magic. It is not a service of prayer to the Deity, but an attempt to control and dominate nature: the totem is not yet regarded in any way in Australia as a deity.

Mr. Tylor also says:[1] "Sir John Lubbock, in his work on the *Origin of Civilisation*, and Mr. Herbert Spencer,[2] have favoured the idea of its springing from the really very general practice of naming individual men after animals —bear, deer, eagle, &c.—these becoming in certain cases hereditary tribe-names. . . . It must be admitted as possible that such personal epithets might become family surnames, and

[1] Tylor, *Primitive Marriage*, vol. ii. pp. 214 and 215.
[2] Spencer, in *Fortnightly Review*, 1870.

eventually give rise to myths of the families being actually descended from the animals in question as ancestors, whence might arise many other legends of strange adventures and heroic deeds of ancestors, to be attributed to the quasi-human animals whose names they bore. . . . Yet while granting that such a theory affords a rational interpretation of the obscure facts of totemism, we must treat it as a theory not vouched for by sufficient evidence, and within our knowledge liable to mislead, if pushed to extremes."

I do not quite understand the last qualification, or whether I could, or have, pushed my suggestion "to extremes."

I am glad to find that so high an authority as Mr. J. M. Robertson concurs in the main with our view. He says:[1]—

"The more one considers the problem, the more one is convinced that Dr. Frazer has remained astray on this point since he merely rejected, instead of improving, the 'nickname' and 'individual-name' theories of Spencer and Avebury.

[1] *The Literary Guide*, July 1, 1910.

"But it was quite unnecessary to limit the notion, as Mr. Lang did in his *Social Origins*, to sobriquets. In the same year (1903), incidentally and quite independently I offered in *Pagan Christs* the solution of simple agreed-on naming. I proceeded upon the suggestions of Lord Avebury and Mr. Spencer, which clearly would not fully meet the case, but which only needed recasting; and I did this without knowledge of any other attempt. I remain satisfied that, in the broad form referred to, the name-theory will cover the whole ground."

As Mr. Robertson says, Mr. Frazer himself "adopted in succession two explanations, both of which he now rejects as being inadequate. With scientific courage and candour he avows: 'I have changed my views repeatedly, and I am resolved to change them again with every change of the evidence.'"

As a general rule the phratry (see *ante*, p. 42) and the totem group coincide. Evidently, however, this is not necessary. In Africa several groups might independently have the bear for their totem, in Australia

the kangaroo or the emu. Hence we might naturally expect to find lion or kangaroo totems in different phratries. This throws some light on the cases in which a man could marry a woman belonging to (nominally) the same totem.[1] It does not, however, follow, as Mr. Goldenweiser supposes, "that the Australian totemic clan is not as such exogamous."[2] The name is the same, but the totemic clans are really distinct.

It is, then, little more than a mere statement of the facts that—

1. Many savage tribes call themselves after animals, plants, and other natural objects, but especially after animals, which are their "totems."

2. That they consider themselves related to, and descended from, such totems.

3. That they treat such totems in consequence with respect and forbearance; and finally,

4. That they finally come to regard them as special and tribal deities.

[1] See, for instance, Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 175.

[2] Goldenweiser, *Inst. of Am. Folk-lore*, vol. xxiii. p. 63 (1910).

CHAPTER IV

WITCHCRAFT AND MAGIC

WITCHCRAFT is the curse of savage life. The savage is haunted by the dread, sometimes no doubt lulled for a time, but ever latent in his mind, that some enemy is endangering his health or life by magical influences.

We are told of many tribes that they attribute all or almost all disease and death to sorcery, so that a death generally implies one murder, and leads up to another.

For instance, "amongst the Central Australian natives there is no such thing as belief in natural death; however old or decrepit a man or woman may be when this takes place, it is at once supposed that it has been brought about by the magic influence of some enemy, and in the normal condition of the tribe the death of one individual is followed by the murder of some one else

who is supposed to be guilty of having caused the death."[1]

So also among the Fijians, Seemann[2] states that "the sorcerer proceeds to obtain any article that has once been in the possession of the person to be operated upon. These articles are then burnt with certain leaves, and if the reputation of the sorcerer be sufficiently powerful, in nine cases out of ten the nervous fears of the individual to be punished will bring on disease, if not death; a similar process is applied to discover thieves."

"The Bechuanas," says Philip, "and all the Kaffir tribes have no idea of any man dying except from hunger, violence, or witchcraft. If a man die even at the age of ninety, if he do not die of hunger or by violence, his death is imputed to sorcery or to witchcraft, and blood is required to expiate or avenge it."[3]

In the New Hebrides, "when a man fell ill, he knew that some sorcerer was burning his rubbish; and shell trumpets, which could

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 476.

[2] *A Mission to Viti*, p. 189.

[3] Philip's *South Africa*, vol. i. p. 118.

be heard for miles, were blown to signal to the sorcerers to stop, and wait for the presents which would be sent next morning. Night after night Mr. Turner used to hear the melancholy too-tooing of the shells, entreating the wizards to stop plaguing their victims."[1] Savages never know but that they may be placing themselves in the power of these terrible enemies; and it is not too much to say that the horrible dread of unknown evil hangs like a thick cloud over savage life, and embitters every pleasure.

How deeply this terror is burnt into the soul of the unfortunate savage is brought home to us by the statement of Spencer and Gillen,[2] that "any bone, stick, spear, &c., which has thus been 'sung' is supposed to be endowed with what the natives call 'arung-quilltra,' that is, magical poisonous properties, and any native who believes that he has been struck by, say, a charmed spear, is almost sure to die whether the wound be slight or severe, unless he be saved by the counter-magic of

[1] Turner's *Polynesia*, pp. 18, 89, 424.
[2] *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 537.

a medicine-man. There is no doubt whatever that a native will die after the infliction of even a most superficial wound if only he believes the weapon which inflicted the wound had been sung over and thus endowed with arung-quilltra." They add a striking illustration: "A man coming down to the Alice Springs from the Tennant Creek contracted a slight cold, but the local men told him that the members of a group about twelve miles away to the east had taken his heart out, and believing this to be so, he simply laid himself down and wasted away."

The possession of clippings of hair, pieces of clothing, leavings of food, even a piece of ground which has been trodden on, places the victim at the mercy of his enemy. Even the knowledge of the name is in some cases sufficient. Thus the true name of La Belle Sauvage was not Pocahontas, but, as we now know, Matokes, which was concealed from the English lest it should give them power over her. So also among the Romans, Valerius Soranus "died an ill death" for disclosing the real name of Rome.

Moreover, the general idea among savages was that diseases, if not the result of witchcraft, were due to demons, which of course is almost as bad.

Savages not only believe in the power of wizards, but what is at first sight even more remarkable, the wizards, in many cases at any rate, believed in themselves. We must, however, remember that they were qualified, sometimes by impressive ceremonies, sometimes by solitude and fasting. Moreover, they often worked themselves up to a state of intense excitement.

"The Shamans of Siberia are," says Wrangel, "by no means ordinary deceivers, but a psychological phenomenon well deserving of attention. Whenever I have seen them operate they have left me with a long-continued and gloomy impression. The wild look, the bloodshot eyes, the labouring breast and convulsive utterance, the seemingly involuntary distortion of the face and the whole body, the streaming hair, even the hollow sound of the drum, all contributed to the effect; and I can well understand that the whole should appear to the

uncivilised spectator as the work of evil spirits."[1]

Among the Esquimaux the "Angekok" answers closely to the Shaman. Graah thus describes a scene in Greenland: "The angekok came in the evening, and, the lamps being extinguished, and skins hung before the windows (for such arts, for evident reasons, are best practised in the dark), took his station on the floor, close by a well-dried seal-skin there suspended, and commenced rattling it, beating the tambourine and singing, in which last he was seconded by all present. From time to time his chant was interrupted by a cry of 'Goie, goie, goie, goie, goie, goie!' the meaning of which I did not comprehend, coming first from one corner of the hut, and then from the other. Presently all was quiet, nothing being heard but the angekok puffing and blowing as if struggling with something superior to him in strength, and then again a sound resembling somewhat that of castanets, whereupon commenced once more the same song as before, and the same cry of 'Goie,

[1] *Siberia*, p. 124.

goie, goie!' In this way a whole hour elapsed before the wizard could make the torngak, or spirit, obey his summons. Come he did, however, at last, and his approach was announced by a strange rushing sound very like the sound of a large bird flying beneath the roof. The angekok, still chanting, now proposed his questions, which were replied to in a voice quite strange to my ears, but which seemed to me to proceed from the entrance passage near which the angekok had taken his station."[1]

Williams gives the following very similar account of a scene in Fiji: "Unbroken silence follows; the priest becomes absorbed in thought, and all eyes watch him with unblinking steadiness. In a few minutes he trembles; slight distortions are seen in his face, and twitching movements in his limbs. These increase to a violent muscular action, which spreads until the whole frame is strongly convulsed, and the man shivers as with a strong ague fit. In some instances this is accompanied with murmurs and sobs, the

[1] Graah's *Voyage to Greenland*, p. 123. See also Egede's *Greenland.*

veins are greatly enlarged, and the circulation of the blood quickened. The priest is now possessed by his god, and all his words and actions are considered as no longer his own, but those of the deity who has entered into him. Shrill cries of 'Koi au, koi au!' ('It is I, it is I!') fill the air, and the god is supposed thus to notify his approach. While giving the answer the priest's eyes stand out and roll as in a frenzy; his voice is unnatural, his face pale, his lips livid, his breathing depressed, and his entire appearance like that of a furious madman; the sweat runs from every pore, and tears start from his strained eyes; after which the symptoms gradually disappear. The priest looks round with a vacant stare, and as the god says, 'I depart,' announces his actual departure by violently flinging himself down on the mat, or by suddenly striking the ground with his club. The convulsive movements do not entirely disappear for some time."[1] The process described by Dobritzhoffer as occurring among the Abipones is also very similar.

[1] *Fiji and the Fijians*, vol. i. p. 224.

Sorcery and divination are closely connected. In New Zealand, before a warlike expedition was undertaken, the natives sometimes planted sticks in the ground in two rows, one of which denotes their own party, the other that of the enemy. If the wind blows the enemy's sticks backwards, they will be defeated; if forwards, they will be victorious; if obliquely, the expedition will be indecisive. The same criterion is applied to their own sticks.[1]

This is a case of divination, but from it to sorcery is a short and obvious step. When once it is granted that the fall of a stick certainly preludes that of the person it represents, it follows that by upsetting the stick his death can be caused. This is not necessarily, or indeed generally, effected by the intermediation of any supernatural being, but rather by directly influencing the course of nature. It is not a religious ceremony, but a result of magic.

For savages, though universally believers in witchcraft, were by no means alone in their faith. It was no case of mere imposture.

[1] Yates's *New Zealand*, p. 91.

The wizard and the witch believed in themselves and their own powers. Even men like Luther and Wesley were equally convinced. Lecky, in his *History of Rationalism*, shows how general the belief in witchcraft was in Europe during the Middle Ages, and gives a melancholy account of the misery which the belief has inflicted on the human race. He dwells most on the terrible punishments inflicted on supposed wizards and witches, but it is probable that they themselves caused as much misery as they suffered.

"If men believe," says Lecky,[1] "that invisible beings, of superhuman power, restless activity, and intense malignity, are perpetually haunting the world, and directing all their energies to the temptation and the persecution of mankind; if they believe that, in past ages, these spirits have actually governed the bodily functions of men, worked miracles, and foretold future events—if all this is believed, not with the dull and languid assent of custom, but with an intensely realised, living, and operative assurance; if it presents itself to

[1] *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism*, vol. i. p. 16.

the mind and imagination as a vivid truth, exercising that influence over the reason and occupying that prominence in the thoughts of men which its importance would demand, the antecedent improbability of witchcraft would appear far less than if this doctrine was rejected or was unrealised."

The whole power of Churches, vigorously supported as they were by the secular arm, was powerless to put down magic and witchcraft. On the contrary, in the Middle Ages it took on a new lease of life.

The sorcerer did not merely rely on his own powers, as had previously been the rule, but entered into an unholy alliance with the powers of evil. As Lecky puts it,[1] "the subject in the twelfth century passed into an entirely new phase. The conception of a witch, as we now conceive it—that is to say, of a woman who had entered into a deliberate compact with Satan, who was endowed with the power of working miracles whenever she pleased, and who was continually transported through the air to the Sabbath where she

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 51.

paid her homage to the evil one — first appeared. The panic created by the belief advanced at first slowly, but after a time with a fearfully accelerated rapidity. Thousands of victims were sometimes burnt alive in a few years.[1] Every country in Europe was stricken with the wildest panic. Hundreds of the ablest judges were selected for the extirpation of the crime. A vast literature was created on the subject, and it was not until much of the eighteenth century had passed away that the executions finally ceased."

We can hardly, I think, admit that this was an entirely new phase, but it certainly acquired fresh force. Punishments and persecution were powerless to destroy the belief.

Even amongst ourselves witchcraft, though happily shorn of its terrors, and scouted by day, revives with the lighting of the candles, and a large proportion of our countrymen and countrywomen half believe in ghosts and nature-spirits—in mediums and spirits who are supposed to be allowed to revisit this

[1] It has been estimated by Sprenger that during the Christian period some 9,000,000 persons—mostly poor women—were burned as witches.

earth for no serious purpose and with no apparent object. So deeply indeed are these superstitious feelings ingrained in us, that perhaps few even of those who in the bright light of day are entirely disbelievers in ghosts, can honestly say that in the dusk of the evening, by firelight or moonshine, they are absolutely unaffected. For all practical purposes, however, any belief in witchcraft or magic has dropped out of our lives. With the savage it is very different.

The light of science, however, is gradually dispersing the gloom of superstition, and has robbed witchcraft to a great extent of its terrors, though it holds its own amongst savages; and amongst ourselves still lingers on and crops up in most unexpected places, though happily in a milder form.

No small part of the life of an Australian is passed in magical ceremonies.

The Intichiuma ceremonies often last over several months. They appear to be magical rites intended to secure a satisfactory supply of food, and are often, though by no means always, associated with the initiation of the young men.

The rain-makers of Central Africa or among the North American Indians do not pray for rain, they "make rain." The Samoan rain-doctor wets his sacred stone when he wishes for wet weather, and dries it before the fire if sunshine is desired.

The terms Magic and Witchcraft are often used as convertible. There are, however, three perfectly distinct operations :—

1. In one, man believes that he can act directly on Nature, as, for instance, in the Intichiuma ceremonies of Australia, the proceedings of rain-makers, &c.

2. In a second, he acts by means of subjected spirits. The genii who were under the control of Solomon afford a well-known illustration.

3. But a third case may be distinguished, which is of more recent origin, or at least attained its development much later : that in which men and women allied themselves with evil spirits, entirely for wicked purposes.

The first form comes most naturally under the head of Magic.

"The traveller," says Plutarch,[1] "who has little or no acquaintance with the language of the land in which he is, resorts naturally to the language of gesture, and mimics the thing which he wishes to have done. Primitive man communicates his wishes to Nature in exactly the same way: if he wishes to have game caught in the trap which he sets, he first pretends to fall into it himself. He has not learnt to 'interrogate' Nature in her own language by means of experiment and crucial instances, but he has a presentiment of the method of concomitant variations and of the substitution of similars."

Witchcraft has been often, indeed as a rule until of late, regarded as a form of religion.

M. Réville, for instance, confuses magic with religion. "Parfois même," he says,[2] and refers in a note to *The Origin of Civilisation*, "on peut signaler la contradiction étrange où tombent des narrateurs éminents quand ils décrivent les croyances en matière de magie, de sorcellerie, de divination, d'indigènes aux-

[1] Plutarch, *The Roman Questions*, lxxix.

[2] Prolegomène de *l'Histoire des Religions*, p. 46.

quels ils refusaient, quelques pages auparavant, toute espèce de foi religieuse."

In *The Origin of Civilisation*, however, I endeavoured to show that this was a mistake, and I laid great stress on the difference between an idol and a fetich. An idol is in some sense or other the seat or emblem of a god. To it prayers are made and sacrifices offered. It is an object of worship and veneration.

A fetich, on the contrary, is an object, the possession of which gives its owner power over some subjected spirit.

In fact the owner of an idol recognised his inferiority and subjection to the god represented; while on the contrary the owner of a fetich thought himself superior, and able to control the spirit subjected to the magic influence of the fetich.

Idolatry is no doubt a low form of religion, but it is a religion. It recognises the inferiority of man to a higher power.

The idolater realises that he is the servant of his idol; the fetichist claims to be the master and tyrant of his fetich, and the corresponding demon.

"Fetichism may," I said, "be regarded as an anti-religion. It has been hitherto defined as the worship of material substances. This does not seem to me to be its true characteristic. Fetichism is not truly a form of 'worship' at all. For the negro believes that by means of the fetich he can coerce and control his deity. In fact, fetichism is mere witchcraft. We have already seen (*ante*, p. 259) that magicians all over the world think that if they can obtain a part of an enemy the possession of it gives them a power over him.

"Now it seems to me that fetichism is an extension of this belief. The negro supposes that the possession of a fetich representing a spirit makes that spirit his servant. We know that the negroes beat their fetich if their prayers are unanswered, and I believe they seriously think they thus inflict suffering on the actual deity. Thus the fetich cannot fairly be called an idol. The same image or object may indeed be a fetich to one man and an idol to another; yet the two are essentially different in their nature. An idol is indeed an object of worship, while, on the contrary,

a fetich is intended to bring the deity within the control of man—an attempt which is less absurd than it at first sight appears, when considered in connection with their low religious ideas. Religion is the submission of man to God; fetichism is the attempt to subject God to man. If, then, witchcraft be not confused with religion, as I think it ought not to be, fetichism can hardly be called a religion; to the true spirit of which it is indeed entirely opposed."[1]

This I think explains the fact, the importance of which had not up to that time been recognised, that the priest and the wizard have been bitter and irreconcilable enemies from the time of Moses, and probably long before, to that of James I., and even later. It was not that they were rivals; on the contrary, they represented two opposite theories.

More recently several high authorities have come to the same conclusion.

Sir A. Lyall in 1882 says:[2] "If we try whether any aid towards a satisfactory explana-

[1] *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 345.

[2] *Asiatic Studies*, first series, p. 76 (1882). See also Oldenberg, *Die Religion der Veda* (1894).

tion is obtained by carefully looking at what goes on before our eyes in India, it seems possible to distinguish a radical separation, from the very outset, between witchcraft and the humblest form of what in India is called religion. Witchcraft appears to have been, from the beginning, the aboriginal and inveterate antagonist of religion or theology, and hardly less so in the most primeval ages of barbarous superstition than it was in the days of our King James I."

I may also quote the high authority of W. Robertson Smith, who says[1] of the ancient Semites that "not only did these magical superstitions lie outside religion, but in all well-ordered states they were regarded as illicit."

Still more recently, and as it would also seem independently, F. B. Jevons has come to the same conclusion. "Religion and magic," he says,[2] "had different origins, and were always essentially distinct from one another." I cannot agree with him, however, when he

[1] *Religion of the Ancient Semites*, p. 265.

[2] Introduction to the *History of Religion*, p. 25 (1896).

adds "that the belief in the supernatural was prior to the belief in magic, and that the latter whenever it sprang up was a degradation or relapse in the evolution of religion." On the contrary, the two seem to me to have been essentially independent and opposite, and the belief in magic to have preceded the dawn of religion.

Again, Dr. Frazer says:[1] "Thus in so far as religion assumes the world to be directed by conscious agents who may be turned from their purpose by persuasion, it stands in fundamental antagonism to magic as well as to science, both of which take for granted that the course of nature is determined, not by the passions or caprice of personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting mechanically."

Finally, Mr. Thomas[2] tells us that "the Central Australian ceremonies, which can hardly be termed religious, inasmuch as they depend for their efficacy, it appears, rather on the supposition that nature moves by fixed laws

[1] Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, vol. i. p. 63.
[2] Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, p. 229.

than that personal beings and volitions control its operations."

Moreover, though I do not find that any previous writer had called attention to the question, which, however, seems to me one of primary significance, still it was evidently latent in the minds of many intelligent observers of savage life. We often meet statements that a particular tribe had no religion, and then come across more or less detailed accounts of witchcraft, or of respect shown to the dead.

For instance, Azara has been criticised as having in his description of various tribes just denied the possession of any religion and then givenc lear evidence that it really existed. Thus M. Roskoff quotes[1] with approval a remark by D'Orbigny that while "Azara denies to many Brazilian races whom he describes the possession of any religion, he afterwards gives details which prove the very reverse."

The "details," however, which Azara gives only indicate a belief in demons and in witchcraft.

[1] *Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvölker*, p. 79.

The belief in witchcraft and evil demons seems to me universal among existing races, but, for the reasons given above, it cannot be regarded either as the origin of, or any evidence for the existence of, religion.

CHAPTER V

RELIGION

I NOW come to the subject of religion. I had expressed the belief that the lowest races were without any belief which could be so called. No one would attribute religion to any of the Quadrumana. Hence to the believers in evolution there must have been a time when it gradually came into existence. The weight of evidence which I have quoted, moreover, seemed, and seems, to me irresistible.

Several critics, however, have attempted to controvert this view. Thus, M. Reinach says :[1] "Beaucoup de peuples sauvages n'ont pas de dieux, mais tous ont une religion ; la religion est plus ancien que les dieux."

But then he adds :[2] "On appelle religion un ensemble de scrupules qui font obstacle

[1] *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, p. 91.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 91.

aux appétits naturels de l'homme et entravent le libre exercice de ses facultés physiques."

Even so I doubt if he could make good his case.

M. de Quatrefages also differs, but not so much as regards the facts, as the definition of religion. For him a belief in magic is a belief in religion.

Mr. Brinton also says:[1] "The fact is that there has not been a single tribe, no matter how rude, known in history or visited by travellers, which has been shown to be destitute of religion under some form."

But a few pages further on[2] he seems to say just the reverse: "So the human mind groped for dateless ages amid brutish toils and pleasures, unconscious of grander aims; until the thought of God, rising to consciousness within the soul, whispered to it of endless progress and divine ideals, in quest of which it has sought and will ever continue seeking, with tireless endeavour, a constantly increasing reward."

Some of the lowest races are, it seems to

[1] *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 30.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 37.

me, still "groping" more or less "unconscious of grander aims."

But the critics to whom an answer is more specially due are Mr. Andrew Lang, and M. Roskoff of Vienna, the latter of whom has done me the honour of devoting to me practically the whole of the second part of his work *Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvölker.*

I must, however, in the first place observe that they have to answer, not to me, but the authorities I have quoted.

The weight of the evidence which I have brought forward in the *Origin of Civilisation* and in *Prehistoric Times* seems to me overwhelming. Sailors, traders, philosophers, Roman Catholic priests, and Protestant missionaries, in ancient and in modern times, in every part of the globe, have concurred in stating that there are races of men altogether devoid of religion. The case is the stronger because in several instances the fact has greatly surprised those who record it, and has been entirely in opposition to all their preconceived views.

The question as to the general existence of religion among men is, indeed, to some extent a matter of definition. If the mere sensation of fear, and the recognition that there are probably other beings more powerful than himself, are sufficient alone to constitute a religion, then we must, I think, admit that religion is general to the human race. But when a child dreads the darkness, and shrinks from a lightless room, we never regard that as an evidence of religion. Moreover, if this definition be adopted, we can no longer regard religion as peculiar to man. We must admit that the feeling of a dog or a horse towards its master is of the same character; and the baying of a dog to the moon is as much an act of worship as some ceremonies which have been so described by travellers.

So also I have never denied that the fear of ghosts, fairies, demons, genii, and Nature-spirits, of the Ariels, Nixies, Brownies, &c., is found everywhere among existing savages. They are beings differing from living men, but are not gods, nor are they worshipped.

The difference is essential; it is not one

of degree, but *of kind*. Mr. Lang himself admits, or rather asserts, this. "Surely," he says,[1] "there is a difference in kind between an eternal, immortal God and a ghost." Here, therefore, I am fortunate enough to be supported by Mr. Lang's high authority. A belief in ghosts is in itself no evidence of religion. A ghost is not a god, though it may become one.

Much of the evidence on which my critics rely merely proves the existence of a belief in magic. I have attempted in the preceding chapter to show that magic is not only not religion, but the very opposite of religion. This suggestion of mine has since been adopted by such high authorities as Sir Alfred Lyall, Mr. Jevons, and Dr. Frazer. In any case, evidence of belief in witchcraft is no answer as against me.

The lives of Australian savages, for instance, are made up to an extraordinary extent of tedious and almost interminable ceremonies, involving severe, gruesome, and in some cases terrible suffering, but in no way of a religious

[1] *The Making of Religion*, p. 306.

character. They contain no prayers or confessions, no offerings or sacrifices, no appeal for help or forgiveness to any superior power. They are gone through as immemorial customs, and when any meaning is attached to them it is as a form of magic, an attempt to control nature and secure material advantages—mainly rain or food.

Another class of evidence on which my critics rely, but which seems to me irrelevant, is the belief, not indeed in the immortality of the soul, but in the survival of the individual after the death of the body. This involves no particular mental effort.

Sleep and death have always been regarded as nearly related to one another. Thus in classical mythology, Somnus, the god of sleep, and Mors, the god of death, were both fabled to have been the children of Nox, the goddess of night. So, also, the savage would naturally look on death as a kind of sleep, and would expect—hoping on even against hope—to see his friend return to himself from the one as he had so often done from the other. What happens to the spirit during sleep? The body

lies, apparently lifeless, almost as in death, and the savage not unnaturally concludes that the spirit has left it. In this he is confirmed by the phenomena of dreams, which consequently to him have a reality and an importance which we can scarcely appreciate. During sleep the spirit seems to desert the body; and as in dreams we visit other localities and even other worlds, living, as it were, a separate and different life, the two phenomena are not unnaturally regarded as the complements of one another.

Again, when they dream of their departed friends or relatives, savages firmly believe themselves to be visited by their spirits, and hence conclude, not indeed in the immortality of the soul, but in its survival of the body. The belief even of the survival is, however, by no means universal.

When asked by M. Bik, the Arafuras of Vorkay, one of the Aru Islands, said "Mati mati sudah" ("When you are dead there is an end of you").

"Many of the negroes," said Captain Burton,[1]

[1] Burton, *Trans. Ethn. Soc.*, new series, vol. i. p. 323.

"count on nothing after the present life; there is for them no hope beyond the grave. They wail and sorrow with a burden of despair. 'Amekwisha' ('he is finished') is the East African's last word concerning parent or friend. 'All is done for ever,' sing the West Africans. The least allusion to loss of life makes their black skins pale. 'Ah!' they exclaim, 'it is bad to die; to leave house and home, wife and children; no more to wear soft cloth, nor eat meat, nor smoke tobacco.'" The Kubus of Sumatra say, "When we are dead, we are dead."[1] The Bongos of the Soudan have, says Schweinfurth,[2] not the remotest conception of immortality. They have no idea of the transmigration of souls, or any doctrine of the kind, than they have of the existence of an ocean. The Hudson's Bay Indians, according to Hearne,[3] a good observer, and one who had ample means of judging, had no idea of any life after death.

In other cases the spirit is supposed to survive the body for a certain time, and to

[1] H. O. Forbes, *Wanderings of a Naturalist in the Eastern Archipelago*, p. 243. [2] *Heart of Africa*, vol. i. p. 304.
[3] *Journey to the Mouth of the Coppermine River*, p. 344.

linger about its old abode. "Ask the negro," says M. du Chaillu,[1] "where is the spirit of his great-grandfather? he says he does not know; it is done. Ask him about the spirit of his father or brother who died yesterday, then he is full of fear and terror; he believes it to be generally near the place where the body has been buried, and among many tribes the village is removed immediately after the death of one of the inhabitants." The same belief prevails among the Amazulu Kaffirs, as has been well shown by Bishop Callaway.[2] They believe that the spirits of their deceased fathers and brothers still live, because they appear in dreams; by inverse reasoning, however, grandfathers are generally regarded as having ceased to exist; perhaps in some cases because the spirit is supposed to have taken, and identified itself with, a new body.

Mr. Ling Roth, one of our latest and best authorities on Australian life, tells us:[3] "In his natural state the fear of death is but as nothing to the savage; he has a hazy notion of the

[1] *Trans. Ethn. Soc.*, new series, vol. i. p. 309.
[2] *The Religious System of the Amazulu* (1860).
[3] *Ethnological Studies*, p. 161.

corpse 'getting older and moving about elsewhere,' when he ceases to bring food and tobacco any longer to the burial place (sections 289, 291); he has no dread of future punishment, no hope of reward in another life. Among the Boulia natives, with whom I could converse in their own language, I am absolutely convinced that their belief concerning a future state is as represented; in other districts, when conversing on these topics, interpreters had of course to be made use of."

Moreover, even when the spirit is supposed to survive the body, the condition of souls after death is not at first considered to differ materially from that during life. The ghost of the North American hunter chases the ghosts of the elk or beaver with the ghosts of bows and arrows, on the ghosts of snow-shoes, and over the spirit of the snow. The "seats of happiness are represented by some Hindu writers to be vast mountains on the north of India."[1]

The Haitians considered that the paradise of the dead was situated in the lovely western

[1] Dubois, *On the People of India*, p. 485.

valleys of their island.[1] Again, in Tonga the souls are supposed to go to Bolotoo, a large island to the north-west, well stocked with all kinds of useful and ornamental plants. In many cases the sky is regarded as a solid dome, above which is another world with its own inhabitants. These differ in various respects from men; they may be more powerful and more knowing, but in the absence of forms or ceremonies, of prayers or sacrifices, such vague myths do not surely constitute a religion.

When we are considering this question we must remember how prone many savages are to regard anything and everything unusual as more or less supernatural. Visitors from a distance, and especially if of a different race, have often been taken for spirits.

"In most African towns and villages," says Lander,[2] "I was treated as a demigod."

Barth was identified by the Fulahs with their god "Fete"; Thomson and Moffat were taken by the Bechuana women for deities,

[1] Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 56.
[2] Turner's *Samoa*, p. ix.

while Tuckey makes a similar statement as regards Congo; and according to Chapman, the Bushmen describe the white men as the children of God. A common Samoan prayer used to be, "Drive away from us 'Sailing Gods,' lest they bring disease and death." Among the natives of India the deification of men is still active.[1]

A sect in the Punjaub still worship General Nicholson under the name of Nikal Sen,[2] and Rajah Brooke in parts of Borneo was supposed to possess supernatural powers.[3]

In early Irish history also we are told that Fedelin and Ethne, daughters of Loegaire, took St. Patrick and his companions for spirits.[4]

The savage does not realise the idea of a "spirit" as we do. It is always more or less material. The tissue may indeed be finer, and the substance more ethereal; but some trace of the body always remains. Though

> "The soul is more tendre and nesche
> Than the bodi that hath bones and fleysche."[5]

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[1] Lyell, *Fortnightly Review*, September 1875.
[2] Monier Williams, *Modern India*, p. 259.
[3] Beardmore, *Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, 1890, p. 464.
[4] Todd's *Dict.*: Patrick, p. 452. [5] Hampole.

Mr. Lang and M. Roskoff attach much importance to the privilege of immortality enjoyed by those superhuman beings. But savages who regard themselves as immortal, who do not recognise that death is ever due to natural causes, but attribute it to violence or witchcraft, would naturally, if asked, attribute the same quality to demons. Demons also would naturally live long, as being well able to take care of themselves. Even they, however, succumb at last.

A friend of Mr. Gideon Scott Lang's tried long ago—and patiently—"to make a very intelligent docile Australian black understand his existence without a body, but the black never could keep his countenance, and generally made an excuse to get away. One day the teacher watched and found that he went to have a hearty fit of laughter at the absurdity of the idea of a man living and going about without arms, legs, or mouth to eat; for a long time he could not believe that the gentleman was serious, and when he did realise it, the more serious the teacher was,

the more ludicrous the whole affair appeared to the black."[1]

Again, some modes of death are supposed to destroy not the body only, but the entire being.

Savages, moreover, often took steps to maim or disable the ghosts.

In parts of Queensland, if there was any reason to fear the vengeance of a dead man, his knee-caps were removed so that the ghost might not be able to walk.[2] In other cases they cut off the right thumb of a dead enemy so that the ghost should not be able to throw the spear. The Tchérémisses used to pierce the feet and heart of the dead if they had any fear of being haunted. A Bushman having killed a woman who was a magician, dashed her head to pieces, lest she should rise again and revenge herself.

In other cases it was thought that burning the corpse destroyed the ghost.

To be eaten was the greatest misfortune that could happen to a New Zealander, since

[1] *The Aborigines of Australia*, p. 31.
[2] Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, p. 226.

he believed that the soul was thus destroyed as well as the body. The chief who could both kill and devour his enemy had nothing more to fear from him either in this world or the next; on the contrary, the strength, ability, and prestige against which he had had to contend, were not only conquered, but, by this dreadful process, incorporated with and added to his own.

Nor has it been usual—nor is it, I think, correct—to dignify with the name of religion a belief in fairies, elfs, brownies, genii, or demons.

Attempts may sometimes be made to propitiate them by food and other offerings, but they are not worshipped or regarded as true deities.

It is also necessary, as Tylor and Loskiel have shown, to be careful not to mistake as of native origin, beliefs which are really the result of missionary instruction.

It will be observed that some of the witnesses—for instance, Bishop Nixon, Dobritzhoffer, Crantz, Captain Wilson, &c.—started with the belief that all races must have a

religion, and were astonished to find that it was not so.[1]

Others, not perhaps such careful inquirers, starting with the same idea, found what they expected.

When, however, we are told that a race of men who cannot count their own fingers of one hand, can rise to the conception of an omnipotent, omniscient, and beneficent Creator, we naturally wish to know how the knowledge of their belief was arrived at. The answer often depends on the question. In the absence, however, of prayers or thanksgivings, offerings or ceremonies, we may well doubt whether such a belief really exists as a living faith, and whether it has not been suggested by the form of the questions asked.[2]

Mr. Lang, indeed, can hardly maintain that the Australians had any idea of a Creator of the universe, for in fact they had, he tells us,[3] no idea of the universe, even in the limited sense in which we may be said to have one. "There is no such thing as orderliness

[1] *Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, vol. xxi. (1892).

[2] See, for instance, the case of Baiame, p. 162.

[3] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, p. 159 (1906).

in their mythical conceptions, and no such thing as a universe."

No doubt, as Mr. Palmer[1] says, savages often sit over the fire and "wonder among themselves, and talk at night about these things, and the past existence of their race, and how they came here." The savage is credulous, but he is also curious. If he is asked, or if he asks himself, who made the world, it is a simple explanation, however unsupported by evidence, that his ancestor or some other mysterious being did so; and then we are told that he believes in an all-powerful Creator!

It will be observed, as we go on, that much of the evidence on which Messrs. Lang and Roskoff rely, consists of a belief in myths. But a myth is one thing, and religion is another. Mythology is not religion. The myths are often contradictory, childish, repulsive, and blasphemous; sometimes, though rarely, charming—as, for instance, the Maori myth that woman was made of sunshine and echo.

[1] E. Palmer, in *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, vol. xiii. pp. 294, 399.

Mr. Lang, at any rate, sees this clearly. Speaking of his supposed "Australian divine beings," he says:[1] "The mythology of the God is a kind of joke, with no sacredness about it." He very properly distinguishes[2] between "the mythical and the *religious* elements in belief." "Religion is one thing, myth quite another thing."[3] He observes indeed that even "in ancient Greece there were . . . a crowd of humorous, obscene, fanciful myths which are in flagrant contradiction with the religious character of that belief."[4] True, but the Greeks unquestionably worshipped these beings in spite of their derogatory myths, while the lowest savages, as I shall show, did not; and in this lies the essential difference.

It would, of course, be open to any one to question the sense in which I have throughout used the word "religion." This would be a difference of opinion as to definition, not as to fact. My critics, however, assert that I am mistaken as to the facts, and that being their contention they must, to verify their

[1] *The Making of Religion*, p. 197.
[2] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. i. p. 306.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 160. [4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 4.

statement, take the word in the same sense as I have.

Mr. Lang's view of the whole subject is not only very different from, but the very opposite of mine. He believes that the lowest savages had a simple, pure, and beautiful religion which gradually deteriorated; while I believe that our primitive ancestors started without religion, and that, speaking generally, as they rose in civilisation their religious conceptions rose with them. So far as religion is concerned, Mr. Lang believes in a golden age long past and succeeded by one of iron.

In his opinion, among "the lowest savages there exists, not a doctrinal and abstract monotheism, but a belief in a moral, powerful, kindly, creative Being," whom he describes in another passage as immortal and "practically omniscient."[1] In place of this simple and beautiful faith, he considers that in a higher state of civilisation "a mob of ghosts and spirits, supposed to be potent and helpful in everyday life, attract men's regard and adoration, and get paid by sacrifice—even

[1] *The Making of Religion*, p. 278.

by human sacrifice. Turning to races yet higher in material culture, we find a crowd of hungry and cruel gods."[1]

In his judgment "the degeneration of religion from the Australian or Andamanese to the Dinka standard—and infinitely more to the Polynesian, or Aztec, or popular Greek standard — is as undeniable as any fact in human history."

"Beyond all doubt," he says,[2] "religious criminal acts, from human sacrifice to the burning of Jeanne d'Arc, increase as religion and culture move away from the stage of Bushmen and Andamanese to the stage of Aztec and Polynesian culture. The Supreme Being is succeeded in advancing civilisation, and under the influences of animism, by ruthless and insatiable ghost-gods, full of the worst human qualities. Thus there is what we may really call degeneration, moral and religious, inevitably accompanying early progress."

"How, then," he asks, "could all mankind forget a pure religion?" He suggests two reasons. In the first place, "that degeneration

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 280. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 276.

I would account for by the attractions which animism, when once developed, possessed for the naughty, natural man, the old Adam."

But if the "mob of greedy ghosts" possessed such attractions, how did the "naughty, natural man, the old Adam," evolve his pure and beautiful religion? and if he did evolve it, why did he lose it? Mr. Lang suggests that:

"A moral Creator in need of no gifts, and opposed to lust and mischief, will not help a man with love-spells, or with malevolent 'sendings' of disease by witchcraft; will not favour one man above his neighbour, or one tribe above its rivals, as a reward for sacrifice which he does not accept, or as constrained by charms which do not touch his omnipotence. Ghosts and ghost-gods, on the other hand, in need of food and blood, afraid of spells and binding charms, are a corrupt, but, to man, a useful constituency. . . . For these he was sure, in the long run, first to neglect his idea of his Creator; next, perhaps, to reckon Him as only one, if the highest, of the venal rabble of spirits or deities, and to sacrifice to Him, as to them. And this is exactly what happened! If we are

not to call it 'degeneration,' what are we to call it?[1] . . .

"It is undeniable that Jehovah, at a certain period of Hebrew history, had become degraded and anthropomorphised, far below Deiramalam and Puluga, and Pachacamac, and Ahone, as conceived of in their purest form, and in the high mood of savage mysteries which yet contains so much that is grotesque. Even the Big Black Man of the Fuegians is on a higher level (as we reckon morals) when he forbids the slaying of a robber enemy, than Jehovah is when He commands the massacre of Agag. The Black Man of shivering communistic savages is nearer the morality of our Lord than the Jehovah of Judges."[2]

Mr. Lang's second reason is that "at this stage of culture the luck of the State, and the interests of a rich and powerful clergy, were involved in the maintenance of the old, animistic, relatively non-moral system, as in Cuzco, Greece, and Rome."[3]

[1] Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, p. 281.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 282. [3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 283.

One of these "wicked and cruel" mob of ghosts may have been a "god of battles," but after all the original good God was in Mr. Lang's belief almost omniscient and all-powerful. Why, then, should the God of Peace, being all-powerful, succumb to the God of Battles? Why should men proffer costly sacrifices and bribes to the inferior deities, rather than prayer to the Supreme? What evidence is there that savages ever had any living faith in their "High Gods" or ever did pray to them? Mr. Lang's theory seems most improbable, and only to be accepted if supported by the strongest evidence. He looks to a golden age in the past; I hope for one in the future. He devotes a considerable portion of his important work on *The Making of Religion* to cases of clairvoyance and second-sight, crystal-gazing and demoniacal possession, and dwells on the stories of Mr. Hume floating out at one window and in at another; of Mrs. Piper,[1] Miss X.,[2] &c., &c. Speaking of such superstitions he says:[3] "I regard them, though they seem shadowy, as grounds of hope, or

[1] *Loc. cit.*, 148. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 93. [3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 334.

at least as tokens that men need not yet despair."

For my part I look forward with hope; but if I were to despair, it would be to see some of our ablest intellects still clinging to the most childish superstitions of the darkest ages and the lowest savages.

Let us now take the four very low races—Australians, Bushmen, Mincopies, and Fuegians—to whom Mr. Lang, in *The Making of Religion*, attributes the worship of (p. 176) moral, practically omniscient (p. 183), all-powerful, and (p. 205) immortal beings.

First, then, as regards the Australians. His contention is that they, or at least some tribes, believe in the existence of a deity named "Baiame," who is omniscient, omnipotent, immortal, beneficent, and to whom the blessed name of "All-father" can fitly be attributed.

There has long been an idea that the belief in a "Great Spirit," wherever it exists, was derived from missionary teaching. Mr. Tylor was formerly of opinion that "this view will not bear examination."[1] Further study led

[1] *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. pp. 339-40.

him, however, to change his opinion. As regards the Australian Baiame, for instance, he says:[1] "Let us now, however, inquire whether Baiame, near 1840 so prominent a divine figure among the Australians, was known to them at all a few years earlier. The missionary traveller, James Backhouse, a minister of the Society of Friends, spent a long time in Australia between 1832–40, partly in what is now Victoria. In his journals he recognises the well-known spirit-beliefs of the Australians, but declares that they have no distinct ideas of a Supreme Being. William Buckley, the 'wild white man,' who lived thirty years among the natives of the district, till he had forgotten English, describes their notions of demons and of becoming white men after death, and says the same. The Rev. L. E. Threlkeld, the first grammarian and lexicographer of New South Wales, mentions the bush-deity, Koin, who controls the native mysteries and teaches the sorcerers, also other demons; but there was no being known to the natives whose name he could adopt as representing Deity."

[1] *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, vol. xxi. p. 293 (1892).

Mr. Hartland also denies the existence of any belief in "High Gods" among the Australians. He says:[1] "Dr. Tylor, whose discussion of the question Mr. Lang does not mention, sums it up in these words: 'The evidence points rather, in my opinion, to Baiame being the missionary translation of the word Creator, used in Scripture lesson-books for God.'[2] Mr. Lang may challenge this opinion as that of an anthropologist, however distinguished, whose theories a large part of his book is occupied with controverting. And probably it is not altogether beyond dispute. The facts, however, remain that the earliest mention of Baiame is in the year 1840; that he is then said to be living on an island in the sea and to feed on fish; that while some natives considered him 'Creator,' others were said to attribute that office to his son Burambin; that his biblical characteristics, as reported by missionaries, constantly expanded down to the publication of Mr. Brough Smyth's work in 1878, and that in the most recent

[1] *The High Gods of Australia.*
[2] *Folklore*, vol. ix. p. 302 (1898).

accounts—those of Mr. Matthews, who is not a missionary—they have so far disappeared that he is now only said to have created the tribesmen themselves."

Mr. Thomas does not accept this view. He says:[1] "But Henderson, whom we have already quoted, gives a long account of Baiame, or Piame, and the mysteries, or initiation ceremonies, of which he learnt particulars from a native in 1829, three years before these missionaries came to those parts. Dr. Tylor's view, therefore, is clearly untenable; we have no reason to suppose that these gods who preside over the initiation rites are anything but genuinely Australian."

This does not necessarily follow. Even if Baiame were a spirit name in Henderson's time, the main question is whether the powers and attributes credited to him by subsequent writers are not the result of missionary influence. Mr. Thomas does not give the exact reference or quote the passage on which he relies. Henderson speaks very doubtfully. His informant, he says, "endeavoured to explain to

[1] *Natives of Australia*, p. 216.

us their rude system of mythology. We experienced, however, great difficulty in comprehending the import of what he intended to communicate."[1]

I do not find that Henderson anywhere speaks of Baiame as a creator or attributes to him any divine powers, but says that he was "the father of the race, and formerly sojourned amongst them."

The name Baiame has been supposed to be derived from the verb "baia," to make. It seems more probable that it is literally Byamee—Big Man.[2]

Other supposed "High Gods" were Bungil and Deiramalam. Bungil was an old man who once lived on earth[3] and possessed great multitudes of cattle, an idea which cannot evidently have arisen before the advent of white men, as there were no cattle in Australia. He had a dispute with the Jay, who let out the winds and blew him away. He is now the star Fomalhaut. Bungil, moreover, is a

[1] Henderson, *New South Wales*, p. 147.
[2] Mrs. Langloh Parker, *More Australian Legendary Tales*.
[3] *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 210.

common title of respect. Mr. Howitt[1] himself was often called Bungil.

"In one tribe Deiramalam used to carry off and eat the initiated boys till he was stopped and destroyed by Baiame."[2]

It is difficult to believe that the idea of an All-father can have arisen among tribes which have female descent. Moreover, Mrs. Parker, though she considers that Baiame is regarded by the natives as a true Deity, gives no evidence of Baiame worship. No offerings are made to him. The natives, she tells us, "do not profess to pray, or to have prayed to Byamee on any occasion except at funerals, and at the conclusion of the Boorah (initiatory) ceremony. Daily prayers seem to them a foolishness and an insult."

Mr. Lang's position is, that Baiame was regarded as an omniscient, all-powerful, and beneficent being. Yet prayers were not offered to him, and all knowledge of him was most carefully concealed from women and children.

[1] Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 489.
[2] Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. ii. p. 29.

This is a very difficult state of things to accept. I can understand a belief in a deity like Brahma who created the world and then interfered no more. We know there are races who believe in evil deities to whom it would be useless to pray. But to believe in a beneficent and all-powerful being who does interfere in even the most trivial affairs of everyday life, to keep that momentous and comforting knowledge a profound secret from their wives and children, and only to pray to him, if at all, at funerals, is a state of mind in which I find it very difficult to believe. I may be told that a similar state of things is not unknown among civilised races, but those who so act do not, it seems to me, really believe in a loving and all-powerful "All-father," nor I think do the Euahlayi. I do not, however, put this forward as conclusive, well knowing the inconsistencies of the human mind.

I may also observe that, in the belief at any rate of some Australian tribes, Baiame was neither omniscient nor immortal. He was deceived by Deiramalam. Watching one day behind a stump for an emu, he injured his

knee by a fall over the stump, and died not long after.

Speaking of Deiramalam, Dr. Frazer says:[1] "In this being, though supernatural, there is no trace of a divine nature."

The Australians, no doubt, are somewhat exercised in their minds by the mysteries of existence, the problem of life and death, and it is not for us to throw stones if their ideas are often incongruous and inconsistent. That remarkable and interesting tribe, the Arunta, deny that marriage leads to the birth of children; it only, they consider, prepares the woman for the entrance of a wandering spirit. Several Australian tribes altogether deny the necessity of death, and attribute it to magic. They believe in a material heaven, either above the sky or across the ocean; the ghost of the dead may still haunt and vex the living, and this leads to most incongruous ideas—sometimes to the bathos of removing the knee-caps of the dead, so that their ghosts should not be able to move about and disturb the living;[2]

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. i. p. 145.
[2] Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, p. 200.

sometimes to the poetical idea that the spirits of the departed ascend to heaven on the rays of the setting sun.[1]

In any case a ghost is not a god, though it may be the germ of one.

But whatever the myths relating to Baiame, Deiramalam, and Pundgil may have been, no prayers or sacrifices were offered to them. It must of course be admitted that much higher races — even the Greeks and the Romans—had very derogatory and degrading myths about their gods. It is difficult for the modern mind to understand how they can have worshipped Jupiter and Juno, Venus and Mars, and even Apollo and Diana, while also believing the stories told about them.

Homer seems to have wished to ignore, and the Greek philosophers certainly did their best to explain away, these low and degrading myths.

But however this may be, there is an essential difference between the Greek and the Australian cases. The Greek gods were wor-

[1] A. W. Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 438.

shipped, and Baiame was not. Neither Baiame nor Deiramalam can be put forward as a supreme deity of a pure and high religion, since no prayers were addressed nor offerings made to either of them.[1]

M. Roskoff does not go so far as Mr. Lang; still he does maintain that even the lowest races of men have a religion, and I will now take *seriatim* the evidence on which he relies. It will be easy to show that it in no way supports his contention. He brings forward no doubt an imposing cloud of witnesses, but I think I shall be able to show that, so far from supporting his case, they really tell against him.

As regards the Australians, M. Roskoff first refers to Sir G. Grey, but I do not understand why, as the passage he quotes has nothing to do with religion.

His next witness is Mr. Oldfield. He does not quote Oldfield's words, and the epitome he gives is somewhat misleading. What Oldfield said was:[2] "If there be any acts of adoration

[1] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, p. 160 (1906).
[2] *Trans. Eth. Soc.*, vol. iii. p. 228.

they must be of a very passive character, since no supplications are made to them, nor is any attempt made to propitiate them. There seems to be but one self-existent evil spirit, for to one only do they give a distinctive appellation, and to this one alone do they assign a habitation beyond the world. All the other malign spirits with which the face of the whole land is infested are included under one general name, In-gna, and these are all of human origin, being the souls of departed black men, and their places of abode are thickets, caves, springs, &c."

M. Roskoff next refers to Eyre, who mentions the dread of evil spirits, which are frightened away by fire, but expressly distinguishes between such beliefs and the possession of a religion. He says :—

"The natives of New Holland, as far as yet can be ascertained, have no religious belief or ceremonies. A Deity, or great First Cause, can hardly be said to be acknowledged, and certainly is not worshipped by this people, who ascribe the creation to very inefficient causes. They state that some things called themselves

into existence, and had the property of creating others. But upon all subjects of this nature their ideas are indistinct and indefinite, as they are not naturally a reasoning people, and by no means given to the investigation of causes and their effects; hence, if you inquire why they use such and such ceremonies, they reply our fathers did so, and we do it; or why they believe so and so, our fathers told us it was so."[1]

M. Roskoff then refers, by name only, to "Cunningham, Dawson, Wilkes, Salvado, and Standridge," without, however, any indication of the passages on which he relies.

His next witness is Braim.

Braim speaks with much doubt, but says: "I think I have found a distinct tradition of the supposed existence of a being possessing some of the attributes of a deity. . . . There is much vagueness and obscurity in their notions on this particular topic." He cannot therefore add much to the strength of M. Roskoff's case. Speaking of Bongil or Pundgil, he says he was "once a black fellow."[2]

[1] E. J. Eyre, *Expeditions into Central Australia*, vol. ii. p. 355.

[2] Braim, *History of New South Wales*, p. 443.

Next comes Dumont d'Urville. His authority, great as it is, cannot be put against the careful reports of subsequent observers, who had much better opportunities of judging. Moreover, he only mentions the existence of a belief in spirits, which no one denies, and he does not record any case of religious ceremonies, or prayers, or any form of adoration.

The next witness adduced by M. Roskoff is Behr.[1] He refers to Waitz, and apparently did not look up the original, which does not bear out his views. M. Behr only attributes to the natives a belief in ghosts and demons which no one has denied, and refers to the corroborees as being perhaps of a religious character. He was evidently, however, by no means satisfied on the point. His words are: "Die allerdings dunkle Antwort eines Eingebornen, den Ich um den Zweck des Tanzes befragte, beweist wenn Ich sie richtig gedeutet habe," &c. ("The certainly ambiguous answer of a native, of whom I inquired as to the meaning of the dance, if I understood him correctly").

[1] *U. d. Urbevölkerung von Adelaide* (*Mon. der Geog. Ges. zu Berlin*, N.F. v. p. 91).

No important conclusion ought surely to be drawn from such an ambiguous answer of a single native, not perhaps correctly understood. Moreover, the observations of subsequent observers show that the corroborees cannot be regarded as religious ceremonies.

To my surprise he then refers to Mr. G. S. Lang. Mr. G. S. Lang attributes to the natives of Queensland, no doubt correctly, a belief in evil spirits, but he expressly says that they "have no idea of a supreme divinity, the creator and governor of the world, the witness of their actions, and their future judge. They have no object of worship, even of a subordinate and inferior rank. They have no idols, no temples, no sacrifices. In short, they have nothing whatever of the character of religion, or of religious observance, to distinguish them from the beasts that perish. They live 'without God in the world.'"[1] Mr. Lang quotes, also, in support of this, the opinion of Mr. Schmidt, who lived as a missionary among the natives of Moreton Bay for seven years, and was well acquainted with their language.

[1] Lang's *Queensland*, p. 374.

Mr. Ridley, indeed, in his "Report on Australian Languages and Traditions,"[1] expresses the opinion that they have a traditional belief in one supreme Creator, but he admits that most of the witnesses who were examined before the select committee appointed by the Legislative Council of Victoria in 1858 to report on the aborigines, "gave it as their opinion that the natives had no religious ideas."

Captain Henderson, writing of the New South Wales Australians, says :—

"The natives appear to have no religion whatever. They have no idea of a Supreme Being. Their only notion of any spirit whatever seems to be a very vague one regarding an evil demon, whom they call Debildebil, a name borrowed from the whites."[2]

The Rev. John Mathew believes that the Australians "acknowledge invisible supernatural powers and beings."[3] They "have what may be termed an apprehension of ghosts rather than a belief in them, the relations of the living with the spirits being more or less

[1] *Jour. Anthropol. Inst.*, p. 257 (1872).
[2] Henderson, *Exc. in New South Wales*, v. ii. p. 155 (1854).
[3] *Eaglehawk and Crow*, p. 148.

intimate in different tribes. In the tribe with which I was best acquainted, while the blacks had a term for ghosts and believed that there were departed spirits who were sometimes to be seen among the foliage, individual men would tell you upon inquiry that they believed that death was the last of them. In other words, a man's personality died with his body and was not continued in his ghost."

In a more recent work[1] he has given a careful study of two Queensland tribes, in whose country he lived for some years and whose language he spoke "like a second mother tongue." These natives believed in demons and ghosts, but if "the offering of propitiatory rites to supernatural beings is an essential element, the conclusion, perhaps, must be that these tribes were destitute of religion. I say perhaps, because though I never heard from the natives of rites which could be called propitiatory, yet there may have been rare and informal examples of such rites." The magician, he says, "is invulnerable and has enormous powers."

[1] *Two Representative Tribes of Queensland*, p. 167.

It requires a clever cross-examiner not to put his own ideas into his witness and get merely the reflection of his own mind when he fancies he is looking into that of the savage. The real beliefs of savages can be better gauged by what they do, or do not do, than by what they say.

For instance, in Messrs. Spencer and Gillen's excellent work on *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (657 pages), where their habits and ideas are carefully and minutely detailed, and their elaborate magical and initiatory ceremonies described at great length, there is no mention whatever of religion, which it is obvious has no place in their life.

In Mr. Thomas's careful work on the *Natives of Australia*, published in 1906, and in which he summarises the researches of previous observers, prayer is not even mentioned, sacrifices and offerings are dismissed as non-existent, there is no question of propitiation. There is a belief in ghosts, but that is practically all. They have long and elaborate ceremonials, which, however, are magical, not religious; no deity has any part in them. The

Australians have no sacred groves, or lakes, or mountains.

Mr. W. E. Roth, in his *Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines* (1897), tells us that he had "unrivalled opportunities for making inquiry into the language, customs, and habits of the Queensland aborigines." He has chapters, not only on their material life, but on their corroborees, sports, and games; their maintenance of law and order; their diseases and death; their belief in witchcraft and ghosts; and we may be sure that he would have described their religion if they had had any. The subject, however, and even the very word, is conspicuously absent.

Dr. Frazer says:[1] "Among the aborigines of Australia magic is universally practised, whereas religion, in the sense of a propitiation or conciliation of the higher powers, seems to be nearly unknown . . . nobody dreams of propitiating gods by prayer and sacrifice." And he sums up[2] the conclusion at which

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. i. p. 141.
[2] *The Golden Bough*, vol. i. p. 73.

he has arrived that "in the most primitive state of human society now open to observation on the globe we find magic there conspicuously present, and religion conspicuously absent."

On such a question the opinion of Mr. Howitt is entitled to exceptional weight. He began by supposing that the Australians believed in the existence of a supernatural being, who might reasonably be termed a deity. Gradually, however, more intimate acquaintance with the natives weakened, and finally removed, this view.

"There is no worship," he says, "but although it cannot be alleged that these aborigines have consciously any form of religion, it may be said that their beliefs are such that, under favourable conditions, they might have developed into an actual religion, based on the worship of Mungau-ngana or Baiame."

"The Blacks," he concludes, "had no knowledge of God, and did not practise prayer." The so-called "All-father" was a former chief, and is now "the headman in the sky country, the analogue of the Headman of the tribe on

the Earth. . . . The Australian aborigines do not recognise any divinity, good or evil, nor do they offer any kind of sacrifice so far as my knowledge goes."[1]

Messrs. Dawson and Ridley were of a different opinion, but he considers they were "misled by their mental bias as missionaries," and adds frankly, "I must confess that I have also committed this misleading error before I really perceived the true facts of the case."[2] The conclusion he has finally come to is that in Baiame, whom he regards as synonymous with Deiramalam, Munjil, and other tribal spirits, "I see a venerable kindly headman of a tribe, full of knowledge and tribal wisdom, and all-powerful in magic, of which he is the source, with virtues, failings, and passions, such as the aborigines regard them. Such, I think, they picture the All-father to be, and it is most difficult for one of us to divest himself of the tendency to endow such a supernatural being with a nature quasi-divine, if not altogether so, and character."[3]

[1] A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 507.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 756.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 500.

And in his last work Mr. Howitt says:[1] "The Australian aborigines do not recognise any divinity, good or evil, nor do they offer any kind of sacrifice, as far as my knowledge goes."

Messrs. Spencer and Gillen say:[2]—

"Perhaps the most important spirit individual in the Arunta tribe is Twanyirika, whose voice is supposed by the women and children to be heard when the bull-roarer sounds. The Arunta have, so far as we could find out, no tradition dealing with the origin of the Churinja; their Alcherinja ancestors possessed them, and behind the Alcherinja they do not penetrate. The women and children are told that Twanyirika is a spirit who lives in wild and inaccessible regions, and only comes out when a boy is initiated. During the actual operation of circumcision, the bull-roarer sounds in the darkness all round the ceremonial ground, and the women believe that Twanyirika enters the body of the boy and takes him into the bush, keeping him there till he has re-

[1] *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 756.
[2] *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 497.

covered. While he is there, carefully secluded from the sight of the women and children, he constantly sounds the bull-roarer."

In fact, in their last work, which has appeared since Mr. Lang's remarks were written, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen say[1] that "we have searched carefully in the hope of finding traces of a belief in such a being, but the more we got to know of the details of the native beliefs the more evident it became that they had not the faintest conception of any individual who might in any way be described as a 'High God of the Mysteries.'"

Moreover, Mr. Lang himself, speaking of the contrast between Australia and Melanesia, says[2] of the latter that "sacrifice and prayer exist; neither is found (perhaps with an exception as regards prayers for the souls of the dead) in Australia"; and with reference to the Arunta tribe especially he admits that there is, "strictly speaking, no worship, as far as we are informed."[3]

[1] *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 503.
[2] *Social Origins*, p. 183. [3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 122.

Bushmen

Mr. Lang's next case of a very low race with, as he considers, a very high religion is that of the Bushmen of South Africa.

For the Bushmen I quoted Lichtenstein. M. Roskoff, however, opposes to him the opinion of Livingstone. I knew Livingstone fairly well and had a great regard for him, but as regards the religion of Bushmen I do not think he would have claimed to speak with any great authority. In his last work[1] he tells us that "the want, however, of any form of public worship, or of idols, or of formal prayers or sacrifice, make both Caffres and Bechuanas appear as among the most godless races of mortals known anywhere. But though they all possess a distinct knowledge of a deity and of a future state, they show so little reverence, and feel so little connexion with either, that it is not surprising that some have supposed them entirely ignorant on the subject." Moreover, he candidly adds, "I have not had any intercourse with either Caffres or Bushmen in their own tongues."

[1] *Livingstone's Travels*, p. 158 (1857).

M. Roskoff also quotes Arbousset and Daumas[1] as stating that the Bushmen believe in an invisible man in the sky, who is omnipotent and to whom they pray. This, however, is not so. Their words are[1]:—

"Les plus éclairés reconnaissent à la vérité un Morena dans le ciel, qu'ils appellent le puissant maître des choses, mais la multitude le nie, et ce nom même de Morena est celui qu'ils donnent au moindre de leurs chefs. Tous les noirs que nous avons connus sont athées; il ne serait pas cependant impossible de trouver parmi eux quelque déistes."

Moreover, they express themselves very doubtfully, saying, "Sans que je sache au juste ce qu'ils professent de croire."

Their testimony, therefore, tends to support the other authorities whom I have quoted.

Mr. Lang quotes as evidence of a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being among the Bushmen, the statement of a native named Quing, to Mr. Orpen, a magistrate at St. John,

[1] *Relation d'un Voyage d'Exploration au Nord Est de la Colonie Cap*, par MM. T. Arbousset et F. Daumas.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 77.

that the world was created by a praying Mantis (*Mantis religiosa*), "Cagn." Possibly the idea was due to the peculiar attitude of this curious insect, from which its name is derived; or perhaps Quing was poking fun at Mr. Orpen. I really thought it absurd as I read it, but Mr. Lang considers it "a good and authentic instance of a cosmogonic myth!"

Quing said that Cagn "at first was very good, but he got spoilt through fighting so many things." Mr. Orpen says, "I asked, 'Where is Cagn?' He answered, 'We don't know, but the Elands do.'" Mr. Orpen asked some other questions, but Quing said he did not know, "only the initiated men of that dance know these things."[1]

"Cagn," as Mr. Lang himself tells us,[2] "is frequently defeated by other animals, and finally got into difficulties and sent to ask Cogaz for advice. Then some dwarfs set upon him, and killed him."[3] A being who was spoilt through fight-

[1] *Cape Monthly Magazine*, p. 2 (1874).
[2] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. ii. p. 38.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 9.

ing and eventually killed by dwarfs can surely not be accepted as a Supreme Being.

Indeed Mr. Lang himself seems rather doubtful about the High Gods of the Bushmen. He says[1] that "Cagn in myth is plainly but a successful and idealised medicine-man"; and again:[2] "Their religion is on a far higher level than their mythology. The conception of invisible or extra natural powers, which they entertain and express in moments of earnest need, is all unlike the tales which they tell about their own gods, *if gods such mythical beings may be called.*" The italics are mine.

Mincopies

Mr. Lang in the third place quotes the Mincopies of the Andaman Islands, as regards whom I relied on Mowatt, Portman, and Man.

M. Roskoff refers to Quatrefages, who again refers to Messrs. Michel Symes and Day. Symes thought he had observed some traces of worship of the sun and moon, but Mr. Man,[3] who

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 37. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 34.
[3] *Journal Anthropol. Inst.*, vol. xii. p. 161.

went carefully into the matter, came to the conclusion that he was mistaken. Neither Quatrefages nor M. Roskoff give the reference to Day, and his paper in the *Bengal Journal* does not bear out their statements. Mr. Lang relies[1] on Mr. Man, "an English official who has made a most careful study of their beliefs." Mr. Man's evidence will not, however, help him.

No doubt they had myths about a certain Puluga. According to Mr. Man, Puluga was not supreme, for he had no power over the evil spirits;[2] he was omniscient, but only during the day; like most savage wizards, he could make storms, but the natives threatened him with punishment if he did so; he lives up in the sky in a stone house (evidently a recent myth, due to English influence); he eats and drinks and sleeps; he is married to a green shrimp, or some say to an eel!

Mr. Lang, as we have seen, draws, and is indeed obliged to draw, a distinction between myths of this kind, one at least obviously of European origin, and religion itself.

[1] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. ii. p. 167.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 157.

As regards religion, Mr. Man expressly tells us[1] that "there is no trace to be found of the worship of trees, stones, or other objects, and it is a mistake to suppose that they adore or invoke the celestial bodies. There is no salutation, dance, or festival of any kind held in honour of the new moon; its appearance does not evoke anything more than an exclamation such as 'Yē-lo! ō-gar l'àidō atire' ('Hurrah! there's the moon')."

On another page again he says that though they had these myths "no form of worship or religious rites are to be found among them."

Finally Mr. Brown, who was sent by the Board of Anthropological Studies of Cambridge specially to study the Mincopies, reports as the result of his inquiries, that "the present Andamaners certainly do not believe in a Supreme Being."[2]

Fuegians

The fourth case referred to by Mr. Lang is that of the natives of Tierra del Fuego. Mr. Lang

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 163.

[2] Man, *A Monthly Record of Anthropological Science*, 1910, p. 36.

bases his belief on the statements of Admiral Fitzroy,[1] who, however, only says that "a great Black Man is supposed to be always wandering about the woods and mountains, who is certain of knowing every word and every action, who cannot be escaped, and who influences the weather according to men's conduct."

Mr. Lang also mentions that "York," the Fuegian who was brought to England, thought his brother would be punished for having committed a murder. "Very bad to kill man." "York," however, had been some time in England. Surely, in any case, this evidence is very meagre. If the Fuegians had any religion we should have heard of it from "York." On the other hand, Decker, who visited them in 1824, states that "there is not the least spark of religion or policy to be observed among them." Fitzroy himself "never witnessed or heard of any act of a decidedly religious nature." He did not agree with Mr. Lang about the "great Black Man." Darwin and Cook make similar statements; and, finally, I may refer to the evidence

[1] Fitzroy, vol. ii. p. 180.

of the French Scientific Expedition to Cape Horn.[1] Messrs. Hyades and Deniker, who spent a year carefully studying the Fuegians, tell us that, "Nous n'avons constaté chez les Fuégiens aucun signe de sentiment religieux."

They then refer to Quatrefages, who, as we know, maintained that a belief in religion was common to the whole human race, and they continue :—

"Malgré ces éloquentes paroles de l'éminent Professeur, nous ne croyons pas modifier notre opinion sur l'absence du sentiment religieux chez les Fuégiens. Nous les avons observés très attentivement à ce point de vue pendant l'année que nous avons passée parmi eux : jamais nous n'avons pu saisir la moindre allusion à un culte quelconque, ni à une idée religieuse."

They refer in a note to a statement by Réville that "une des causes principales de l'erreur qui fait refuser à certaines peuplades sauvages le sentiment religieux, 'C'est le manque de patience, de preparation spéciale, et d'observa-

[1] *Mission Scientifique des Cap Horn*, vol. ii. (*Anthropologie Ethnographie*, par P. Hyades et J. Deniker, pp. 253–257). (Paris, 1891).

tion méthodique. Nous avons fait notre possible pour ne pas mériter cette accusation, et nous regrettons que les faits observés par nous ne puissent nous ranger du même côté que ces éminents contradicteurs."

Finally, I may observe that in his last work Mr. Lang considerably approximates to the position I have occupied.

In the last edition of *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, he explains[1] that "as to the Australians, I mean no more than that, *among* endless low myths, some of them possess . . . the germs of a sympathetic religion." A germ of religion is, however, a very different thing from a religion.

[1] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, p. xviii. (1906).

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION—(*continued*)

M. Roskoff, of Vienna, has done me the honour of devoting one entire section of his work, *Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvölker*, to a criticism of, and reply to, my statements. I feel the more bound to reply because Mr. Lang, in *The Making of Religion*, expresses his opinion that M. Roskoff has "confuted" my statements. In the first place, however, I must observe that M. Roskoff had not to answer me, but the authorities I cited. Moreover, the authorities he cites do not by any means support his conclusions.

M. Roskoff replies partly by belittling the authorities I quoted, and partly by endeavouring to bring forward evidence on the other side. As regards the former issue he has not, I venture to think, been very successful. The first of my witnesses whom he impugns is the late Mr. Bates. This does not seem to

me a happy case to have selected. No one, I should have thought, who has read his delightful book, *The Naturalist on the Amazons*—certainly no one who enjoyed the honour of his friendship—would doubt that Mr. Bates was a most careful and conscientious observer, and that he would make no statement except on clear evidence.

When, however, I say that M. Roskoff has attempted to belittle the evidence which I brought forward, I do not mean that he does so in any unfair spirit; though, as I have just indicated, he does not, I think, do so successfully. Nor does he in any way question the accuracy of my quotations, but endeavours to impugn their value, or to produce counter-evidence. Moreover, in not a few cases he repeats what I have myself said as if it was an argument against me.

M. Roskoff includes tattooing, ceremonial dances, and even smoking as evidence of religion. No doubt dances, as we see in the Old Testament, and solemn smoking ceremonies, as in North America, in some cases assume a religious character, but assuredly they are not

in themselves evidence of religion. When these points are borne in mind, I think it will be easy to show that M. Roskoff's evidence completely breaks down. I may observe also that M. Roskoff does not refer to all the instances in which savage races have been stated to be without religion.

I will now take *seriatim* the cases in which he disputes my conclusion, and in the order in which he discusses them, though the sequence is not by any means natural. I do not propose to repeat the evidence quoted in my two books to which I must refer, and here will only discuss the rebutting arguments brought forward by M. Roskoff and others. Nor need I again refer to the Australians, the Bushmen, the Mincopies, or the Fuegians; they have been dealt with in the preceding chapter.

Tasmanians

As regards the Tasmanians, I relied on Dr. Nixon[1] (whom M. Roskoff calls Nidon), the first Bishop of Tasmania, feeling sure that he would not have given the weight of his great

[1] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 431.

authority to a statement so important without having thoroughly satisfied himself. Bishop Nixon came to the conclusion that "no trace can be found of the existence of any religious usage or even sentiment among them." I may also quote Bonwick:[1] "The Tasmanians were as destitute of the idea of Divinity as of the nature of the soul. As no word existed in their dialects for the purpose, that of Godna was invented to convey the doctrine. . . ." As to the future state, he tells his readers: "From every inquiry, both from themselves and from whites most conversant with them, I have never been able to ascertain that such a belief exists."

Against these two important authorities, and apparently in reply to me, M. Roskoff quotes Milligan (from Tylor). I had, however, also referred to his statement[2] "that they believed in the existence of a number of mischievous spirits who lived in caverns or the dark recesses of the forest, and that after death their spirits went to England"—which is evidently a modern idea.

[1] *The Daily Life of the Tasmanians*, p. 171.
[2] *Tasmanian Journal of Nat. Science*, vol. i. p. 249.

He also refers to Peron, without giving any reference. But Peron makes no statement as to the beliefs of the natives; all he says is that having landed one day he found a grave, over which were laid some pieces of bark with marks cut on them!

Finally, I may add that Mr. Tylor also tells us that "the whole evidence for a Tasmanian supreme good spirit is, in my opinion, worthless."[1]

Hottentots

As regards the Hottentots, I said that, "whether the Hottentots can be said to have had any religion, depends on the exact meaning we attach to the word."[2]

I quoted Le Vaillant, who expressly declares that the Hottentots had no religion.

M. Roskoff, however, relies on Kolben, who no doubt satisfied himself from their answers to his questions that they did believe in the existence of spirits; but he continues: "But it does not appear that they have any institution of worship directly regarding the

[1] *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, vol. xxi. p. 298 (1892).
[2] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 413.

Supreme God. I never saw, nor could I hear, that any one of them paid any act of devotion immediately to Him."[1]

His testimony is the more significant because he was fully persuaded *à priori* that they must have a religion, and insisted, for instance, although they stoutly denied it, that their dances were religious, "let the Hottentots say what they will."

Sparrman points this out. He says:[2] "The moon, according to Kolben, receives a kind of adoration from the Hottentots. But the fact is, that they merely take the opportunity of her beams, and at the same time of the coolness of the night, to amuse themselves with dancing; and, consequently, have no more thoughts of worshipping her than the Christian colonists, who are seen at the same time strolling in great numbers about the streets, and parading on the stone steps with which their houses are usually encircled."

He adds:[3] "They are not sensible of the existence of any Being who is the origin and

[1] *The Cape of Good Hope*, vol. i. p. 95.
[2] *Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope*, vol. i. p. 212.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 207.

ruler of all things; for, on being questioned, they say they know nothing of the matter."

M. Roskoff also refers at some length to Fritsch, but frankly admits that Fritsch regarded the so-called "Great Captain" of the Hottentots as no more than the powerful ghost of a former chief.[1]

He also relies on Alexander's[2] Travels, vol. ii. p. 138. There is, however, nothing about religion on this page, and Alexander is in reality a witness, not against, but for me. On p. 140 he tells us that "notwithstanding that some people maintain that there is no nation on earth without religion in some form, however faintly it may be traced in their minds, yet, after much and diligent inquiry, I could not discover the slightest feeling of devotion towards a higher and an invisible power among the Hill Damaras; neither had they any fear of an evil influence."

Moffat, "the venerable missionary," as Dr. Hahn justly calls him, tells us[3] that "while

[1] *Die Eingeborenen Südafrikas*, p. 338.
[2] Alexander, *Expedition into the Interior of Africa*, 1838.
[3] Moffat, *Missionary Labours in South Africa*.

living among the Namaquas I made many inquiries respecting the name they had to denote the Divine Being, but could not come to any satisfactory conclusion on the subject, though I had the assistance of Africander (the chief) in my researches." Surely it is obvious that a tribe could not have a religion of which their own chief knew nothing. Dr. Hahn is therefore scarcely charitable in attributing[1] Dr. Moffat's conclusions to "religious narrow-mindedness."

Dr. Hahn's opinion is, no doubt, entitled to respect, though his evidence for the most part only proves the existence of a belief in wizards and ghosts and the existence of various, sometimes very repulsive, myths. Mr. Lang himself tells us[2] that Dr. Hahn's description of the so-called religion of the Hottentots is "a firm belief in sorcery and the arts of hiring medicine-men on the one hand, and on the other, belief in and adoration of the powers of the dead." Even Tsuni Goam, after whom Dr. Hahn names his book,

[1] Hahn, *Tsuni-I I Goam*, p. 51.
[2] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. ii. p. 44.

Tsuni Goam, the Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi (Hottentots), was, as he himself tells us,[1] a rich chief and wizard among the Koras, who was wounded in the knee by a rival chief and afterwards died. Moreover, Dr. Moffat tells us that "the worthy Rev. Wuras, superintendent of the Berlin mission, who has now been more than fifty years among the Koras, writes to me that Tsuni-I I Goam was a great chief and sorcerer among the Koras, and possessed numbers of cattle." Dr. Hahn cannot altogether nullify the evidence of other equally experienced and careful observers who record the condition of the natives in their own districts. No doubt there were differences between different tribes and even different individuals.

Esquimaux

The Esquimaux form a very interesting case. They are much more advanced than some of the other races with which we have been dealing. They are a peaceable, kind, well-behaved race with remarkably little crime.

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 62.

They live under great difficulties from the Arctic climate, and occasional want of food. As to the absence of religion I quoted high authorities, to whom M. Roskoff opposes Crantz, Parry, and Egede.

Crantz was a Danish missionary who was firmly convinced that it was impossible for any race to be without religion. Therefore he takes for granted that the Esquimaux must have had one[1] which their posterity "neglected by little and little, the further they were removed from more wise and civilised nations, till at last they lost every just conception of the Deity."

But he expressly says[2] that at the time he wrote they "have neither a religion nor idolatrous worship, nor so much as any ceremonies to be perceived tending towards it."

The quotation from Parry only mentions the belief in "angekoks," or wizards, as I myself mentioned. There is not a word about religion.

Ross confirms this. He says:[3] "Ervick,

[1] *History of Greenland*, p. 198. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 197.
[3] Ross's *Voyage of Discovery to the Arctic Regions*, p. 127.

being the senior of the first party that came on board, was judged to be the most proper person to question on the subject of religion. I directed Sacheuse to ask him if he had any knowledge of a Supreme Being; but after trying every word used in his own language to express it, he could not make him understand what he meant. It was distinctly ascertained that he did not worship the sun, moon, stars, or any image or living creature. When asked what the sun or moon was for, he said to give light. He had no knowledge or idea how he came into being, or of a future state; but said that when he died he would be put into the ground. Having fully ascertained that he had no idea of a beneficent Supreme Being, I proceeded, through Sacheuse, to inquire if he believed in an evil spirit; but he could not be made to understand what it meant. . . . He was positive that in this incantation he did not receive assistance from anything, nor could he be made to understand what a good or an evil spirit meant."

Lastly, to my surprise, M. Roskoff refers to

Egede; but what does Egede say? He tells us[1] that "The Greenlanders' ignorance of a Creator would make one believe they were atheists, or rather naturalists. For when they have been asked from whence they thought that heaven and earth had their origin, they have answered 'Nothing; but that it had always been so.' But if we consider that they have some notion of the immortality of souls, and that there is another much happier life after this; moreover, as they are addicted to different kinds of superstition, and that they hold there is a spiritual being which they call Torngarsuk, to whom they ascribe a supernatural power, though not the creation or the production of creatures (of whose origin they tell many absurd and ridiculous stories)—all this, I say, supposes some sort of worship; although they do not themselves, out of their brutish stupidity, understand or infer so much." And a little further on, speaking of Torngarsuk, he says "the commonality know little or nothing of him, except the name only."

Bancroft also, in his great work, *The*

[1] Egede, *The Natural History of Greenland*, p. 183.

Native Races of the Pacific States, says:[1] "The Eskimos do not appear to recognise any supreme deity, but only an indefinite number of supernatural beings varying in name, power, and character—the evil seeming to predominate. . . . Their whole religion may be summed up as a vague fear finding its expression in witchcraft"—which, I think, has been shown not to be religion.

So far as the Esquimaux then are concerned, M. Roskoff's attack completely breaks down on examination.

Lapps

M. Roskoff devotes several pages to the religion of the Lapps. To these I need not, however, refer, as I have not denied the existence of a belief in religion amongst them.

Northern American Indians

As regards the American Indians of the Far North, I said:[2]

"Hearne states that the Northern Indians had no religion; even the celebrated 'five

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iii. p. 141.

[2] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 495.

nations' of Canada, according to Colden, had no religion, nor any word for God. Burnet never found any semblance of worship among the Comanches. In the central parts of North America, however, the Indian tribes generally believed in the existence of a Great Spirit, and the survival of the soul; but they seem to have had scarcely any religious observances, still less any edifices for sacred purposes. The Dacotahs never pray to the Creator; if they wish for fine weather, they pray to the weather itself. They are said to believe that the Great Spirit made all things except thunder and rice, but we are not told the reason for these two curious exceptions."

M. Roskoff admits that the Takhali, whom he mentions as specially uncivilised, have no clear conception of a Supreme Being, but asserts that "they are not without traces of such a belief." He refers as his authority to Captain Wilkes.[1] Wilkes, however, says absolutely nothing in the passage cited about religion, or any belief in a Great Spirit. Further on he says that "this tribe has

[1] *United States Expl. Expedition*, vol. iv. p. 452.

priests or medicine-men, who practise incantations." This, however, is only witchcraft.

The other authority on which M. Roskoff relies is that of Brasseur, who is, however, not a strong witness in his favour, if indeed he is not rather in mine.

He says:[1] "Ils n'admettaient que vaguement l'existence d'un être suprême, mais ils saisirent promptement l'idée du Grand Esprit, dès qu'elle leur eut été suggérée par les missionnaires." They believed in life everywhere—in stones, in wood, in mountains, and in certain spirits to whom they attributed all evil; but Brasseur does not give in the passage referred to any evidence of worship or religion, and in the careful and copious index the word does not even occur.

M. Roskoff quotes Tylor[2] as saying that Cartier in his second Canadian voyage (1535), "speaks of the people having no valid belief in God, for they believe in one whom they call Cudouagni, and say that he often speaks with them, and tells them what the weather will be;

[1] Brasseur, *Hist. du Canada*, vol. i. p. 22.
[2] *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 309.

they say that when he is angry with them he casts earth in their eyes." Thevet's statement somewhat later is as follows: "As to their religion, they have no worship nor prayer to God, except that they contemplate the new moon, called in their language Osannaha, saying that Andouagni calls it thus, sending it little by little to advance or retard the waters. For the rest, they fully believe that there is a Creator, greater than the sun, the moon, and the stars, and who holds all in his power. He it is whom they call Andouagni, without, however, having any form or method of prayer to him."

Here we have two inconsistent and contradictory statements: belief in a Great Spirit, but not in a God; belief in a supernatural being, but no attempt to secure his protection and assistance.

In *Primitive Culture*, Tylor makes no attempt to explain this difficulty, but more recently he has done so. In the absence of belief or worship we have the original Indian condition: the assent to the existence of a Great Spirit, without, however, giving any

practical effect to the supposed belief, is due to missionary teaching.

"Most distinct cases," he says,[1] "of the borrowing and adaptation of dualistic and monotheistic ideas by tribes of the lower culture from nations of the higher culture are to be found in the New World. Conspicuous among these is the famous belief in the 'Great Spirit' of the North American Indians, who for the last century or more has been brought forward by philosophers as the type of deity discovered by or implanted in or revealed to

> '. . . the poor Indian, whose untutor'd mind
> Sees God in clouds, and hears Him in the wind.'

Yet the historical evidence that the Great Spirit belongs not to the untutored but to the tutored mind of the savage, is preserved for us in the records of the tutors themselves, the Jesuit missionaries in Canada. . . . The whole class," he continues, "of spirits or demons, known to the Caribs of the West Indies by the name of cemi, in Algonquin as manitu, in Huron as oki, he now spells with

[1] E. B. Tylor, in *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, vol. xxi. p. 284 (1892).

capital letters, and converts them each into a Supreme Being, 'Ce Grand Esprit connu chez les Caraibes sous le nom de Chemiin, sous celui de Manitou chez les nations Algonquines, et sous celui d'Okki chez celles qui parlent la langue Huronne,' &c."[1]

Thus then Tylor, whom he quotes as against me, is really a witness in my favour. Tylor has, indeed, convinced me that I went too far in attributing to the American Indians a belief in a Great Spirit.

Schoolcraft describes[2] the Manitous as "a species of little men or fairies who love to dwell on rocks near water," and Tylor[3] seems to me to have shown that the idea of the Great Spirit was derived from the early missionaries.

M. Roskoff next cites Smith, in *The History of New York*. He does so on the authority of Waitz, and apparently without looking at Smith's book. Had he done so he could not fairly have claimed him as a witness. What does Smith say? His words are:[4]

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 285.
[2] *Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes*, p. 194.
[3] *Journal Anthropol. Institute*, p. 284 (1892).
[4] Smith, *History of New York*, p. 41.

"With respect to Religion, the Indians may be said to be under the Thickest Gloom of Ignorance. If they have any, which is much to be questioned, those who affirm it will find it difficult to tell us wherein it consists. They have neither Priest nor Temple, Sacrifice nor Altar. Some traces indeed appear of the original Law, written upon their Hearts, but they have no system of Doctrine, nor any Rites and Modes of publik worship. They are sunk unspeakably beneath the polite Pagans of Antiquity. Some confused Notions indeed of Beings superior to themselves they have, but of the Deity and His Natural and moral perfections no proper or tolerable Conceptions, and of His general and particular Providence they know nothing. They profess no Obligations to Him, nor acknowledge their dependence on Him. . . . If they have a religion it is worse than none."

M. Roskoff next refers to Carver, who, however, writing as lately as 1780, expresses the great difficulty he found in acquiring any satisfactory conception of their religious ideas. He certainly credits them with a belief in a Great

Spirit, but came to the conclusion "that the ideas they annex to the word Spirit are very different from the conceptions more enlightened nations entertain of it."[1] This leaves much to be desired.

Again, M. Roskoff relies on the account given by Loskiel, as if it confuted my view. He has, however, evidently not read Loskiel with his usual care. Loskiel commences his chapter by pointing out that he refers[2] to the present opinions of the Indians, which in his opinion were greatly due to the instruction given by Europeans, who had lived so long in the country, and that "the present religious notions of the Indians differ in many respects from those of their forefathers." If M. Roskoff had read this passage he would not, however, I am sure, have felt justified in quoting Loskiel's authority against me.

M. Roskoff also cites Charlevoix, but without giving any reference, and I can find in his three large quarto volumes nothing which contravenes the statements quoted by me. Even

[1] *Travels in North America*, p. 383.

[2] *Mission of the United Brethren among the Indians in North America*, p. 33.

of the comparatively advanced Algonquins he admits[1] that "Les Dieux ont des corps, et vivent à peu près de la même manière que nous; mais sans aucune des incommodités auxquelles nous sommes sujets. Le terme d'Esprit ne signifie chez eux qu'un Etre d'une nature plus excellente que les autres. Ils n'en ont point pour exprimer ce qui passe la portée de leur intelligence, extrêmement bornée sur tout ce qui n'est pas sensible, ou d'un usage commun."

Western Indians

As regards the Indians of the Far West, I relied on Baegert, who lived among them for seventeen years, and La Pérouse.

M. Roskoff quotes against them the account given by the Jesuit missionary, Father Venegas. His account is, however, very contradictory. He first says:[2]

"All relations agree that hitherto no idolatry has been found among the Californians. They neither worshipped any creatures nor had any representations or images of false deities to

[1] *Hist. de la Nouvelle France*, vol. iii. p. 345.
[2] Venegas, *History of California*, vol. i. p. 87.

whom they paid any kind of adoration. Nor had they among them any temples, oratories, altars, or any other place set apart for religious exercises. Indeed, no such thing was known there—no outward profession of religion in festivals, prayers, vows, expiations, or any publick or private marks of addresses being made to God, or even of any knowledge of Him."

But then he continues: "They not only had an idea of the unity and nature of God as a pure Spirit, and likewise of other spiritual beings, but also some faint glimmerings of the Trinity, the eternal generation of the logos, and other articles of the Christian religion, though mixed with a thousand absurdities."

The first account seems to bear out my statement; the second is surely a faint echo of the teaching of the worthy missionaries.

Bancroft also says:[1] "The Tinneh, that great people stretching north of the fifty-fifth parallel nearly to the Arctic Ocean and to the Pacific, do not seem in any of their various tribes to have a single expressed idea with regard to a

[1] *The Native Races of the Pacific States*, vol. iii. p. 141.

supreme power"; and "the Haidahs,[1] at least those seen by Mr. Poole on Queen Charlotte Island, have no worship, nor did they look upon themselves as in any way responsible to any deity for their actions. As with their northern neighbours, a belief in goblins, spectres, and sorcery seems to be the sum of their religion."

Next, M. Roskoff refers to Picolo, who, according to Waitz, says that the Californian Indians worshipped ("Verehrten") the moon. What Picolo really says is: "Wir haben bei ihnen weder ein ordentliches regiment noch einen vollstantigen Gotten dienst angetroffen. Sie beten zwar den Mond an und schneiden ihnen selbst die Haar; doch kan ich nicht versicheren ob solches nach dem Mond kauff zu einer gewissen zeit und diesem planeten zu ehren geschehe. Die abgeschorene haar geben sie ihrem afterpfaffen welcher sich solches zu allerhand Uberglauben bedienet."[2]

("We have not found among them any estab-

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 149.

[2] *In Allerhand briefe, welche von der Missionariis der Ges. Jesu seit* 1643–1726, *angelangt, oder der Neue Welt-Bote.*, iii. 38 *fg.* (Augsburg, 1726.)

lished government, nor any regular religion. They pray, however, to the moon, and cut off their own hair; yet I could not satisfy myself whether they offered this at any special time, and wishing to honour this planet. The hair itself they give to their false priests, who use it for various superstitions—probably for witchcraft.")

As we come south, the Redskins gradually rise in the scale of civilisation. Even among them, however, the religious beliefs were more or less vague.

M. Roskoff quotes Schoolcraft's[1] account of the traditions relating to Hiawatha, who "assumed the shape of a man, being in all things like the rest of them; and in this shape he visited their original point of origin near the borders of Lake Ontario. He had a wonderful and magnificent canoe, with which he passed over the lakes and visited the streams and rivers. This canoe was of the purest whiteness, and appeared to move, when he was seated in it, with the power of magic. With the touch of the paddle it ascended the

[1] Schoolcraft's *Indian Tribes of North America*, vol. v. p. 157.

rapids of the Oswego River. In this canoe he ascended all the lesser lakes, carefully examined their shores, and placed all things in proper order for the sustenance and comfort of good men. He had taught the people of the different tribes the art of raising corn and beans—articles which had not before been cultivated among them. He made the fishing grounds free, and opened to all the uninterrupted pursuit of game. . . . These things being accomplished, he deliberately resolved to lay aside his divine character, and in after years to make his abode among the children of men. He accordingly selected for his residence a beautiful spot on the southern shore of Cross Lake, or 'Te-nugkt'-too,' as called by the natives. He here erected a suitable habitation, after a time formally relinquished his divine name and title of Ta-ren-ya-wa-go, and in all respects assumed the character and habits of a man."[1] This is a curious myth, but there is no evidence that Hiawatha was worshipped as a god.

[1] *Loc. cit.*, vol. v. p. 157.

Brazil

The Brazilian tribes constitute numerous, generally small and more or less isolated communities. Though as a rule at a very low stage of civilisation, we must expect to find some differences.

For the absence of religion among many Brazilian tribes I quoted Bates, Wallace, Spix, Martius, and Azara.

M. Roskoff alleges in opposition that Spix and Martius quote the existence of Pajis or wizards among the Coroados. This is so, and I quoted the statement, but it is evidence of magic only, not of religion. He also quotes Prince Maximilian of Wied-neu-Wied, who considered that all men must have a religion, and mentions among the Botocudos a dread of an evil wood-demon.[1]

M. Roskoff, as regards the Botocudos, says: "Nach St. Hilaire[2] sollen sie das höchste Wesen Tupan nennen" ("According to St. Hilaire they call the supreme spirit Tupan").

[1] *Reise nach Brasilien*, vol. ii. p. 58.
[2] *Voyage au Brésil*, vol. i. 439.

This statement is taken from Waitz,[1] and apparently without verification. Waitz is generally very careful, but this statement is incomplete and misleading. What St. Hilaire said was not that the Botocudos, but only those of Passanha, called the supreme being Tupan; and he adds that they probably learnt this from outside, Tupan not being a Botocudo word. His actual statement is: "Comme les Botocudos de Jiquitinhonha n'ont aucune idée de la Divinité, ceux de Passanha differaient d'eux sur un point bien essentiel, s'il est vrai, comme on me le raconta dans le pays, qu'ils reconnaissent un Être suprême, et qu'ils le croient irrité, quand ils entendent gronder le tonnerre. Ce qui, au reste, tendrait à prouver que cette croyance leur a été communiqué par les Malalis ou d'autres Indiens de même lignage, c'est qu'ils donnent à Dieu le nom du Tupan, qui appartient au langage de ces peuples."

As regards the Indians of the Amazons, Bates, whom M. Roskoff calls my witness, says "that none of the tribes on the Upper

[1] *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vol. iii. p. 447.

Amazons have any idea of a Supreme Being, and consequently have no word to express it in their language." M. Roskoff, however, objects that he elsewhere refers to a supernatural being, named Iurupari, whom he says they attempt to propitiate by dances. Bates, however, describes him[1] "simply as a mischievous imp, who is at the bottom of all those mishaps of their daily life, the causes of which are not very immediate or obvious to their dull understandings. It is vain to try to get information out of a Tucuna on this subject; they affect great mystery when the name is mentioned, and give very confused answers to questions; it was clear, however, that the idea of a spirit as a beneficent God or Creator had not entered the mind of these Indians."

I may also observe that in the appendix to the volume of *Expeditions into the Valley of the Amazons*, published by the Hakluyt Society, and edited by Sir Clements Markham, we are told that the Chunchos, a numerous and formidable group of tribes, "have no religion

[1] Bates's *Naturalist on the River Amazon*, vol. ii. p. 403.

whatever," and of the Curetus, a tribe inhabiting the country between the river Iapura and Uanpes, that "they have no idea of a Supreme Being."

M. Roskoff refers to the Coroados as worshipping the sun, and especially the moon. I have myself also made the same statement, but it is scarcely correct. What Spix and Martius say is: "The Coroado[1] hardly ever raises his eyes to the starry firmament. Yet he is actuated by a certain awe of some constellations, as of everything that indicates a spiritual connection of things. His chief attention, however, is not directed to the sun, but to the moon; according to which he calculates time, and from which he is used to deduce good and evil. As all that is good passes without notice by him, and only what is disagreeable makes an impression on him, he acknowledges no cause of good, or no God, but only an evil principle, which meets him sometimes in the form of a lizard, of a man with stag's feet, of a crocodile, or an ounce; sometimes transforms itself into a swamp, &c.,

[1] *Travels in Brazil*, v. ii. p. 243.

leads him astray, vexes him, brings him into difficulty and danger, and even kills him."

M. Roskoff also refers to Eschwege,[1] who, however, only says that he heard from the missionary that they believed in witchcraft and ghosts, and buried the dead in his hut with his implements and weapons.

As against Bates especially M. Roskoff says: "Nach d'Acugna haben oder hatten der Anwohner des Amazonstroms menschenäherliche, aus holz geschnitze Fetische" ("According to Acugna, the dwellers on the Amazons have, or had, figures of men carved out of wood"). Acugna's statement does not even raise a presumption of anything that can be called religion.

As regards Azara's statements, M. Roskoff quotes[2] with approval D'Orbigny's criticism that Azara first denies the existence of religion and then makes special statements showing that the reverse is the case. Tylor also gives the weight of his authority to this statement. The quotations they make from Azara, however, merely show a belief in witchcraft and in ghosts, which

[1] *Tour. v. Brasilien.* [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 79.

he, as it seems to me rightly, did not regard as amounting to a religion.

For instance, Azara asserts[1] that the Charruas "n'ont aucune religion." M. Roskoff questions this, but only on the very slender ground that they buried things with the dead—indicating merely a belief in ghosts.

Of the Minuanes, Azara makes the same statement,[2] against which M. Roskoff can only object that the women were tattooed, and that the sick were treated by wizards and witches. So again of the Pampas he says: "Ils ne connaissent ni religion ni culte." Here again the only rebutting evidence which M. Roskoff can bring forward is that the women are tattooed!

I had thought that I would omit the other Brazilian tribes referred to by M. Roskoff, for fear of wearying even the most patient reader, but on the other hand it might be supposed that there was no possible reply, and it is perhaps better to mention them briefly. These are the Pampas, the Ancas, the Guaranys, the

[1] *Voyage dans l'Amérique Méridionale*, vol. ii. p. 3 (1809).
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 33.

Guganas, the Ninaquiguilas, the Guanas, and the Payaguas.

As regards the first two, M. Roskoff does not attempt any answer.

Of the Guaranys, M. Roskoff only mentions that the women are tattooed, which is surely no proof of religion.

Of the Guganas the only evidence of religion which he adduces is that they armed themselves in times of mourning!

As regards the Ninaquiguilas he brings forward no evidence whatever as against Azara's statement.

Of the Guanas he states that sometimes they wound themselves, and that when ill they are attended by medicine-men.

Lastly, as regards the Payaguas he quotes Waitz.

Perhaps also I ought to refer specially to the Mbayas, with reference to whom M. Roskoff is, I think, scarcely fair to Azara. He accuses him of inconsistency because, as he alleges,[1] he first asserts the absence of religion and then makes statements which show that

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 79.

it really existed. I have already shown on what frail foundation this statement rests. Azara's words are:[1] "Quant à la religion ils n'adorent rien, et on ne remarque parmi eux rien qui fasse allusion à cet objet, ni à la vie future. On en trouve quelques-uns qui, pour expliquer leur première origine, s'expriment ainsi: 'Dieu créa, au commencement, toutes les nations aussi nombreuses qu'elles sont aujourd'hui.'"

M. Roskoff also refers to Lery,[2] according to whom the natives believed in evil demons, and in the spirit surviving the body. On the other hand Lery expressly states that they[3] "neither acknowledge nor worship any false gods, either celestiall or terrestrial; and therefore have no publike place where they may assemble for the cause of religion. They are ignorant also of the creation of the world." In fact, therefore, Lery confirms the statements of Azara.

M. Roskoff refers to Marcgraff, but can hardly, I think, have looked up his work. Marcgraff says:[4] "Brasilienses barbari nullum pene habent

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 107. [2] Lery, *History of Brazil.*
[3] *Purchas his Pilgrimmes*, vol. x. p. 549.
[4] Marcgraff, *Tract. Top. Brasileae*, p. 20.

religionis sensum, nec de origine, et creatione hujus universi quisquam nolunt . . . neque Deum aliquem noverunt, neque proprie adorant quicquam, unde nec illud nomen in ipsorum idiomate reperire est, quod Deum exprimat, nisi forte Tupa, quo excellentiam aliquam supremam denotant; unde tonitru vocant Tupa cuminga. . . . Coelum aut inferos post hanc vitam pariter ignorant, licet animas post separationem a corpore superesse credant atque nonnunquam in daemones converti."

("The natives of Brazil have scarcely any idea of religion, nor of the origin or creation of the universe. They know no God, nor do they worship any, nor is there in their language any word to be found to express God, unless perhaps it be Tupa, which denotes supreme excellence, and whence thunder is called 'Tupa cuminga.' They have no knowledge of heaven or hell after this life, except an idea that the spirits may survive the body and sometimes become demons.")

His next witness is Coreal, who, however, does not give him much, if any, support.

Coreal says :[1] "Ces sauvages n'ont ni temples ni monuments à l'honneur d'aucune divinité. . . . Ils ne savent ce que c'est que la création du monde, et ne distinguent les temps, que par les lunes, c'est comme s'ils disaient voilà qui est admirable!" But he disclaims speaking on the subject with any authority, "car je ne suis pas missionnaire, et je n'ai pas assez de lumières pour donner des avis sur ce chapitre."

Paraguay

For Paraguay M. Roskoff relies, as I did, on Dobritzhoffer. But though Dobritzhoffer was so long there—eighteen years—his account is somewhat confused and doubtful as to the real views of the natives. M. Roskoff does not question the accuracy of my quotations, and none of the passages he adds prove anything more than a belief in witchcraft and some dread of demons.

As regards the Paraguayans, I said: "They had no regular form of government, nor, according to Azara, any ideas of religion. Dobritzhoffer makes the latter statement generally for

[1] *Voyage aux Indes Occidentales*, vol. i. p. 224.

all the Indians, and repeats it particularly for the following tribes—namely, the Charruas, Minuanas, Aucas, Guaranys, Guayanas, Nalicuegas, Guasarapos, Guatos, Ninaquiguilas, Guanas, Lenguas, Aguilots, Mocobys, Abipones, and Paraguas; yet it appears from other passages that some at least of these tribes were believers in witchcraft and in mysterious evil beings."[1]

They believe no doubt in witchcraft, but he says:[2] "Theologians agree in denying that any man in possession of his reason can, without a crime, remain ignorant of God for any length of time. This opinion I warmly defended in the University of Cordoba, where I finished the four years' course of theology begun at Gratz in Styria. But what was my astonishment, when removing from thence to a colony of Abipones, I found that the whole language of these savages does not contain a single word which expresses God or a divinity. To instruct them in religion, it was necessary to borrow the Spanish word for God,

[1] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 507.
[2] *History of the Abipones*, vol. ii. p. 57.

and insert into the Catechism "Dios ecnam caogarik" ("God the creator of things").

M. Roskoff also refers to Charlevoix, but without giving the passage. Charlevoix says,[1] however, of the Guaycurus: "Ils ne reconnaissent point d'autre Divinité que la lune et la constellation de la Grande Ourse, auxquelles on n'a point aperçu qu'ils rendent aucun culte religieux"—which seems a somewhat inconsistent statement. Of the Chiquites also he says:[2] "On n'a trouvé parmi les Chiquites aucune trace bien marquée de religion; mais ils craignoient les demons."

Polynesians

M. Roskoff says: "Polynesians, New Zealanders. Quatrefages remarks with reference to the evidence brought forward by Lubbock as regards the absence of religion among the Polynesians," and gives interesting particulars as to the religion of the New Zealanders, Tongans, Tahitians, &c. Any one not reading the context very carefully would naturally

[1] *Hist. de Paraguay*, vol. i. p. 120.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, vol. iv. p. 148.

suppose that I had denied this. On the contrary, I made full and frequent references to them both in *Prehistoric Times* and in the *Origin of Civilisation*. What I did say was that "some of the Polynesians" were stated to have no religion, which is of course a very different statement. All this part of his work is really therefore in no sense, as a reader who did not compare the passages would naturally suppose, in any way a reply to me, or a refutation of anything I have said.

For my statements referring to certain islands I quoted Williams' *Missionary Enterprises*, the *Voyage of the Novara*, and Dieffenbach. It will hardly be denied that these are first-rate authorities. I referred particularly to Samoa.[1]

The statement of Williams, the venerable missionary of the Polynesians, was: "The Samoans have neither morals, nor temples, nor altars, nor offerings, and consequently none of the sanguinary rites observed at the other groups. In consequence of this the Samoans were considered an impious race by their neighbours; and their impiety became

[1] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 552.

proverbial with the people of Rarontongo, for, when upbraiding a person who neglected the worship of the gods, they would call him 'a godless Samoan.'"[1]

Waitz appears to admit the absence of religion among the Samoans, and accounts for it by the suggestion that they had outgrown the childish superstitions of other Polynesians. From the statements of Turner,[2] however, which are substantially in agreement with those of Hale,[3] the previous accounts seem to be incorrect, or what may be perhaps more probable, the circumstances have changed. Mr. Turner does not indeed distinguish between family totems and real Gods. Many at any rate of the "Gods" he mentions are evidently totems.

Caroline Islanders

For the Caroline Islanders I quoted *The Voyage of the Novara.* M. Roskoff does not question the accuracy of this reference. The Carolines are a numerous and scattered group,

[1] *Missionary Enterprises*, p. 464.
[2] G. Turner, *Samoa.*
[3] *United States Exploring Expedition*, p. 24.

and there may well be differences between the inhabitants of different islands. He quotes Hale and Forster.

Mr. Hale,[1] however, only says, speaking of the Island of Bānapē: "The priests, according to O'Connell, have considerable influence. They are called 'Ediomet,' and belong to the class of petty chiefs; indeed, this word is frequently used to signify merely chief. Their worship is very simple. It consists in prayers and invocations addressed to the spirits (hani or ani) of departed chiefs. They have neither temples, idols, nor offerings. Certain animals, also, particularly fish, are esteemed sacred among them; some, as eels, being so to the whole people, while others are merely prohibited to particular families. O'Connell supposes this to proceed from some rude system of metempsychosis, connected with their religious belief." This appears to be a case of totemism rather than of religion.

As to J. R. Forster's "*Observations*, section 497," there seems something wrong about the reference.

[1] *United States Exploring Expedition*, p. 84.

He also refers to Waitz's citation of "Cantova," without, however, giving any reference. So far as I can find, Cantova only speaks of totemism not yet developed into a religion. He expressly says that "Ils n'ont ni temple, ni autel, ni idole, ni sacrifices, à part quelques offrandes de noix de coco déposées au pied d'un arbre, dans lequel il croient que se trouve l'esprit."[1]

Pelew Islands

For the Pelew Islands, M. Roskoff, to my surprise, refers to Captain Wilson's *Account of the Pelew Islands*.

Captain Wilson spent some time in friendly intercourse with the natives, of whom he gives a pleasant account. They believed in witchcraft, and Captain Wilson tells us that he started with the belief that all mankind had some form of religion. Nevertheless, "our people, during their continuance with the natives of Pelew, never saw any particular ceremonies, or observed anything that had the appearance of public worship."[2]

[1] Cantova, *Découverte et Description des Iles Garbanzos* (*Carolines*), p. 2.

[2] *Account of the Pelew Islands*, p. 324.

As regards another island of the Caroline group, Ulee, M. Roskoff refers to Forster, who says,[1] not quite consistently, "It is observed that though they have no knowledge of a Maker of heaven and earth, they, however, acknowledge a good and great spirit, who is the great Lord of heaven, to whom many spirits, both good and evil, are subordinate; these spirits are celestial beings different from those who inhabit the earth; they 'have a body,' and marry, in the style of their chiefs, more than one wife."

As regards these spirits who "have a body," they have certain myths; but he tells us a little further on[2] that "these islanders have neither temples, nor carved or any other images; and they never think it necessary to make any offerings or sacrifices, except a few of them, who seem to worship their deceased friends."

M. Roskoff also refers to Chamisso. But Chamisso frankly tells us that the account he received from his interpreter leaves much to be desired, and is open to criticism. The inhabitants of different islands by no means appear

[1] *Observations*, p. 604. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 606.

to agree, and of Ulee and the eastern islands, Chamisso expressly says that there are neither temples, nor priests, nor offerings to spirits.[1]

Mallicolo

M. Roskoff can only bring forward a belief in witchcraft, and a dread of possible injury by evil spirits. He refers specially to the two Forsters, who, however, were only one day at the island, and do not claim to speak with any authority. Still I have not, and do not know that any one else has, denied the existence of religion in Mallicolo.

Aru Islands

For the Aru Islanders I quoted the statements of Wallace. Against his testimony, M. Roskoff alleges that he was primarily a naturalist. The objection does not seem to me to have much force. Moreover, he is not the only witness. I also relied on M. Bik, who specially studied the islanders. M. Bik as the result of his inquiries says: "It is evident that the Arafuras of Vorkay (one of the Southern Arus) possess no religion whatever. Of the immor-

[1] Chamisso, *Reise um der Welt*, vol. iv. p. 168.

tality of the soul they have not the least conception. To all my inquiries on this subject, they answered, 'No Arafura has ever returned to us after death; therefore, we know nothing of a future state, and this is the first time we have heard of it.' Their idea was 'Mati, mati, sudah' ('When you are dead there is an end of you'). Neither have they any notion of the creation of the world. To convince myself more fully respecting their want of knowledge of a Supreme Being, I demanded of them on whom they called for help in their need, when their vessels were overtaken by violent tempests. The eldest among them, after having consulted the others, answered that they knew not on whom they could call for assistance, but begged me, if I knew, to be so good as to inform them."[1]

In opposition to Bik, M. Roskoff refers to Waitz, who quotes Captain Kolff, M. Bik's commanding-officer, as stating that the natives erected images in front of their houses as a protection against evil spirits. Captain Kolff indeed says that though he "can hardly coin-

[1] *Voyage of the Dourga*, p. 158.

cide with the opinion entertained by one of my officers, who had visited these islands in 1824 with M. Bik, that the Arafuras had no religion whatsoever, I will here insert some of the observations he made, as contributing greatly to give a knowledge of these people. The facts he relates are not to be doubted."

Captain Kolff, then, while not prepared altogether to agree with M. Bik's opinion, made, or at least records, no observations of his own, and entirely corroborates M. Bik's statements of fact as "not to be doubted." The statement to which Waitz refers is that in one of the villages M. Bik found a house in front of which certain "figures, such as snakes, lizards, crocodiles, and human forms were carved, and which the owner stated to be intended for preserving the house from evil spirits (Swangi)," but he continues, "it is evident that the Arafuras of Vorkay possess no religion whatsoever."[1]

The Bachapins.

For the Bachapins, a Kaffir race, I may quote Burchell, who says:[1] "The Bachapins (Kaffirs)

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 159. [2] *Travels in South Africa*, vol. ii. p. 550.

had no form of worship or religion. They thought 'that everything made itself, and that trees and herbage grew by their own will.' They had no belief in a good deity, but some vague idea of an evil being. Indeed, the first idea of a god is almost always an evil spirit."

And again: "The superstition of the Bachapins, for it cannot be called religion, is of the weakest and most absurd kind; and, as before remarked, betrays the low state of their intellect. These people have no outward worship, nor, if one may judge from their never alluding to them, any private devotions; neither could it be discovered that they possessed any very defined or exalted notion of a supreme or beneficent Deity, or of a great and first Creator. Those whom I questioned, asserted that everything made itself; and that trees and herbage grew by their own will."[1]

M. Roskoff sets against these authorities the statement of Waitz-Gerland, that the Bachapins tattoo themselves! This is surely no evidence in itself of a religion.

[1] Burchell, *South Africa*, vol. ii. p. 530 (1824).

For the Koussa Kaffirs I quoted[1] Lichtenstein's statement "that there is no appearance of any religious worship whatever." M. Roskoff replies only that they were believers in witchcraft. This I not only did not deny, but expressly mentioned. He thinks, however, that I was inconsistent, because in another passage[2] I record that "the king of the Koussa Kaffirs having broken off a piece of a stranded anchor, died soon afterwards, upon which all the Kaffirs looked upon the anchor as alive, and saluted it respectfully whenever they passed near it."

M. Roskoff states that the anchor was regarded as the representation of "einer ubersinnlichen verderblichen macht"—a supernatural destructive power.

What Lichtenstein says, however, is: "At the mouth of the river Keissi, or Keisskamma, as it is called by the Hottentots, lies the anchor of a stranded ship. Chachabe, the grandfather of the present king, had a piece of it broken off, and it so happened that the person by whom this was done died soon after. The

[1] *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 222. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 299.

anchor was immediately considered as an enchanter, who had power over the sea, and was angry at the offence which had been given him; a name was in consequence conferred upon him, and he is saluted by it whenever any one passes the spot."[1]

There is nothing here about any "supernatural" power. The anchor was endowed with life and regarded as an enchanter; but an enchanter is not a god.

Negroes

For the Foulahs of Warsoulo, in Central Africa, I quoted[2] Caillié, who states: "I tried to discover whether they had any religion of their own; whether they worshipped fetishes, or the sun, moon, or stars; but I could never perceive any religious ceremony amongst them."[3]

M. Roskoff here again only replies that they believe in magic, which, as I have attempted to show, is a very different thing.

Of the Bambaras, Caillié makes the same statement, and M. Roskoff the same reply.

[1] *Travels in South Africa*, vol. i. p. 254.
[2] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 553.
[3] *Travels to Timbuctoo*, vol. i. p. 303.

Damood Island

For the natives of Damood Island I quoted Jukes,[2] who "could find no trace of any religious belief or observance." M. Roskoff questions Jukes' statement, but brings forward no counter-evidence.

Much light, moreover, is thrown on this part of the question if we consider not merely what savages do not, but what they do, believe. I will run through these lowest races rapidly. When the natives of the Nicobar Islands put up scarecrows to frighten the spirits from their villages; when the Negro beats his idol if he does not get what he wants; when the Lapps made a separate box as a home for each household God, and wrote up the name so that each might know his own box; when the natives of Kamchatka complained of Kutka for making too rapid rivers and inaccessible mountains; when the Bechuanas cursed the spirits for sending a storm, and the Namaquas shot poisoned arrows to drive it away—surely such conduct

[1] *Prehistoric Times*, p. 552.
[2] *Voyage of the "Fly."*

rather indicates the absence of religion than anything which could reasonably be so termed.

"Kibuka" was the war-god of the Baganda. His jawbone, navelstring, and other parts of his body are now in the Ethnological Museum at Cambridge.[1]

The Bechuanas attribute all evil to an invisible being, whom they call Murimo, and "never hesitate to show their indignation at any ill experienced or any wishes unaccomplished by the most bitter curses."[2]

"The Wilder Bedouins," says Burton,[3] "will inquire where Allah is to be found; when asked the object of the questions, they reply, 'If the Eesa could but catch him they would spear him upon the spot; who but he lays waste their homes and kills their cattle and wives?'"

An old woman belonging to the Eesa tribe who was suffering from toothache, was overheard by Burton, saying, "Oh, Allah, may thy teeth ache like mine! Oh, Allah, may thy gums be as sore as mine!" This may show a

[1] Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. p. 35.

[2] Tanner's *Narrative of a Captivity among the Indians*, p. 136.

[3] *First Footsteps in East Africa*, p. 52.

belief in Allah—of a sort—but can it be dignified by the sacred name of religion?

Mr. Lang admits[1] the existence of "a vast body of testimony that savages had no religion at all," but he adds, "that testimony *en masse* was refuted by Roskoff." I do not wonder that any one who has read Roskoff, and not verified his references, should be of that opinion; but I have now gone through them one by one, and those who have had the patience to follow the quotations will judge whether his case has not entirely broken down.

Mr. Lang continues: "Negative evidence of squatters, sailors, and colonists who did not see any religion among this or that race, is not worth much against evidence of trained observers and linguists who *did* find what the others missed."

I have shown, I think, that the "trained observers" did *not* find what the others missed.

For the Australians, I may refer specially to Howitt, Spencer, and Gillen; for the Bushmen to Lichtenstein; for the Fuegians to the recent French Mission; for the Mincopies to Mr. Man,

[1] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, p. 338 (1906).

whom Mr. Lang quotes as having made "a most careful study of their beliefs"; and, lastly, to Mr. Brown.

I submit, then, that if some of the suggestions I threw out and the opinions expressed in my early works have been criticised by great authorities, I am able to show that they are supported by others; and what is of course of even more importance, that they are in accordance with the facts.

THE END

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